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Full text of "The argument, a priori, for the being and the attributes of the Lord God, the absolute One, and First Cause"

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Shelf No. 

Register No. \ t 

; 1907 






IcUprint of tijc Sixti) or ^cists 

piSTCi! ds A/og Tasai /AIV ayuiat 
6 dnQgui -ruv aycjgal, /i<rrj5 
Ka/ XVASKST crccn-)) ^ A/oj 
ToD ya^> xa/ yscoj iffj&iv. 



Him we men never pass over 

Unmentioned. All streets are full of God, 

And all meeting-places of men ; the sea is also full, 

And harljours too ; and in all places we all yearn for God, 

For His offspring also are we. 



NT. A PRI01 








K.R.O.S. ; K.7..S. , K.G.S.I.. ; ETC.. KTi\ 



x or 

With a Prrj arc j^.-j-imi on Behalf uf : 

./ Tort>antl<;n, 

liv JAMKS l. r f:QT T HA.RT, F.S.A > 

E n i N B u R a ii : 



T. k T. CLARK, 3s HK..K..K STHKKT. 











F.R.G.S. ; F.Z.S. ; F.G.S.L. ; ETC., ETC. 




<Sixth or Theists (BMtion, 

With a Preface prepared on Mialf of the Trustees of Mrs. Hontiman Gillespie 
of Torbime/nll, 

l!v JAMES URQUHART, F.S.A. (Scox.). 





O 0F.O2! n TO/rVa; rnv xrJa/JMv y.a! Tai-ra rd sv crjrw, o-Jroj 
cisai-oS xai yr^ Kveio; i/--de%(*jv, o\tx sv ;//sMro/r7Vo; vao/j xaroixii , 
oufe I/TO ynouv dvdettiTUV OzeaKiiizru.! ffgofffaoftfvos rivo:, a jroc 
vast ^ur t v xai TVOJJV xai ra TacT-a g-To/Jjfff n EI/OJ a/ /iaro 
i TbH, xaroixsTv SKI KO.V TO T^&Vwcoi/ TTJJ y^g, oe/ tfaj 
; xaiodit; xai rd; (>?ot)saiac rr^ xaro/x/ aj avruv 
TON 0EON, / a^ay= -v]/7i>.af qffnav O.-JTOV xai tvgoitv, xalroiys OT 
T/I/EJ rww xa() 0/xag cro/^rwi j/gjjxaff/* 

ToD yae xa/ ysvof ffffjbiv. 

Two; o\/v -j-TdgyMTSS TOT 0EOT, oix Otpt 
7) ayu*w j X/tfw, ^agay/tar/ rs^v/jc xa/ 
TO 0EION f/ r va< o,ao/of. ST. PAUL. 


The God who made the earth and all things that are in it, He, being 
Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands, 
neither is He served \ty the hands of men, [as if] needing anything, 
Himself giving to all, life, and breath, and all things ; and He made of one 
[blood] every nation of men, to dwell upon all the face of the earth, having 
determined [their] appointed times, and the bounds of their habitation ; 
that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him, and find 
[Him], though He is not far from each one of us, for in Him we live, and 
move and have our being as even some of your own poets have said, 
" For His offspring also are we." 

Being, then, the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the God 
head is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, in graven form [the outcome] of 
art and device of man. 



GILLESPIE. ...... Page vii 








SUB-DIVISION I. The Transitional Attributes. . . f>6 

SUB-DIVISION II. The Relative Attributes. . . 63 









MRS. HONYMAN GILLESPIE, who died iii 1886, 
by her Trust-Disposition and Settlement directed 
her Trustees, as soon as conveniently might be 
after fulfilling certain purposes of the Trust (which 
included munificent benefactions, a continuance 
of like generous acts in her lifetime), to apply a 
specific sum, which formed a considerable part of 
her estate, for the purpose generally of extending 
the circulation of the Works of the Author, her 
late husband, " so as to keep his memory and 
teaching alive." 

The Trustees, at a meeting in December, 1905, 
decided that the time had arrived when this pro 
vision could be proceeded with, and resolved to 
commence carrying it into execution by at once 
reprinting " The Argument, a priori, for the 
Being and the Attributes " (Theists Edition), 



Mr. Gillespic s latest and most important 
work, leaving the others to be taken up at such 
time and in such order and form as the Trustees 
shall deem advisable. 

Besides stating the circumstances under which 
the fresh issue is placed before a thoughtful public, 
the Trustees requested one of their number to 
prepare a suitable Preface. 

In accepting the responsibility, the writer has 
kept before him the fact that his work is not to 
enter into episodes of Mr. Gillespie s family history, 
details of his habits, his domestic life or his friend 
ships, or to give an Appreciation of his life ; but 
to endeavour to convey, as accurately as may be, 
an impression of his character as received, partly 
through reading his written statements, partly by 
considering his known actions, and partly from 
opinions expressed by those still alive who knew 
him personally. Neither is it the writer s pro 
vince to enter into the merits of Mr. Gillespie s 
various books, but to make such references to 
them as will indicate his teaching. An effort 
has been made to obtain from likely sources all 
information that would help in preparing this 

To the attentive reader of any important book, 
the motive which called it forth, the circumstances 
under which it was written, and the character and 
environment of the author are always of interest. 


The universal testimony to the great, almost 
unique, value of "The Argument, a priori" 
justifies the belief that any such information 
regarding Mr. Gillespie s Life and Works will be 

William Gillespie (afterwards named William 
Honymau Gillespie) was born at Glasgow in 1808. 
His father was Richard Gillespie, of South Wood- 
side, Renfrewshire, a descendant of the Gillespies of 
Ballemore in Cowal, Argyllshire. On both sides of 
the house Mr. Gillespie traced his lineage from the 
Scottish nobility, and on one with a temperament 
like his, this fact would probably have influence, 
inspiring him with lofty aspirations, and strengthen 
ing him in habits of self-respect and high moral 

Educated at the High School and University of 
Glasgow, he afterwards followed the profession of 
the law. At the University, where he matriculated 
in 1826, his mind showed a bias towards Logic and 
Natural Philosophy, and in the former subject he 
became a prizeman. The then Lord Rector was 
the distinguished Lord Brougham, and in after 
years they were on terms of scholarly friendship. In 
memory of her husband Mrs. Gillespie in 1876 
endowed a Lectureship in Geology in Glasgow 
University, to be called the Honyman Gillespie 

Great results often spring from small beginnings. 


Naturally reverential, Mr. Gillespie accepted theo 
logical doctrines without much inquiry, until one 
day, in his twenty-first year, when passing along 
the streets of Glasgow, he was attracted by a book 
seller s shop- window wherein a superior edition of 
Hume s philosophical works was exposed for sale. 
A ready purchaser, he soon became a constant 
reader of the Dialogues. They awakened his mind, 
but only to a perturbed condition, and aroused a 
spirit of inquiry. Becoming possessed shortly 
afterwards of a copy of Dr. Samuel Clarke s 
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, his mind, through its perusal, soared to 
lofty conceptions. The study of these two 
authors was the turning-point in his life. He 
was convinced of the existence of God ; but, 
not satisfied with Clarke s argument, he began a 
scientific process of independent inquiry. It 
seemed to him that the argument a posteriori was 
defective, and that what had been written from the 
a priori position was unsatisfactory. He gradually 
concentrated his attention on what he believed to 
be the best methods of proof. Finally adopting a 
method never before attempted, he started from the 
propositions, acknowledged by Atheists and Theists 
alike, that there is Infinity of Extension and Infinity 
of Duration. 

Generally, his investigation proceeded on an ex 
amination of the a posteriori arguments, an inquiry 


into the a priori arguments as demonstrated up 
to that time, a conviction that the a priori method 
should be based on intuition and not obtained 
through the senses, and a series of propositions 
that God exists and is knowable. Encouraged at 
college by the success of a Thesis on these lines 
which drew from his Professor much praise, he 
took pride in his effort, and cherished it. After 
his demonstration of the character of God, he 
discovered that his delineation was in accordance 
with the Divine Revelation made to the inspired 
Prophets of old. 

Joining the lending debating societies of the day, 

O *-3 

Mr. Gillespie devoted himself to contributing papers 
on theological discussions, particularly in regard to 
questions of infidelity. He soon was recognised 
as an enthusiastic controversialist of the first rank, 
and easily took his place in public as an accredited 
opponent of Atheism. His hands became full, for 
he had many opponents, infidel notions being 
popular and rampant at the time. 

At an early date he began to recognise that the 
work of his life was to present an unassailable 
argument that God is. He was convinced that the 
weakness of the position of the Theists was that, 
up to that time, they had not proved their case 
by an accurate demonstration. 

In later years he frankly gives his reasons for so 
dedicating his life, when he refers to " his duty in 



reference to the Master s work to be done in the 
world at this present time," adding " Let no man, 
therefore, suppose that the Editor embarked in his 
undertaking hoping for the thanks of the wise in 
science or the mighty in divinity. He works with 
other sort of reward in view than is obtainable 
from the savants of either kind. And, if the 
Absolute Disposer of all events shall continue, 
through the medium of the same human instru- 


mentality, to awaken to the consciousness of the 
better light from Heaven, now one here, now one 
there each one of whom, with his big brain, is 
sure to become a centre of ideas in this huge, living 
panorama the worker has the reward he coveted." 
His great book assumed its present shape by a 
process of evolution, although the full idea was long 
in the author s mind. As each division appeared, 
he awaited its criticism, continued to test the 
strength of his efforts, compared its value with that 
of others on the same and kindred subjects, recon 
sidered, readjusted, and built upon it, until, in 
majestic grandeur and solemnity, there developed, 
after years of thought, reason, and patient applica 
tion, his ideal of the finished Argument, a priori, 
which he claimed to be the end of the Theistic 
controversy. The first part appears to have been 
presented to the public in 1833. It relates to (1) 
the Being and the Natural Modes, and (2) to the 
Intellectual Attributes, and forms the groundwork 


on which the rest is based. A learned critic de 
scribed the treatise as " The hardest, closest, most 
irrefragable argument we have seen for many a day, 
and, so far as we have discovered, without a single 
weak point." After its trial (during which a Defence 
was published in 1840), at protracted intervals, 
and amid much anxiety, further parts were issued : 
the Propositions relating to the Happiness and the 
Goodness or the transitional Moral Attributes in 
1843; the relative Moral Attributes in 1865, 
described in "Laws of Thought," 1868, as "A 
course of severe reasoning as strict, indeed, as 
that of Euclid " ; and the Complex or Compound 
Moral Attributes in 1870. These were all published 
together in that same year as the fifth edition, and 
have been described as the book suited to meet the 
arguments of Atheists. Thereafter he proceeded to 
work out to completion his great plan, by writing 
the Transcendent Excellencies, which, added to the 
fifth volume, was published in 1872 as the Sixth 
Edition, or Theists Edition. The latter division, 
which exhibits a high tone of moral and religious 
feeling, is suited to the appreciation of the Believer. 
It contains, further, a general Scholium applicable 
to each division of the Demonstration. 

Mr. Gillespie more than once gave a reason for 
the difference of style in the latter part of his book, 
the change having been objected to by several 
critics. He says, "The first part might be repre- 


sen ted by the fixed skeleton generally ; the other 
portion being likened unto the flesh and blood, and 
all the outward adornments of the structure, as a 
living organism, in all the glow of high health and 
beauty. . . . The earlier Scholia concern the Being 
whose existence is in course of being proved ; while 
the later Scholia have much to do with Man and 
his concerns. . . . The truth about the Being of 
beings, as He is in Himself, is simple, and capable 
of being clearly stated in few words. But with Man s 
entrance on the stage, a complicated and confused 
state of affairs is superinduced, and, by comparison, 
a deluge of words becomes necessary, and requires 
to be excused." 

Writing in regard to this completed work, he 
says, "If this our demonstration be, as it is 
commonly admitted by its students to be, an 
impregnable, logical construction : if it be, in 
truth, a demonstration equal to a mathematical 
certainty (as it is confidently declared to be), 
mark what follows." He then proceeds to deal 
with those who desire to refute the existence 
of a Holy Lord God, and with those who will 
not concede that Nature herself had an actual 
commencement, being created in the thoughts of 
God. Proceeding, he says, " The course of the 
reasonings is duly completed, so that there is now 
existent a finished performance, wanting nothing 
and coming to its proper and natural ending. . . . 


While the ages roll on this argument will exist, 
for it is founded upon a rock which cannot be 
moved." In after years, he writes, " A whole 
generation of mortal men has passed away since 
I brought out the original edition of a work 
professing to demonstrate the existence of a God. 
During all these years the Atheists of this Island 
have been endeavouring to find an actual flaw 
in my demonstration, but in vain. Mr. Bradlaugh 
and those who simultaneously attacked the demon 
stration went to loggerheads with each other 
about the really weak spot, charging each other 
with signal failure in not having properly selected 
fit and proper places to be assailed." 

Some of Mr. Gillespie s critics, besides making 
many other objections to his book, have complained 
that he has gone outside his province in his 
Scholia in regard to the finality of punishment 
in Hell, which implies that the .soul of unregenerate 
Man is not immortal, and in regard to the sexual 
nature of God. On the other hand, others have 
complained that he has not demonstrated the exist 
ence of evil, the value of prayer, the forgiveness of 
sin, the Incarnation and the Trinity ! 

Mr. Gillespie, in 1834, married Miss Elizabeth 
Honyman, daughter of Sir Richard Honyman, 
Bart., and heiress of entail of the estate of 
Torbanehill, Linlithgowshire. She succeeded to 


the estate in 1842. Despite much personal atten 
tion given, for many years afterwards, to matters 
connected with the estate and with litigation in 
which he had become involved, two of the cases 
being carried to the House of Lords, Mr. Gillespie, 


who had now retired from his professional duties, 
devoted all the time at his command to his life s 

In 1840 he published the first edition of "The 
Examination," which, with other treatises, ulti 
mately appeared in one volume in 1843, and again 
in 1863, and in 18G5 under the title of "The 
Necessary Existence of God." The author, speak- 
ino- of the last edition, mentions that the corisecu- 


tive treatises given there may, not without reason, 
be held to constitute an entire, compact body 
of information respecting the a priori method. 
Really the predecessor of the Fifth Edition of the 
Argument, it consists of an inquiry into the 
defects of the a posteriori arguments, reviews 
of Demonstrations by Locke and others, an 
Examination of " The Refutation of the Argument, 
a priori" and other Papers. 

:< The Truth of the Evangelical History of our 
Lord Jesus Christ proved in opposition to Dr. 
Strauss, the chief of modern disbelievers in Revela 
tion," was issued in 1856. This book only pro 
ceeded to a certain stage, and, after Mr. Gillespie s 
death, was reissued by his widow in 1875, under 


the appropriate title of " The Distinctive Designs 
of the Four Evangelists." These titles explain its 
nature. A critic writes, " Mr. Gillespie has done 
here against anti-supernaturalism, what, in a pre 
ceding and masterly work, he has done against 

Absolutely confident in his position, he three 
times challenged the champions of infidelity to a 
public discussion once in Edinburgh in 1837, 
when he was met by an abortive attempt from 
the other side, and again in Glasgow in 1838 
where, in his opinion, he was faced by a foeman 
worthy, who wrote under the -title of " Antitheos," 
and who might be said to have represented the 
Atheists of Scotland. A summary of this controversy 
appears in "The Necessary Existence." Lastly, in 
1867, he challenged Mr. Bnidlaugh, as the accredited 
champion of Atheism in this country. The results 
are found in a volume published in 1872, entitled 
" Atheism or Theism," where Mr. Gillespie claimed 
victory on a field from which his foe had withdrawn. 

Various lesser works may be mentioned. A 
volume of poetry, entitled " The Origin of Evil : a 
Celestial Drama," was published anonymously in 
1873. A second edition, issued by his widow, 
followed in 1875. The leading theme is meant to 
be a warning to Atheists. Mr. Gillespie joins with 
others in upsetting certain Miltonic theories. His 

suggestions are, that evil sprang in the mind and 


was therefore, originally, purely intellectual, not 
moral ; and that the Devil and his Angels were 
not cast into Hell at first but to palaeontological 
earth, and were there when man was created. 
A trace of playful grimness reveals itself here, 
as in some of his other less important writings, 
that shows he possessed a fair sense of humour. 
A book entitled, "The Theology of Geologists," 
a pamphlet entitled, " On the Proveableness of a 
God," another on "The Absurdity of Materialism," 
and a few Brochures, complete the list. 

In his later years Mr. Gillespie, naturally 
unobtrusive and unostentatious, lived in- com 
parative seclusion, principally at Stirling. In 
1875 he passed away, and was buried on the 
grassy slope of a little knoll in the picturesque 
cemetery there, a suitable resting-place, his mother 
having been born at Kippen, a village in the 
county of Stirling. An imposing monument, with 
a suitable inscription, marks the grave. A beauti 
ful stained-glass memorial window was placed by 
his widow in the Kippen Hall, a public building 
which was one of her many benefactions. Equipped 
with a valuable library, this Hall was associated 
with the memory of Mr. Gillespie s mother, whose 
death shortly preceded his, and to whom he was a 
devoted son. Stirlingshire can claim many men 
of eminence since the days of George Buchanan, 
the prince of Scotland s scholars. 


Although not written by Mr. Gillespie, there 
are two works published, the first on his behalf, 
and the second on behalf of his widow, which 
should be noted. One is a pamphlet entitled, " A 
Vindication of the Argument, a priori" by the 
Rev. Dr. Adamson, Edinburgh, issued in 1872, arid 
the other, " The Historic Aspects of the A Priori 
Argument," by Dr. Cazenove, Sub-Dean and Chan 
cellor of the Cathedral Church of St. Mary, Edin 
burgh. The latter, consisting of four public lectures 
delivered in 1884, and published in 1886, was 
arranged through the generosity of Mrs. Honyman 
Gillespie, who intended them to form the first 
series of a Lectureship. 

Like all men of strong individuality who 
have risen above the commonplaces of life and 
dared to take a lead in public questions of con 
troversy, Mr. Gillespie had many detractors ; and, 
like such others, he correspondingly attached to 
himself many warm admirers. In 1860, shortly 
after the settlement of the famous Torbanehill 
Mineral Case, which began in 1852, and was 
described as an arduous and unparalleled contest, he 
was presented with an address by many who knew 
him intimately as well as by other friends. So 
numerous were the subscribers that the signatories 
had to be restricted to one hundred of the well- 
known names. In reading the address one is 
impressed by the unusual number of excellent 


qualities attributed to him. The subscribers 
express their admiration of the ardour, moral 
courage, firmness, fortitude, and perseverance, in 
combination with prudence and wisdom, with 
which he conducted his case. They declare that 
he has displayed unshaken confidence in the 
Attributes of the Great Supreme as the righteous 
moral Governor whose Providence extends not 
only to the world as a whole, but particularly to 
the affairs of moral agents created after the image 
of the Divine Mind, and refer to his firm, unwaver 
ing belief and personal confidence in the faithful 
ness of God. Such valuable testimony cannot be 
lightly considered. Incidentally to this litigation, 
which arose out of a lease of coal in the estate, a 
large body of scientific and practical evidence was 
presented on behalf of the proprietors on the 
question as to whether the Torbanehill Mineral, of 
extraordinary richness in oil which had been 
discovered by the lessees, was a coal or a shale or 
sui generis. Mr. Gillespie s intellect predisposed 
him towards fundamental problems and stimulated 
research along geological lines for the immediate 
purpose of the case, a field of enquiry on which 
having once entered he felt from time to time 
recalled in after life. Among; other recognitions, he 

O O 7 

was elected a Fellow of various scientific societies. 

Mr. Gillespie, who was a man of simple habits, 
was highly conscientious, exact, methodical, and of 


stern impartiality, unswayed by feelings in the 
endeavour to act justly. The protracted nature of 
his intense studies produced long periods of abstrac 
tion, but those coming in contact with him found him 
urbane and considerate. He showed confidence in 
his employes and gave personal attention to their 
needs. He took an active interest in improving the 
cottages of the poor, generously assisted the inmates 
in their financial and other difficulties, and visited 
the sick. He retained his servants from father 
to son. Shy to strangers and clinging to old and 
tried friends, those who understood him best liked 
him most. Where he trusted he naturally expected 
that his interests would be attended to with faith 
fulness, intelligence and accuracy. The masculine 
qualities of his mind were not always appreciated. 
Engrossed with many schemes, some of which were 
never completed, his regard to detail, which often 
caused much deliberation, threw him open to the 
charge of being finical and procrastinating in some 
of his methods. 

Mr. Gillespie had many difficulties to contend 
with in order to reach the daily tenour of his life, 
but obstacles only stiffened his character. His 
writings reveal him to be a man of faith, of 
prayer, of meditation, and of evangelical truth. 
His reasoning faculties were more highly developed 
than the affections of his heart. He was an 
original thinker, of an ingenious, calm, reflective, 


and well-exercised mind, whose intellect, so marvel 
lously analytic and synthetic, carried him into 
cold altitudes of dispassionate reasoning. He 
never wavered in his teaching that the exist 
ence of God is as demonstrable as that (to 
use his own words) the three inside angles of 
a triangle are equal to two rectangles. He 
never faltered in his writings, for he never 
doubted his mission. Opposition to his teaching 
braced him to scrutinise more closely every link 
of his argument, persevere with his deliberate 
pen in a merciless combat with his opponents, and 
press forward the claims of what he believed to be 
the truth. He invariably replied to all completed 
works which sought to demolish his arguments. 
As he proceeded with his life s work he saw more 
clearly the perfect consummation of the Archetypal 
plan, for any mist in his mind gradually dispelled ; 
indeed he seemed to attain to what might be called a 
naked brain. These characteristics, unconsciously 
and gradually made him a man apart and out 
of personal sympathy with social life. To add 
to his loneliness, Mr. Gillespie had no children to 
enrich his nature and brighten his home. 


We are often too apt to value a gift by con 
siderations of our appreciation of the messenger 
who brought it. Curly le (perhaps prophetically 
describing himself us portrayed in after years 
by Froude) in his essay on Burns writes of 


the poet as appointed to hold a great light guid 
ing humanity. One gathers that Mr. Gillespie 
valued his mission more than himself and gladly 
would stand behind his great argument and be 
overlooked, holding up the truth he taught to his 
fellow beings, if only he thereby convinced them of 
the certainty of an Eternal Father. 

From the material at the writer s disposal enough 
has been extracted to interest and satisfy a serious 
reader. There has been an advantage in consider 
ing Mr. Gillespie s life and writings at this interval 
of time. Circumstances which once assumed pre 
ponderance are now forgotten. We are in a better 
position, and are enabled with a better balance, to 
consider justly the merits. 

As the effect of a picture is seen by standing at 
a proper distance from it and in a good light, so 
now one can view the lineaments of Mr. Gillespie s 
character; and, as the effect of a completed structure 
of noble proportions can be better judged after the 
scaffolding is taken down, and the style of architec 
ture defined in bold relief amid the clear light of 
day, so now (amid the debris of much that was 
ephemeral) one can estimate the value of Mr. 
Gillespie s teaching. 







Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing. Page 1 

PROP. II. Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible. . 2 

Prolegomena. . . . . .2 

Demonstration. . . . . .3 

Scholium. . ... 4 

COROLLARY from Proposition II. Infinity of Ex 
tension is necessarily immoveable. . . 4 

Prolegomena. . . .4 

Demonstration. . . . . .5 

Scholium. . . . . .5 

III. There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension. 6 

IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of 

unity and simplicity. . . . .7 

Corollary. . . . . . .9 

Scholium. . . . . . .10 

SUB-PROPOSITION. The Material Universe is Jinitv 

in extension. . . . . .10 

Postulata. . . . . .10 

Demonstration. . . . . .15 

Scholium. . . . . . .17 

General Scholium as to Extension. . . 20 

Sub-Scholium. . . . . 21 





PROP. V. There is necessarily but one Being of Infinity of 

Expansion. .... Page 22 


PROP. I. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing. . . 24 

II. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible. . 25 

Prolegomenon. . . . . .25 

Demonstration. . . . . .25 

COROLLARY from Proposition II. Infinity of Dura 
tion is, necessarily, immoveable. . . .25 

Prolegomenon. . . . . .25 

Demonstration. . . . . .26 

III. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration. . 26 

IV. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of 

unity and simplicity. . . . . .27 

Scholium I. . . . . . .29 

Corollary. . . . . . .29 

Scholium II. . ., . . .29 

SOB-PROPOSITION. The Material Universe is finite 

in duration. . . . . .30 

Prolegomenon. . . . . .30 

Demonstration. . . . . .31 

Scholium. . . . . . .33 

COROLLARY from Sub-Proposition. Every succes 
sion of finitely extended substances is finite in 
duration. . . . . . .34 

V. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of 

Duration. 36 



PROP. I. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion 

and Infinity of Duration. . . . Page 38 

Scholium. . . . . . .41 

II. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity <>f 

Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. . 43 
III. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of 

Expansion and Infinity of Duration. . . .44 

Scholium. . . . . . .44 

Epilegomenon. . . . . .45 



PROP. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 

Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent, and All-knowing.. 46 
Prolegomena. .... .46 

Demonstration. . . . . .47 

Scholium. . . 48 


PROP. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, All- 
powerful. . . . . . . .4!) 


PROP. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, 
necessarily, entirely Free. . . . .52 

Scholium. ... . 54 

Epilegomenon . . . . .55 




PROP. I. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and 
of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and 
entirely Free, is, necessarily, completely Happy. Page 56 
SUB-PROPOSITION. The Simple, Sole, Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is 
All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and 
completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good. 58 
Scholium. . . . . . .60 

Epilegomenon. ... .63 


SCHOLIA PR^:POSITA. . . . . .63 

Scholium I. ... . . 63 

Scholium II. . . . . . .65 

PROP. II. God is, necessarily, True. . . . 67 

Prolegomenon. . . . . .67 

Lemma. . . . . . .68 

Postulatum. . . . . . .72 

Demonstration. . . . . .72 

COROLLARY from Proposition II. God, who is True, 

is, necessarily, Faithful. . . . .76 

Lemma. . . . . . .76 

Demonstration. . . 77 




PROP. III. God, who is True, and Faithful, is, necessarily, 

inflexibly Just. .... Page 79 

Lemma. . . . . . .79 

Demonstration. . . . . .82 

Scholium I. Man, as a Moral Being inhabiting the 
Earth. ...... 90 

Scholium II. The indissoluble connection between 
Morality and Happiness, and Immorality and 
Misery. ... 96 

Scholium sub Scholio II. . . . . 106 

Scholium III. The Justice of the Future. . 108 

I. Shall there be a Future State for Man ? . 110 
II. How shall Justice be administered in the 

Future State ? . . . .115 

ill. Shall Future Punishment be Eternal ? .119 
( OROLLARY from Proposition III. God, who is True, 
ami Faithful, and inflexibly Just, is, necessarily, 
altogether Righteous. .... 134 

PROP. IV. God, who is True, and Faithful, and inflexibly Just, 
and altogether Righteous, is, necessarily, All-Loving, 
yea, Love Itself. . . . .138 

Prolegomenon. . . . . .138 

Lemma I. . . . . . . 139 

Lemma II. . . . . 140 

Demonstration. .... 140 




PROP. IV. Scholium I. An important difference between Pro 
positions II. & III., on one side, and Proposition 
IV., on the other. .... Page 150 

Scholium II. Other vital differences between 
Propositions II. & III., and Proposition IV. . 155 

Scholium III. Shall the Rewards of the Good, and 
the Punishments of the Evil, be to all Eternity 1 161 

Scholium sub Scholio III. .... 168 

Epilegomena. ..... 171 



PROP. 1. As God, the Lord, is the Best, so He is, necessarily, 

the Wisest of Beings. . . . .174 

Prolegomena. . . . .174 

First Demonstration. .... 176 

Scholium after First Demonstration. . . 178 

Second Demonstration. . . . .179 

Corollary from Second Demonstration. . .180 

Scholium after Second Demonstration. . . 181 

General Scholium as to Wisdom. . . . 181 

Epilegomenon. . . . . .188 

PROP. II. God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, is, neces 
sarily, of ineffable Moral Purity. . . . 188 

Prolegomena. . . . . .188 

Demonstration. ..... 190 

Scholium. The Moral Purity, what it fundamen 
tally involves, and really consists in. . .193 

Sub-Scholium. 202 



PROP. III. God. the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, and of 
ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, the Holiest 
One. ..... Page 204 

Prolegomena. ..... 204 

Demonstration. . . . . .210 

Scholium I. The Holiness and Sin not abso 
lutely contradictory correlatives. . . 216 

Scholium II. The Holiness and never-ceasing 
Sin incompatible. .... 218 

Scholium III. The negative Moral Purity, 
and the positive Holiness, in fundamental 
agreement. ..... 219 

Epilegomena. ..... 221 


PROF. 1. The Lord God, who is the Holiest One, is, neces 
sarily, the Self-Beaiitifid, and the All-Perfect 
Being. ...... 

Scholium. ..... 

PROP. II. The Lord God, who is the Self-Beautiful, and the 
All-Perfect Being, is, necessarily, the Ever-Blessed 
One. . . . . . .239 

Prolegomena. ..... 239 

Demonstration. ..... 242 


Summary of positions in the demonstration. . 248 

Application of the Summary of positions in the 
demonstration. .... 251 









Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing. 

1. Even when the miiid endeavours to remove 
from it the idea of Infinity of Extension as really 
outwardly existent, it cannot, after all its efforts, 
avoid leaving still within it the idea of such infinity. 
Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace 
this idea, that is, conceive the external Infinity of 
Extension non-existent; every one, by a ivtlrx 
examination of his own thoughts, will find it is 
utterly beyond his power to do so. 

2. Now, since, even when we would remove 


the notion of Infinity of Extension, as existing, 
out of our minds, we cannot but leave the notion 
of it behind ; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of 
Extension is necessarily existing : For, Every thing 
the existence of which we cannot but believe, is 
necessarily existing. 

3. To deny, therefore, that Infinity of Exten 
sion necessarily exists, is to utter a downright 

4. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily 

Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible. 


1. To say, Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
indivisible, is as much as to say, the parts of 
Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible 
from each other. 

2. Indivisible, in this Proposition, means 
indivisible either really or mentally: For there 
can be no objection to a real, which would not 
apply to a mental divisibility ; and a mental 
divisibility, we must suppose, would imply an 
actual divisibility, of Infinity of Extension. 

3. The Proposition, then, is to the effect, that 
the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily 
indivisible from each other really or mentally. 



1. That which is divisible really, may be 
divided really : and a thing which is actually 
divided from another must have superficies of its 
own, every way, and be removed or separated from 
that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance. 
If any one should say that things, really divided 
from each other have not real superficies of their 
own, every way ; to be able to believe him, \ve 
must first be able to believe this, that a thing can 
be, and not be, at the same time, and in the same 
place : And if any one should say that things 
which are really divided from each other, which 
have real superficies of their own every way, can 
possibly be conceived as without a certain distance, 
however little, being between them ; as this, 
it could as soon be believed that, in a good 
syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from the premises. Being really 
divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the 
same thing. 

2. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of 
separation : As it is an utter contradiction to say. 
Infinity of Extension can be separated ; that is, a 
part of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain 
distance, from Infinity of Extension ; there remain 
ing Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken 
away : a the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, 

a Prop. I. 2. 


being removed from the remaining parts to these 
very same parts ; the part, thus, being at rest while 
it is taken away ; a the part so moved away, being 
moved away from itself; it still remaining, inas 
much as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension ; a 
that is, though moved away, being not moved 
away : Which could not be, unless it be false, that 
whatever is, is, where it is, and when it is. As it 
is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of 
Extension can be separated, so it is an utter 
contradiction to say it is not indivisible. 

$ 3. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily 


The parts of Infinity of Extension being 
necessarily indivisible from each other ; it is a 
necessary consequence, that the thing, the parts of 
which are divisible from each other, is not Infinity 
of Extension ; nor any part of it : part, in the 
sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise 
Infinity of Extension can have no parts. b 

Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable. 

1. Infinity of Extension is necessarily immove- 

Prop. I. 2. i> Prop. II. Dem. 2. 


able : This is equal to saying, the parts of Infinity 
of Extension are necessarily immoveable among 

2. And immoveable, in the Corollary, means 
immoveable either really or mentally. 

3. The Corollary, therefore, lays down, in 
effect, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are 
necessarily immoveable among themselves really 

or mentally. 


1. Motion of parts, that is, the motion of the 
parts of a thing as among themselves, supposes, 
of necessity, separation of the parts. He who does 
not see that motion of parts among themselves 
supposes, or presupposes, of necessity, separation 
of the parts, need never be expected to see the 
force of the dialectical inference, that because every 
A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal to A. 
And, Infinity of Extension being necessarily 
incapable of separation, a is, therefore, necessarily 
immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily 
immoveable among themselves. 

2. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily 



The parts of Infinity of Extension being neces 
sarily immoveable among themselves ; it is a 
necessary consequence, that the thing, the parts of 

a Prop. II. Dem. 2. 


which ore moveable among themselves, is not 
Infinity of Extension ; nor any part of it : part, 
in the sense of partial consideration only, for other 
wise Infinity of Extension can have no parts. a 


There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of 

1. Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or 
(which is at bottom the same thing) w r e conceive 
it to subsist, without a support or substratum : or, 
it subsists not, or (which is the same thing) we 
conceive it not to subsist, without a Support or 

2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist with 
out a substratum, then it is a substance. And if 
any one should deny, that it is a substance, it so 
subsisting ; to prove, beyond contradiction, the 
utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy 
him to show, why Infinity of Extension is not a 
substance, so far forth as it can subsist by itself, or 
without a substratum. 

3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny 
that Infinity of Extension exists, b so there is, on 
the supposition of its being able to subsist without 
a substratum, a substance or being of Infinity of 
Extension necessarily existing : Though Infinity of 

a Prop. II. Dem. 2. i> Prop. I. 3. 


Extension, and the being of Infinity of Extension 
are not different, as standing to each other in the 
relation of mode and subject of the mode, but are 

4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist 
not without a Substratum, then, it being a con 
tradiction to deny there is Infinity of Extension , a it 
is a contradiction to deny there is a Substratum to it. 

5. Whether or not men will consent to call 
this Substratum Substance or Being, is of very 
little consequence. For, tis certain that the word 
Substance, or Being, has never been employed, 
and can never be employed, to stand for any thing 
better entitled to the application of the term than 
the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. But to 
refuse to give such Substratum that name, being 
a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name 
Substance or Being. 

6. Then, there is, necessarily, a Being of 
Infinity of Extension. 


The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
of unity and simplicity. 

1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
indivisible, 1 " therefore it is of the truest unity. For 

* Prop. I. 3. b Prop. II. Dem. 2. 


to affirm that though it is necessarily indivisible, 
even so much as by thought, yet it is not of the 
truest unity, is to affirm what is no more intel 
ligible than would be the assertion, that a circle, 
this being a figure contained by one line, with 
every part of that line or circumference equally 
distant from a certain point, is not round. 

2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
of the truest unity, so it is necessarily of the utmost 
simplicity. For what more can be included in 
simplicity than is implied in unity caused by a 
thins; beino 1 necessarily indivisible, we can have no 

o O J 


3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of 
Extension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a 
being of Infinity of Extension,* so, this supposed, 
that being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without 
a Substratum ; that we cannot, without an express 
contradiction, deny, that the Substratum is of the 
truest unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most 
easily demonstrated. 

5. For it is intuitively evident, that the Sub 
stratum of Infinity of Extension can be no more 
divisible than Infinity of Extension itself. And 
if any one should affirm that though Infinity of 
Extension is necessarily indivisible, yet that its 
Substratum can be considered as divisible, we could 

a Prop. III. 3. 


in) more assent to the proposition than we could 
believe that a subject can never be truly pre 
dicated of itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of 
Extension is necessarily indivisible,* so is its 

6. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily 
of unity and simplicity because necessarily 
indivisible, 15 its Substratum is so likewise, for the 
same reason. 

7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity 
of Extension subsists not without a Substratum, 
there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Exten 
sion, so, this supposed, that Being is necessarily 
of unity and simplicity. 

8. Then, the Being of Infinity of Extension is, 
necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 


The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being 
necessarily indivisible, 1 that is, its parts being 
necessarily indivisible from each other : it is a 
corollary, that its parts (parts, in the sense of 
partial consideration ouly, d ) are necessarily immove- 
able among themselves : For the same reason that 
the parts of Infinity of Extension arc necessarily 
immoveable among themselves, because necessarily 
indivisible from each other. 

a Prop. II. Dem. 2. : Prop. III. $ 4 & Jj 5. 

b Supra, 1 & 2. ll Prop. IV. 5. 



On the whole, therefore, the thing, the parts of 
which are divisible from each other, is not the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension, nor any part 
of it : And, the thing, the parts of which are 
moveable among themselves, is not the Substratum, 
nor any part of it : Part, in the sense of partial 
consideration only. a 


The Material Universe is finite in extension. 

1. If, now, it should be alleged, that the 
Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension, the 
falsity of the allegation may be made to appeal- 
most evidently. That is to say, the application of 
positions already demonstrated, directed to the fact 
of Matter, (in the case of those who shall, or may, 
object the fact,) enables the reasoner to make 
manifest, by incontestable proof, that the Material 
Universe is truly not of Infinity of Extension, but 
finite in extension. 

2. For, if any one should affirm, that the 
Material Universe is truly of Infinity of Extension ; 
his affirmation might be made in one or other of 
two ways. To wit, either by way of an assertion 

!l Prop. IV. 5 . 


grounded on reasons : or, as being an assertion 
made without the support of any reason at all. 
The allegation, in this latter case, being made 
simply because the alleger pleases and for no 
better reason, or any other reason whatsoever. 
Tis first affirmed, that the Material Universe and 
Infinity of Extension are so related to each other, 
that this does not exist without that ; and, next, 
it is admitted, that the affirm er of the close 
relation betwixt those two can assign no reason 
for his assertion of the existence of the relation 
save his own good pleasure. 

3. Now, as to the second of those alternatives, 
no more need be said about it. What is arbitrarily 
affirmed without any reason, and indeed reasonable 
ness, may, much more, be denied with sufficient 

4. As to the other member of the alternative, 
the position, to wit, that the Material Universe is 
of Infinity of Extension, as a position grounded on 
reasons, that is, necessary reasons, because, to 
speak of reasons other than necessary, were futile 
and absurd. De facto, or a posteriori, or mere 
empirical, reasons are out of the question in a case 
beyond the limits of all possible human experience, 
through the medium of sensation. Only reasons 
derived from the necessary relations of our ideas 
can avail. As to the position in question, we 
repeat, as one grounded on d priori reasons, it will 


be found, by that psychological experience which 
is here admissible, that no reason can be assigned, 
but one ; because, to wit, the Material Universe is, 
i.e., must be considered to be, the Substratum of 
Infinity of Extension. No other reason whatever, 
tis deliberately repeated, can be assigned : none 
can be imagined. The Material Universe is, or 
rather must be, of Infinity of Extension, by reason 
of its being the Substratum of Infinity of Extension : 
that, or some position or other, directly resolvable 
into that, is the one only reason which can possibly 
be advanced, or thought of. Which he who 
pleases, may know, or verify by experience : One 
may try the question in the interior of his own 
mind ; and, should the experimentalist happily 
discover some additional reason, let him be sure to 
remember other folk, not by any means so 
fortunately situated, by making his discovery 
widely known. 

5. The Material Universe is of Infinity of 
Extension : and the reason is. because the Material 
Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 
Therefore, the proposition which really comes 
before us for examination is this, The Material 
Universe is the Substratum in question. Yea, the 
upholders of the dictum, that the Material Universe 
is of Infinity of Extension, will be among the 
foremost to maintain that the Material Universe is 
that Substratum : since, on any other supposition, 


there would unquestionably be an Extension 
besides the extension of Matter; and this is the 
very thing which these men are most determinedly 
(not to say, madly) set against as a position which 
they can by no means endure. In truth, the 
supposition of the existence of Extension, yea, of 
Infinity of Extension, apart from Matter, or distinct 
from the extension of Matter, would render it a 
piece of pure idleness, on the part of the supposer, 
to hold that Matter is of Infinity of Extension. It 
is only to get quit of an extension distinct from 
that of Matter that the assertion, Matter is 
infinitely extended, is made. Introduce the other 
and separate extension, as necessarily existing, and 
all reason for holding by the infinite extension of 
Matter is gone. 

6. The Material Universe is the Substratum 
of Infinity of Extension : this, then, is the proposi 
tion for examination. And, after due reflection, it 
will become evident, as it is in itself incontestable, 
that to contend that the Material Universe is the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension, is tantamount 
to another contention, the other being this, The 
Material Universe is a thorough plenum of Infinity 

O L / 

of Extension. The proof, too, which will serve to 
evidence the unsoundness, and utter falsity, of the 
one proposition, would also suffice to demolish 
every vestige of the other position. 

7. That the Material Universe is the Substratum 


of Infinity of Extension, will, indeed, be maintained 
if it be contended, and only if it be contended, that 
the Material Universe is a thorough plenum of 
Infinity of Extension. This is very evident, as, 
bv a thorough plenum of matter, must be meant 
a material plenum in which no empty interstice, or 
hollow vacuity, (actual or possible, by compres 
sion, or otherwise,) can be : the two factors, the 
Substratum, to wit, and the plenum, being 
perfectly, and at all points indissolubly, coincident. 
For, the supposition of a plenum in which there 
are, or can be, true vacuities, would be the supposi 
tion of no true plenum at all, and would avail 
nothing. A plenum (if one could rightly call 
it so) with vacuities, or any one vacuum, however 
small, could not serve as the Substratum of 
Infinity of Extension, in which no vacuum, nor 
division of any kind whatever, is conceivable. a 
The plenum, then, must be held to be with 
out the possibility of any vacuum, when we 
speak of a thorough plenum of Infinity of 
Extension as being the Substratum of Infinity 
of Extension. But, on the other hand, to 
contend that the Material Universe is a thorough 
plenum which is the equivalent of an absolute, 
or completely incompressible, solid of Infinity 
of Extension, would be (as has been said) equal 
to the affirmation that the Material Universe 

a Prop. IV. Schol. 


is, verily, the Substratum of Infinity of Exten 

8. Those postulates being thus laid down, the 
advance to the demonstration itself may be most 
satisfactorily accomplished. 


1. If, then, it should be maintained, that the 
Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of 
Extension : (which will be maintained, as is most 
evident, if it be contended that the Material 
Universe is truly of Infinity of Extension, that is, 
is a thorough plenum of Infinity of Extension ;) 
to put to the proof, whether or not the Material 
Universe can be such Substratum, we have but to 
ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe 
divisible from each other ? and, Are they moveable 
among themselves ? For, if they be so divisible, if 
so moveable, then the Material Universe cannot 
be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. a 

2. Now 7 , we know, of a certainty, that some 
parts of the Material Universe are divisible from 
each other; and, as far as we know, every part of 
it to which our minds could be directed is as 
divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know 
are divisible : and this is the conclusion to which, 
by the rules of philosophy, we are entitled to 

a Schol. under Prop. IV. 


3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be 
the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 

4. Again, we are certain, that some parts of 
the Material Universe are moveable among them 
selves ; and, that every part of it to which our 
minds could be directed is as moveable, as are the 
parts which we certainly know are moveable, is 
(here, as in the other case) what we are entitled to 

5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe 
cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Exten 

6. And, if, because the parts of the Material 
Universe are divisible from each other, it is proved 
that it is not the Substratum of Infinity of Exten 
sion ; then, because the parts of the Material 
Universe are divisible from each other, and 
moveable among themselves, it is proved, much 
more, (if that were possible,) that the Material 
Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of 
Extension. It is proved, that the Material 
Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of 
Extension ; nor any part thereof, for the Sub 
stratum of Infinity of Extension can have no parts 
but in the sense of partial consideration : a that is, 
that the Material Universe is finite in extension. 
For, were it of Infinity of Extension, it would be 
the Substratum thereof. But it being not that 

a Prop. IV. 5. 


Substratum : Therefore, it is not of Infinity of 

7. The Material Universe, then, is Jinite in 


1. It has been manifested, that an infinitely 
extended plenum of matter, with hollow gaps, 
would not serve as the Substratum of Infinity of 
Extension. a A Substratum of Infinity of Extension 
can have no vacua, nor divisions, nor even divisi 
bility, of any sort. b In truth, a material substratum 
of Infinity of Extension, with empty interstices in 
it, would be no fit substratum, nor, indeed, sub 
stratum at all: yea, a j^cnum, with vacua, would 
be no plenum, or, at most, a, plenum only in words. 
But even were one to suppose such a plenum, and 
such a substratum, to exist, the supposition would 
be made to little purpose. For, while such a 
plenum, and substratum, could not serve as the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension, the Infinity 
of Extension itself must be conceived to have an 
adequate (or indivisible) substratum of its own, if 
there be a substratum at all. An adequate Sub 
stratum would, in short, necessitate a Substratum, 
as without external limits, so without internal 
interstices. Ab intra, no less than ab extra, there 
must be no pure vacuum. The supposition, in 

a Sub-Prop, prececl., Postal. 7. > Prop. IV. Sehol. 

c Prop. IV. 5. 


question, would, therefore, be made in vain ; or, 
rather, it would be worse than in vain, and fruitless, 
since it would be fruitful of very undesired con 

2. As it is here, so it will be there. Why, 
then, should any one suppose, even as the merest 
hypothesis, that, although matter have, or may 
have, vacuous spaces interspersed through it, or in 
it, (a supposition this involved in the position of 
the divisibility and moveability of matter,) matter 
yet has no general boundaries ? Why suppose 
divisible and moveable, and, therefore, possibly 
vacuous, matter to be infinitely extended in that 
imperfect sense ? It has been demonstrated, that 
matter is finite in extension.^ What, then, would 
avail such a blind hypothesis ? What could avail 
the hypothesis of a plenum, with vacua, but without 
general limits, that is, without vacuum all around 
the limits of matter as a whole, seeing that the 
circumferential spaces of every internal vacuum 
bound, or limit, the material extension all round 
the circumference make, in fine, the matter finite ? 
The necessity of the concession of extension finitely 
extended in such respect, makes it of no moment 
to contend that the extension generally, or as a 
whole, is infinite. Extension infinite generally, or 
without general boundaries, but with interspersed 
hollownesses, were not true infinite extension 

a Sub- Prop, preced., Dem. 6. 


(which implies fulness) but, at most infinity, in 
number, of finite extensions : each one of the 
empty interstices bounding, or limiting, or makiug 
finite, the extension all round the circumferential 
spaces. A single vacuum, indeed, anywhere in the 
Material Universe would destroy plenitude : all the 
lines converging on the vacuum, great or little- 
would be stopped by its circumference. The exten 
sion of the matter would be infallibly arrested, 
whenever the rim, or superficies, of the vacuum 
were reached. 

3. In fine, to allege, that Matter, or (if you 
will) a plenum of matter, exists, with so many, or 
not so many, i.e., infinitely numerous, vacua con 
tained in it, and interspersed throughout it, as a 
whole ; were simply a form of the position, Matter 
is finite in extension. If matter be finite in this 
regard, it is worth no one s while to contend for 
its infinitude in the sense of no general boundaries. 
In fact, accept, or admit, (and who, after the 
preceding demonstration, can deny ?) the fmiteness 
in extent, in the one sense ; and what could be the 
purpose to be served in asserting, that matter is 
infinite in extension, in the other sense ? Gener 
ally, and to all practical intents, that which is 
divisible much more, that which is moveable, is 
finite in extent. 



1. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of 
its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, being 
necessarily indivisible from each other, a and im- 
moveable among themselves : b and the parts of 
the Material Universe being divisible from each 
other, and moveable among themselves : and it 
therefore following, that the Material Universe is 
not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but 
is finite in extension : c Here are two sorts of 
extension. The one sort, that which the Material 
Universe has : And the other, the extension of 
Infinity of Extension. And as Infinity of Exten 
sion is necessarily existing, d and as the extension 
of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in 
the extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part of 
this, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, 
(part, but in the sense of partial consideration ; a ) 
must penetrate the Material Universe, and every 
atom, even the minutest atom, of it. 

2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish 
between these two kinds of extension. And, 
accordingly, let us confine to matter, namely, to 
the distance of the extremities of matter from each 
other, the name extension; and apply to the 

a Prop. II. Dem. 2, & Prop. IV. 5. 

b Coroll. from Prop. II. Dem., & Coroll. under Prop. IV. 

c Prop. IV. Sub-Prop. Dem. 6. d Prop. I. 2. 


extension of Infinity of Extension, a part of which 
(part, in the sense of partial consideration only, a ) 
penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, or 
corpuscular monad, the name Expansion. 

3. And, therefore, every thing which hath 
been proved to be true in relation to that exten 
sion which matter has not, must be true with 
regard to Expansion. 


1. Penetration, as evidenced in the foregoing 
General Scholium, being postulated, a most im 
portant result makes its appearance. Infinity of 
Extension Expansion, rather, or its Substratum, 
(if there be one,) penetrates matter : hence, we have 
the fact, and the doctrine, of Spirituality coming 
to the surface. That which intimately penetrates 
matter all matter, of whatever kind is, of course, 
immaterial : and it is no unwarrantable step farther 
to take, to advance that the Immaterial Being or 
Substance (a Substance, on any supposition* 3 ) which 
penetrates all matter, may be called a Spiritual 
Substance : in one word, a Spirit. 

2. Therefore, there has been proved to be a 
Spiritual Substance of Infinity of Expansion. And 
if any one should prefer to speak of such as being 

a Prop. II. Dem. $ -2. 

> Prop. III. 3, & 5, with Gen. Schol. 3. 


an Infinite Spirit, no fault would, or righteously 
could, be found with such a mode of speaking. 

3. Thus, there is existing necessarily a Spiritual 
Substance, or Spirit, of Infinity of Expansion, or, 
in other words, an Infinite Spirit. 

4. But although the Spirituality of the 
Necessary Being of Infinity of Expansion has been 
manifested, it will not be requisite or expedient to 
introduce, in express words, the element of the 
Spirituality at every stage, and carry it expressly 
along from point to point. It shall suffice to 
know, and bear in mind, that the principle, in con 
nection with the Being of Infinity of Expansion, is 
always latently present ready, when necessary, to 
be evoked, and drawn from potentiality into 
actuality. The principle may be referred to once 
more in the course of this Division. But, at all 
events, the element shall nowise be neglected 
when, at a future stage, there shall be a 
summarizing, to a certain extent, of the various 
more salient elements of the entire demonstration. 31 


There is necessarily but one Being of Infinity of 

1. Infinity of Expansion either subsists by 
itself, or it subsists not without a Substratum. 15 In 

a See the concluding General Scholium, 4, &c. 

b Prop. III. 1, compared with Gen. Schol. as to Extens. 3. 


both cases there is necessarily a Being of Infinity 
of Expansion.* Now, we are under a necessity of 
inferring from the existence of such a Being, that 
there is but one such Being. 

2. For, as tis evident, there can be but one 
Infinity of Expansion, so, on the supposition that 
it subsists by itself, and so is a being, b there can be 
but one being of Infinity of Expansion. And, as 
tis evident there can no more be more than one 
Substratum of Infinity of Expansion (whatever 
that Substratum is) than there can be more than 
one Infinity of Expansion ; and as, therefore, tis 
evident, there can be but one Substratum of 
Infinity of Expansion : so, on the supposition that 
Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a 
Substratum, or Being, there can be but one Being 
of Infinity of Expansion. 

3. And, therefore, any one who asserts he can 
suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, 
each of Infinity of Expansion, is no more to be 
argued with than one who denies, Whatever is, is. 
The denying of this proposition cannot, indeed, be 
regarded as more curious than the affirming of the 

4. Then, there is, necessarily, but one Being of 
Infinity of Expansion. 

a Prop. III. 3, & 4, 5, & Gen. Schol. 3. 
h Prop. III. g 3, & Gen. Schol. 3. 
c Prop. III. $> 4, 5, & Gen. Schol. 3. 




Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing. 

1. The truth of this is evident from the same 
sort of consideration as shows there is necessarily 
Infinity of Extension ; to wit, that, even when we 
endeavour to remove from our minds the idea of 
Infinity of Duration, that is, Infinity of Duration 
a parte ante and a parte post, we cannot, after all 
our efforts, avoid leaving this idea still there. 


Endeavour as much as we may to displace the idea, 
that is, conceive Infinity of Duration a parte ante, 
or a parte post, non-existent, we shall find, after a 
review of our thoughts, that to do so is utterly 
beyond our power. 

2. And since, even when we would remove 
the conception of Infinity of Duration from the 
mind, we necessarily leave the conception of it, as 
existing, behind ; tis manifest, that Infinity of 
Duration necessarily exists : Because, Every thing 
the existence of ivhich we cannot but believe, is 
necessarily existing. 

3. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily 


Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible. 


This Proposition is equivalent to another : to 
wit, The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily 
indivisible from each other ; and indivisible really 

or mentally. 


1. As was laid down before, what is divisible 
may be divided ; and that which is divided from 
something else must have superficies, every way, 
and be separated from the other thing, be the 
distance ever so small. There is no difference 
between being divided and being separated. 

2. Then, divisibility meaning possibility of 
separation : Because the parts of Infinity of Dura 
tion are necessarily inseparable, they are necessarily 

3. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily 

Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, immoveable. 


The Corollary is tantamount to this proposition, 
The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily 
immoveable among themselves, really or mentally. 



1. Motion of the parts, among themselves, of 
Infinity of Duration, would necessarily involve 
separation of its parts. And its parts being 
necessarily incapable of separation, a are, therefore, 
necessarily immoveable among themselves. 

2. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily 


There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 

1. Either, Infinity of Duration exists, or is 
conceived to exist, without a substratum ; or, it 
exists not, or is conceived not to exist, without 
a Substratum. 

2. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, 
it is a substance. For should any one deny that it 
is a substance, if it so exist ; we shall prove, past 
contradiction, the absurdity of the denial, by just 
demanding the reason -why Infinity of Duration is 
not a substance, if it exist without a substratum, 
or by itself. 

3. And therefore, as there is necessarily In 
finity of Duration , b there is, supposing it to exist 
by itself, a substance or being of Infinity of 

a Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. 2. b Part II. Prop. i. 2. 


Duration necessarily existing : Infinity of Duration 
and the being of Infinity of Duration being 
identical, not different. 

4. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not 
without a Substratum, there is a Substance or 
Being of Infinity of Duration. For the word 
Substance or Being can never, it is certain, stand 
for anything having a better claim to the applica 
tion of the term than such Substratum. 

5. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily 
existing,* so there is necessarily a Substance or 
Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition 
that it exists not without a Substratum. 

6. Then, there is, necessarily, a Being of 
Infinity of Duration. 


The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, 
of unity and simplicity. 

1. As Infinity of Duration is necessarily 
indivisible, 13 so it is necessarily of the truest unity. 
For, if what is necessarily indivisible, even by 
thought, be not of the truest unity, what unity 
consists in is altogether unintelligible. 

2. And since Infinity of Duration is necessarily 

* Part II. Prop. i. 2. b Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. 2. 


of the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost 
simplicity. Because, we can have no conception 
of what is in simplicity, that is not in unity 
caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible. 

3. And as there necessarily is a being of 
Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that 
Infinity of Duration exists without a substratum, a 
so, this supposed, the being is necessarily of unity 
and simplicity. 

4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a 
Substratum ; that the Substratum is of the truest 
unity and utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult 
to be demonstrated. 

5. For, that the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration is no more divisible than Infinity of Dura 
tion, is a self-evident truth. Therefore, because 
Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible, b so is 
the Substratum. 

6. And Infinity of Duration, because neces 
sarily indivisible, being necessarily of unity and 
simplicity, its Substratum, for the same reason, is 
so likewise. 

7. And as there necessarily is a Beino- of 

T /> 

Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that 
Infinity of Duration exists not without a Sub 
stratum/ 1 so, this supposed, the Being is necessarily 
of unity and simplicity. 

a Part II. Prop. iii. 3. c Supra, 1 & 2. 

b Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. 2. i Part II. Prop. iii. 5. 


8. Then, the Being of Infinity of Duration is, 
necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 


The Substratum of Infinity of Duration bein^ 


necessarily indivisible,* that is, its parts being 
necessarily indivisible from each other ; it is a 
necessary consequence, that the thing, the parts of 
which are divisible from each other, is not such 
Substratum, nor any part thereof. 


It is a corollary from the proposition, The parts 
of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are 
necessarily indivisible from each other, that they are 
necessarily immoveable among themselves : Just as 
Infinity of Duration is necessarily immoveable, 
because necessarily indivisible. 


And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration being necessarily immoveable among 
themselves ; b it is a necessary consequence, that 
the thing, the parts of which are moveable "/////// 
themselves, is not such Substratum, nor any part 

a Part II. Prop. iv. 5. b Coroll. preced. 



The Material Universe is finite in duration. 

Just as it will be maintained, that the Material 
Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, 
if it be contended that the Material Universe is 
truly of Infinity of Extension ; so, it will be held, 
that the Material Universe is the Substratum of 
Infinity of Duration, if it be alleged that the 
Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of 
Duration, d parte ante. To contend that the 
Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of Dura 
tion, a parte ante, is tantamount to holding that 
there is an indissoluble bond which we are under 
a necessity of conceiving ; so that the Infinity of 
Duration cannot be conceived to have existed 
without the Material Universe, the correlate. Now, 
such a position, regarding an indissoluble bond in 
our conceptions between Matter and Duration, 
would be held in the face of the notorious and 
decisive fact, that no such bond has any existence 
whatsoever in our conceptions. But not to rest on 
the undoubted and readily evincible fact in 
psychological experience, that the human mind can 
most easily conceive the non-existence, from 
Infinity of Duration, past or to come, of Matter ; 
no bond, which can anywise represent a necessary 


bond or relation, can be imagined, other than the 
relation between the two of Mode and Substratum, 
whereby the Infinity of Duration stands for Mode, 
(Quality, Property, Attribute, anything, in fact, 
you like,) and the Matter bears to the other the 
relation of Substratum or Substance. Tis posited, 
in fine, by the maintairiers of the fact of the 
indissoluble bond in our conceptions between the 
Infinity of Duration and the Matter, that the 
Infinity of Duration cannot be id cst, cannot be 
conceived to be without the Matter, because this 
is the Substratum of that, the Mode. 


1. If, then, it should be held, that the finitely a 
extended Material Universe is the Substratum of 
Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; (which 
will noticeably be held, if it be alleged that the 
Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of Dura 
tion, ct, parte ante;) to put to the proof whether or 
not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, 
or a part thereof, we have but to ask, Arc the parts 
cf the Material Universe divisible from each other ? 
and, Are they moveable among themselves ? For 
if they be so divisible and moveable, the Material 
Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration, nor any part thereof, lj the Substratum 

a Part I. Prop. iv. Sub-Prop. 

b Part II. Schol. I. & n. under Prop. iv. 


having 110 parts in the sense of capability of 

2. Now, we know, certainly, that some parts 
of the Material Universe are divisible from each 
other; and that every part of it to which our 
minds could be directed is as divisible, as are the 
parts which we certainly know are divisible, is the 
conclusion to which the rules of philosophy entitle 
us to come. 

3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the 
Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part 

4. Again, we know, certainly, that some parts 
of the Material Universe are moveable among 
themselves; and that every part of it to which our 
minds could be directed is as moveable. as are the 
parts which we certainly know are moveable, is 
(in this, as well as in the other case) the conclusion 
to which we are entitled to come. 

5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot 
be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any 
part thereof. 

6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in 
duration. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, 
it would be the Substratum thereof, or, at least, 
a part of the Substratum. But it being not 
that Substratum, nor any part of it : Therefore, 
it, of itself, is not of Infinity of Duration, but 

;i Part II. Prop. iv. 5. 


is finite in duration. So it began sometime to 

7. Thus, the Material Universe is finite in 


1. To state, in few words, the result of the 
whole reasoning on the topic introduced by the 
Sub-Proposition, set down above : The truth is, 
that, while Matter, or (if you prefer it) the 
Material Universe, is emphatically the divisible, 
and the moveable ; Duration, or Infinity of Dura 
tion, is the subject to which the predicates, divisible, 
moveable, are totally inapplicable. The ideas of 
the two things, Duration, and divisibility by 
separability of parts, are absolutely incompatible. 
And, on the other hand, Matter is simply another 
word for that which is divisible in every sense, or 
in every possible way. How, then, can the one 
that which is so divisible be so bound up with 
the other that to which the idea of division, or 
divisibility, of any sort, is so utterly repugnant 
as that the two tilings must be always associated 
together ? The plain truth is, that the notion of 
such junction is purely preposterous. 

2. When, therefore, one shall be met with 
maintaining, or consequentially implying, by any 
position he may maintain, that the Material 
Universe, as a substance, or existence of any sort, 


the parts of which are divisible from each other, 
and moveable among themselves, in every variety 
of way ; can be, and is, the substratum of that 
other thing, Duration, even Infinity of Duration, 
to which it is ridiculous to think of applying the 
notion of divisibility at all, (far less, moveability of 
parts from parts : ) what are we to make of the 
allegation ? Examine well, and, if it be clear that 
the propounder of the dictum is seriously in 
earnest, then there is plainly a case, not for any 
doctor of philosophy, but for a doctor of medicine, 
exclusively and imperatively. And as a philosopher 
labouring under a manifest intellectual delusion 
has never been found, in any age or country, to 
be the most eligible company ; the sooner so 
unprofitable perhaps, so dangerous companion 
ship is dissolved, the better for the party whose 
headpiece is yet unshattered and entire. 


Every succession of finitely extended substances 
is finite in duration. 

1. Should it, now, be asserted that any suc 
cession, or successions, of substances finite in 
extension ; finite in extension, for not to say, 
that there can be but one Substance, or Being, of 


Infinity of Extension, a a succession of substances 

a Part I. Prop, v., & 3, Gen. Schol. under Prop. iv. 


of Infinity of Extension were we know not what : 
Should it be asserted, that any successions, or any 
one succession, of substances say, of animals, or 
vegetables, or minerals, or all together, or of 
worlds, or of systems of worlds, or systems of 
germs of worlds is of Infinity of Duration ; the 
falsity of the assertion is, immediately and abund 
antly, apparent. For, seeing that the whole finitely 
extended Material Universe, itself, is finite in 
duration, a every succession of substances which 
are in the Material Universe (and, of course, there 
can be no substances finite in extension which are 
out of it) must, therefore, be finite in duration, 

2. Should it be pertinaciously alleged yet 
farther, that not substances in the Material 
Universe, but such a world, as one actually 
existing whole, is but an item in a succession of 
worlds, or germs of worlds, having no beginning, 
or being of Infinity of Duration a parte ante : then, 
the ready answer would be, that a succession (of 
whatever kind) does, most obviously, involve 
motion, or things moved ; since successions, or but 
a single course of succession, implies, by the very 
nature thereof, motion, things succeeding each 
other, being things moved in relation to each other. 
Now, things (successions, as you will, of motes, or 
molehills, or mountains, or worlds, or systems of 

a Sub-Prop, preced. 


worlds, or systems of germs of worlds) which are 
moved, cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration, nor any part of it : a and, therefore, can 
not be of Infinity of Duration, but are tied down 
to finiteness in duration. 1 * But an answer, over 
whelmingly potent, is at hand, as a preliminary bar 
to any such supposition as is set down. The over 
whelming preliminary is this : After all, such a 
succession of Universes as that ex hypothesi 
advanced, would be but our own old Material 
Universe, itself, in disguise. The supposed succes 
sion of worlds emerging, one by one, from the depths 
of eternity, would be nothing more than the 
Material Universe under one of its conceivable (if 
it be conceivable) or possible phases, or as a system 
of primordia rerum renewing itself, phoenix-like, 
over and over again. And we have seen, that the 
Material Universe itself is finite in duration. 13 

3. Every succession of material substances, is, 
then, finite in duration. 


Iliere is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity 
of Duration. 

1. Infinity of Duration either exists without a 
substratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum : c 

a Part II. Prop. iv. Schol. n. b Supra, Sub-Prop. Dem. 6. 
c Part II. Prop. iii. 1. 


And in either case, there necessarily is a Being of 
Infinity of Duration.* And we are under the 
necessity of inferring from the existence of such a 
Being, that there can be no more than one such 

2. Because tis manifest there can be but one 
Injinity of Duration, therefore, on the supposition 
that it exists without a substratum, and, so, is a 
being, b there can be but one being of Infinity of 
Duration. And because tis as manifest there can 
be but one Substratum of Injinity of Duration 
(whatever the Substratum is), as that there can be 
but one Infinity of Duration ; and because, there 
fore, tis manifest there can be but one such Sub 
stratum : therefore, on the supposition that Infinity 
of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or 
Beinor there can be but one Beino; of Infinity 

o o y 

of Duration. 

3. Then, there is, necessarily, but one Being 
of Infinity of Duration. 

> Part II. Prop. iii. i$ 3 & 5. Part II. Prop. iii. 3. 

Part II. Prop. iii. 4. 




There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion and Infinity of Duration. 

1. This will be demonstrated, if it be proved, 
that the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of 
Expansion, and the necessarily existing Being of 
Infinity of Duration, are not different Beings, but 
are identical. 

2. Now, either, Infinity of Expansion subsists 
by itself, and, then, it is a Being : a and, Infinity 
of Duration exists by itself, and, then, it is a 
Being. 1 

3. Or, Infinity of Expansion subsists not 
without a Substratum, or Being : c and, Infinity of 
Duration exists not without a Substratum, or 
Being. d 

4. To take the former alternative. Every 
part of Infinity of Expansion being in every part 
of Infinity of Duration, every part of the Being 
of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the 

a Part I. Prop. iii. 1 & 3, compared with Gen. Schol. 3. 

b Part II. Prop. iii. 1 & 3. 

c Part I. Prop. iii. 1 & 5, and Gen. Schol. 3. 

d Part II. Prop. iii. 1 & 4. 


Being of Infinity of Duration. And every part 
of Infinity of Duration being in every part of 
Infinity of Expansion, every part of the Being of 
Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Being 
of Infinity of Expansion. Part, in all the cases, in 
the sense of partial consideration only. 

5. To-wit, The whole of Infinity of Expansion 
being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the 
whole of the Being of Infinity of Expansion is in 
the whole of the Being of Infinity of Duration. 
And, The whole of Infinity of Duration being in 
the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the whole of 
the Being of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of 
the Being of Infinity of Expansion. Whole, in 
every instance, but as a figure. 

6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, 
if the Being of Infinity of Expansion and the 
Being of Infinity of Duration be different ; it 
necessarily follows, that they are identical. 

7. That is, Infinity of Expansion is Infinity 
of Duration, and Infinity of Duration is Infinity 
of Expansion. Which conclusion being plainly 
absurd ; and it necessarily following irom the 
supposition, that Infinity of Expansion subsists by 
itself, and that Infinity of Duration subsists by 
itself, it is proved, that the supposition itself is 
absurd. Therefore, Infinity of Expansion cannot 
exist by itself, and Infinity of Duration cannot 
exist by itself. 


8. Then, to turn to the other alternative, 
Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Sub 
stratum, or Being : and Infinity of Duration 
subsists not without a Substratum, or Being. 

9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion 
is in every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, 
every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expan 
sion is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity 
of Duration. And, as every part of Infinity of 
Duration is in every part of Infinity of Expansion, 
therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity 
of Duration is in every part of the Substratum of 
Infinity of Expansion. Part, but in the sense of 
partial consideration. 

10. That is, The whole of Infinity of Expansion 
being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the 
whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion 
is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of Dura 
tion being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, 
the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration 
is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of 
Expansion. Whole, in all the cases, used figura 

11. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, 
if the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expan 
sion, and the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of 
Duration, be different, it follows necessarily, that 
they are identical : To- wit, the Substratum, or 


Being, of Infinity of Expansion is, also, the Sub 
stratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration. 

12. And this being proved, it is demonstrated, 
there is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion, and Infinity of Duration.* 

13. Then, there is, necessarily, a Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 


1. Combinations of the alternatives might have 
been made other than those presented in Sections 
2 & 3, in the preceding Proposition. Two sets of 
combinations are there given ; but a third set might 
have been added. It is not thought necessary, 
however, to state the additional combinations of 
alternatives, in a formal manner, and as positions 
demanding consideration far less, rigid discussion. 
Those other combinations of alternative proposi 
tions, going to constitute the third set, would be. 
at best, only stupid and inept methods of saying 
virtually the things over ao-ain which were said 

J O O 


2. Exempli gratia, if one should contend that 
Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself, and that 
such is to be combined with Infinity of Duration, 
which exists not without a Substratum, and which 
has for its Substratum the self-subsisting Infinity 

a Supra, 1. 


of Expansion : what were this, at bottom, but a 
way of imperfectly and clumsily stating what 
comes, and amounts, to the same thing as the 
conclusion actually arrived at, by a more unobjec 
tionable method, a The Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity 
of Duration ? 

3. Again, were one to simply reverse matters, 
and urge that the Infinity of Duration it is which 
exists by itself, and that the Infinity of Expansion 
it is which subsists not without a Substratum, the 
Substratum being the Infinity of Duration : what, 
in the way of conclusion, would be really advanced 
(so far as there is truly any comprehensible sense 
in the statement) more than what is alleged already 
when it was said, as the demonstrated conclusion, b 
There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion, and Infinity of Duration ? 

4. Besides, and as the preliminary fatal objec 
tion to such supposita (which have undoubtedly 
their own inherent and ineradicable impossibilities :) 
No good reason can be given why either of these 
arbitrary, and ungainly, combinations should be 
preferred to the other. Why should one be allowed 
to hold, that Expansion can subsist, or exist, by 
itself, more than Duration can be self-subsistent, or 
self-existent : or, that Duration can exist, or subsist, 
by itself, more than Expansion can do so ? It is 

a Vide preced. Prop., 11. b Vide, ibid., 12. 


absolutely indispensable that a rational pretext 
should be set up, or laid down, for the preference, 
since, Whatever (a thought in your mind, as much 
as one in mine, or his) Whatever begins to be must 
have a cause. And no rational pretext whatever 
can be given in this case, i.e., for a preference of 
the one unseemly combination to the other. Try 
all you can to hit upon a sufficient reason, and, 
in the end, confess the truth that tis really so : no 
reason for a preference is discoverable. 


The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity 
of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and 

1. The Being of Infinity of Expansion is, 
necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 8 And, the 
Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of 
unity and simplicity. 13 And these two being not 
different, but identical, it follows, that the Being 
of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration 
is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 

2. Then, the Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity 
and simplicity. 

a Part I. Prop. iv. 8, compared with Gen. Schol. 3. 
b Part II. Prop. iv. 8. c Part III. Prop. i. 11. 



TJiere is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 

1. There is, necessarily, but one Being of 
Infinity of Expansion.* And the Being of Infinity 
of Expansion being also the Being of Infinity of 
Duration, 13 it follows, that there is, necessarily, but 
one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity 
of Duration. 

2. Then, there is, necessarily, but one Being 
of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 


We may, for an instant, evoke here the always 
latent principle or element of Spirituality. It has 
been shewn, that there is an Immaterial or Spiritual 
Substance, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion ; 
and there is but one such Substance or Beiug. d 
It has been demonstrated, too, that the Being 
of Infinity of Expansion is, also, of Infinity 
of Duration, 6 and that there is but one such. f 
Consequently, as there is one, so there is 
but one, Immaterial or Spiritual Substance, or 

a Part I. Prop. v. 4. J Part I. Prop, v., and Gen. Schol. 

b Part III. Prop. i. 11. e Part III. Prop. i. 

c Part I. Sub-Prop., Sub-Schol. * Part III. Prop. iii. 


Being, of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of 


Here endeth the consideration, as of the BEING, 
so of the Natural, or Physical Modes or Attributes. 
Those Attributes are also Absolute and Simple. 




The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent, 
and All-knowing. 


1. To try to define Intelligence, would be a 
vain effort. That which Consciousness, directly 
and always, testifies, while thought goes on, is best 
evidenced by Consciousness itself. Thought is 
best explained by being left without endeavour 
at explanation. 

2. The same holds with regard to knowing. 
What to know is, or essentially involves, is best 
come at by keeping silence to the outward ear, 
and letting the voices within be alone heard. 

3. If you understand wherein Intelligence, 
Thought, Consciousness, Knowledge, as subjective, 
or without reference to aught beyond the mind 
itself, consists, farther than Consciousness itself 


doth immediately testify ; thrice happy and 
fortunate, as well as most peculiar, are you, who 
ever you be. If, however, none of us can ascend 
higher up, or go farther in, than the testimony 
itself of Consciousness ; tis because the secret in 
the Cogito is the ultimate to us all. 


1. Now, that the Simple, Sole, Being of In 
finity of Expansion, and of Duration, is Intelligent, 
will not be a thing very difficult to demonstrate. 
For Intelligence either began to be, or it never 
began to be. 

2. That it, absolutely speaking, never began 
to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, 
in the sense of there never having been any 
Intelligence whatever before, it must have had 
a cause ; for, Whatever begins to be must have 
a cause. And the cause of Intelligence must be 
of Intelligence ; for, there having been no Intelli 
gence whatever before, What is not of Intelligence 
cannot make Intelligence begin to be. Therefore, 
if Intelligence began to be, there was Intelligence 
before there was Intelligence. Now, Intelligence 

O O 

being, before Intelligence began to be, is a contra 
diction. And this absurdity following from the 
supposition, that Intelligence began to be, it is 
proved, that Intelligence never began to be : to- 
wit, is of Infinity of Duration. 


3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Dura 
tion, and supposes a Being: And no succession of 
substances, or beings, is of Infinity of Duration : a 
It necessarily follows, that there is one Being of 
Infinity of Duration which is of Intelligence. And 
as there is but One Being of Infinity of Duration : b 
and this Being is of Simplicity : c and is also of 
Infinity of Expansion : d It follows, that the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and 
of Duration is necessarily of Intelligence. 

4. And that this Being is All-knowing, is no 
inference from the proposition, that the Simple, 
Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration is necessarily of Intelligence, for it is, 
indeed, implied by such proposition : A Being of 
Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, is convertible with an All-knowing 

5. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, 
Intelligent, and All-knowing. 


1. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, being Intelligent, 6 is a 
Mind, a Mind conscious of Itself. An intelligent 

a Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub- Prop. 

b Div. I. Part ii. Prop. v. 3. c Div. I. Part ii. Prop. iv. 8. 

d Div. I. Part iii. Prop. I. 11. e Dem,, prceced. 


being that is not a mind, being all the same as an 
intelligent being that is not, in any proper sense 
of the term, intelligent : And a mind which is not 
conscious of itself, being just a mind which is not 
deserving of the name of mind at all. 

2. Perception without the power of apperception 
Consciousness of thoughts, without there being- 
thought objective to the subjective thought which is 
conscious ; would be 110 evidence of the existence 
of a mind, in any thorough sense of the term 
standing for the true idea of a Mind.* To be con 
scious of consciousness, is to have the mind, as 
conscious subject, and the objective thought of 
which the mind is conscious : this much, at the 
least, is implied in the very being of thinking with 



The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, 
i i ecessa rily , A ll-powe rful. 

1. This must be granted, if it be shown, that 
the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, made matter 
begirt to be. 

a Vide, infra, Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. 14, aliosq; loc. 


2. Then, as the Material Universe is finite in 
duration, a or began to be, it must have had a cause ; 
for, Whatever begins to be must have a cause. 
And that cause must be, in one respect or other, 
the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing ; b inas 
much as, what being, or cause, other than, or 
independent of, that Being, could there be ? 
And therefore, that Beinsj made matter begin 

7 O O 

to be. 

3. The momenta expressed, or implied, in the 
proof are these : The Material Universe is finite 
in duration, a or it began to be. Whatever begins 
to be must have a cause : Therefore, the Material 
Universe had a cause. Besides the Simple, Sole, 
Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, 
there was ere the Material Universe began to be 
no substance or being : at any rate, none 
admissible on this platform. Whereon no sub 
stance or being is introducible without sufficient 
warrant in the premises, to wit, the previously 
established posita, or supi^osita having independent 
necessary supports. Therefore there existed no 
Substance or Being to be the cause of the Material 
Universe, other than the necessarily existing 
Intelligent Substance or Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and Duration. Therefore, again, this 
Substance or Being was, and must have been, the 

a Div. I. Part ii. Sub-Prop. * Supra, Part i. 


very Cause, or Creator, of the Material Universe, 
or all matter. 

4. By the common consent of philosophers 
who have flourished since men have been familiar 
ized with the idea of Creation, in the strict and 
proper sense, (in the sense, that is, of a creating 
being simply the making begin to be ofivhat before 
ivas not /) it has been agreed, that to make matter 
begin to be, in other words, to create matter, 
would evince the possession of unlimited power, or 
all power, not involving any contradiction, or 
impossibility, or absurdity of any kind. For good 
reason, did the philosophers, nemine contradicente, 
so agree. If true creation do not prove all-power- 
fulness, this can by no means be proved at all. 
But Creation is the highest conceivable exercise of 
power. Creation is, in truth, the test, and the 
sign, of Omnipotence. In fine, .the Being who 
created all Matter, namely, all the visible, or (as it 
is called) gross matter, and all the particles, atoms, 
sperms, elements, however subtile, visible or in- 

O * * 

visible, solid or imponderable, of matter as men 
see it ; that Being can do all possible things. No 
truth can be plainer. 

5. And it being shown, that the Being in 
question did make matter begin to be, it must be 
granted, that that Being is, necessarily, All- 
powerful. 8 

a Supra, 1, 2, &c. 


6. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Extension and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, 
necessarily, All-powerful. 



The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, ivho is All-knowing, and 
All-powerful, is, necessarily, entirely Free. 

1. This will be evinced, if it be manifested, 
that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All- 
powerful, made motion begin to be. 

2. Now, of all the corporeal substances in 
motion, none of them belongs to a succession of 
Infinity of Duration, every succession of corporeal 
substances being finite in duration. 81 And the 
moving substances being all finite in duration, or 
having begun sometime to be, they must have had 
a cause ; for, Whatever begins to be must have a 
cause. And no first cause can be assigned, or even 
thought of, other than the Simple, Sole, Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 

a Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub-Prop. 


knowing,* and All-powerful. b Therefore, this Being 
made moving substances, or motion, begin to be. 

3. No philosopher, of any age, was ever known 
to call in question the position, that the Being 
causing, or making begin to be, all motion, or 
motion absolutely, is Free, or must be supposed to 
be Free, Free of all outward or extraneous 
influence, i.e., in the truest sense of the word. To 
be the cause of all motion to originate absolute 
motion, is, and has universally been, allowed to 
be the best possible test, and sign, of the posses 
sion of true Freeness. There is the common con 
sent of philosophers : and there is the sufficient 
reason for the universality of doctrine. 

4. Motion involves the existence of bodies, 
and, so, of matter. If there were no bodies, there 
could lie no motion : at any rate, no motion of 
the sole kind which could appear on a platform 
as between Theist and Atheist, or Materialist. 
Motion other than the motion of corporeal things, 
were altogether beside the purpose of this demon 
stration, at least, as at this precise point in its 
progress. Motion, then, implies bodies, or cor 
poreal substances ; bodies, again, imply matter. 

5. The momenta expressed, or involved, in this 
demonstration, are these : Every individual cor 
poreal substance, or body, and every set, and every 
succession, of bodies, in motion, being finite in 

a Supra, Part i. b Supra, Part ii. 


duration, 31 began to be. Whatever begins to be 
must have a cause : Therefore, every moving body, 
or substance, and every set, or succession, of 
moving bodies, had a cause, or creator. Besides 
the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, there was ere motion, all motion, 
be<mn to be no Substance or Beino- whatever in 

O <-> 

existence, except Matter, which, ex hypothesi, was 
at absolute rest. Therefore, there was no sub 
stance, or being, to be the cause, or creator, of 
motion, other than the necessarily existing Intelli 
gent and All-powerful Substance or Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and Duration. Therefore, 
again, this Substance or Being was, and must be 
supposed to have been, the very Cause, or Creator, 
of all the motion which began to be, that is, of 
all motion whatsoever. 

6. And this being manifested, it is evinced, 
that that Being is, necessarily, entirely Free. b 

7. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
and All-powerful, is, necessarily, entirely Free. 


As the Simple, Sole, Being, Mind, or Spirit, of 
Infinity of Expansion and Duration, who is All- 
knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, was the 

a Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub-Prop. 
b Supra, 1, 2, &c. 


cause of all substances that move,* or, in other 
words, all successions of substances, or beings, (for 
tis plain, that successions of beings, as successions, 
are moved ;) therefore, that Being was the Cause of 
the particular successions, or succession, of men. 
To express the same thing otherwise, The Being 
in question made the succession, or successions, 
of those intellectual and moral beings denominated 
men, begin to be. That is, that Being is the 
Creator of men. 


With this Division, the consideration of the 
Attributes called, by a certain licence, the Intellect 
ual Attributes, ends. Those Intellectual Attri 
butes may, moreover, be said to fall under the 
head of the Absolute Attributes. They are, like 
wise, to be classed with the Simple Attributes, or 
those which are not Complex or Compound. 
Lastly, the Attributes being divided according 
to another classification, those Intellectual Attri 
butes fall to be ranged among the Psychical, and, 
among the Psychical, their place is the first. 

a Prop, preced. 2, 3, &c. 





The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All- 
powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, 
completely Happy. 

1. Every position which we cannot but believe, 
is a necessary truth.* But we cannot but believe, 
that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan 
sion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All- 
powerful, and entirely Free, is completely Happy. 
Therefore, that this Being is completely Happy, is 
a necessary truth. The minor proposition of the 
syllogism is the only proposition standing in any 
need of expatiation. The major is an undeniable 
axiom : a and the conclusion is the unavoidable 

a Vide, infra, Div. V. Prop. i. 2. 


$ -. Before we could righteously predicate 
unhappiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All -knowing, 
All-powerful, and entirely Free, w r e would require 
to know of some sufficient reason for the predication. 
But we can know of none. For every kind, and 
degree, of unhappiness must proceed, or be 
resolvable into what proceeds, from some natural 
defect, or imperfection : And what imperfection 
can that Simple Being be subject to, who, Only, 
is of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is 
All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free? 

3. And as we can have no sufficient reason for 
ascribing unhappiness to that Being ; so, on the 
other hand, there is a sufficient reason why we 
cannot help ascribing to It Happiness the most 
complete. For, the Being is a Mind, a conscious of 
Itself: that is, It perceives Its own attributes, or 
perfections, and is conscious of the thoughts 
whereby It perceives them. b How could a Mind 
conscious of perceiving, as appertaining to Itself, 
such attributes as Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, All-powerfulness, entire Freeness. be 
supposed otherwise than as most consummately 
Happy ? 

4. Truly, therefore, we cannot but believe, 

a Div. II. Parti. Schol. 1. 

b Vide, supra, 2, Schol. apud Part i. Div. II. Ac vide, infra, 
Prop. iv. Dem. 14. 


that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, and entirely Free, is completely 

5. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, 
completely Happy. 


The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, ivho is All-knowing, All- 
powerful, entirely Free, and completely 
Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good. 

1. On the supposition, that the Simple, Sole, 
Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, 
who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, 
and completely Happy, created intellectual and 
moral beings indeed, any animal natures what 
ever ; the only motive, or, if you think there were 
more motives than one, one of the motives, to create, 
must be believed to have been, a desire to make 
happiness besides Its own consummate Happiness 
begin to be. And should there be assigned any 
additional motive, it cannot be believed to have 
been incompatible with such desire. The reason 
being very plain : A Mind labouring with incon 
gruous motives cannot be happy. 


-2. But it has been demonstrated that tis the 
case, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, 
created intellectual and moral, or, to employ a 
most comprehensive term, sentient, substances or 

beings. a 

^3. Therefore, the only motive, or, at least, one 
of the motives, to create, must have been, a desire 
to produce creaturely happiness. The will to create 
moral intelligences, in one word, men, involves, 
on the part of the essentially Happy Creating Mind, 
a desire to communicate of or, according to Its 
own. Had there been no such will, the will pre 
supposing the desire, in the Divine Nature, the 
Divine would have remained sole, alone, without 
the creatures. But creation having become an 
accomplished fact, a we can legitimately argue back 
to the indispensably requisite sine qud non conchtio, 
without which the creature-minds must have been 
as impossible as an effect without any cause. 

4. The consequentially necessary connection 
between the consummate Happiness of the Simple, 
Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura 
tion, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely 
Free ; and Its desire to communicate happiness, all 
possible happiness (for there is no sufficient reason 
why we should suppose the amount of happiness to 

"Div. II. Part iii. SehoL, & Div. III. Prop. i. 4. 


be bestowed on the creatures, as creatures, to be 
less than it might be :) the necessary connection, 
we say, is intuitively evident. By no stretch of 
imagination can we conceive, that the Simple, Sole, 
Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, 
who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and completely 
Happy, could be the Free Cause of misery, or aught 
but happiness, to Its creatures : Unless we can 
conceive, that happiness, as happiness, can give 
birth to its opposite ; the cause being wholly 
disproportionate to the effect. 

5. Now, to produce, in consequence of desire 
to produce, all possible creaturely happiness, is to 
be perfectly Good. 

6. From all which, it is most obvious, that the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely 
Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, 
perfectly Good. 

7. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, 
is, necessarily, perfectly Good. 


1. This Proposition as to Goodness, is the 
great transition Proposition. It passes from the 
absolute positions to those which are purely 


relative : itself constituting the link between the 
two sorts. The truly absolute Propositions dis 
course of an unconditioned Being, which, a 
Supreme Mind, yet exists in, and by, and for, 
Itself: while Goodness takes (so to speak) that 
Mind beyond (as it were) Itself, and supplies 
the creaturely objects for the exercise and dis 
play of the relative Moral Attributes or Per 

2. The penultimate Proposition, with its 
positions relating to Happiness, is it is to be 
noted of a different complexion, in that the 
Happiness, strictly considered, is quite an absolute 
thing. That is, the Being treated of in the Pro 
position now in question is consummately Happy 
in Itself. By Itself, it is in possession of complete 
Happiness ; needing, or indeed admitting of, access, 
or the possibility of increase, in essential Happi 
ness, from no quarter whatever ; least of all, 
from the creature, the product of Its own Will, 
and mere good pleasure. But, the Happiness 
overflowing, Goodness, as a distinct thing, is to 
be seen in being, and the creature, in its train, 
is the result. The creature once in conscious 
existence, objects for the manifestation of the 
relative Qualities or Properties of Mind stand out 
as realities. 

3. There may be much propriety in noticing, 
on this occasion, a nice, perhaps, but, withal, very 


important distinction. Remark we, then, that 
Goodness, as appertaining to the Supreme Mind, is 
no such single and simple thing as one might too 
hastily conclude it to be. Goodness has, indeed, 
two sides ; or it may be said to look with two faces. 
On the one side, it may be regarded as the still 
complacency of the Supreme Spirit, disposing It 
contemplatively and abstractly to doings of Benevol 
ence. The other face of Goodness presents us with 
the actual active kindnesses exercised in regard to 
the already existing creature-minds, the images, to 
some extent, of that Supreme Mind. In the first 
way, there is perfect Happiness ready to overflow, 
and, creating, to flood the other with gladness : In 
the second way, the Happiness, so consummate, 
has run over into, being mingled with, acts of 
actual Goodness, by the continuous production of a 
creation with Intellectual and Moral agents capable, 
according to their measure, of happiness them 
selves. The creatures, once in being, are objects 
fitted to be continuously and lastingly receptive of 
the Most Happy Creator s successive communica 

4. But Goodness, as the principle and fount of 
sustained series of actings, belongs rather to 
another head, and the student may be prepared for 
finding Goodness, seen in such light, handled under 
a subsequent Proposition. a 

a Vide, infra, Prop. IV. in this same Division. 



With Proposition I. in this Division, terminate 
the purely Absolute Attributes. As a whole, these 
two Propositions of this Sub-Division constitute 
and exhaust the Transitional, and prepare the way 
for the directly Relative, Moral Attributes. Of 
course, those Propositions carry on the series of 
the Propositions relating to the Attributes which 
are the Simple and the Psychical. 




1. In place of the words, "The Simple, Sole, 
" Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, 
" who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, 
"and completely Happy," as well as "perfectly 
" Good," as occurring in the last section of the last 
Sub-Proposition ; a or in place of any such collection 

a Viz. Div. III. Prop. i. Sub-Prop. 7. 


of words ; for the future, we shall employ the one 
term GOD. That is, so often as is desirable we 
shall do so. 

2. This substitution will be highly advan 
tageous, inasmuch as it will save repetitions of 
words, in clauses consisting of many words. 
Twill be certainly a great object gained, to prevent 
the necessity, ever recurring, of using so many 
words, in cases where each word, or phrase, is 
simply syncategorematic, or a part only of the 
complex term which forms the subject of the 
proposition. In the generality of cases, such 
circumlocutions might be apt to become trouble 

3. There is, too, another consideration. This 
is not a case of mere arbitrary substitution of one 
term for another. For the great majority of 
persons, including many of our best etymologists, 
are firmly of opinion, that the term, " God," is 
tantamount, linguistically speaking, to " The Good." 
If, however, the fact, regarding the etymology, be 
not as is supposed, let the term chosen be if not 
by etymology, by hypothesis, and express adoption 
equivalent to the whole complex term constitut 
ing the subject in such propositions as we have in 
view. Then, having argumentatively compassed the 
existence of The Good One ; we shall henceforth 
employ the word in question as being simply 
equivalent to that Good Being whose existence the 


demonstration has attained to ; namely, The 
necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration ; who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and, 
also, perfectly Good. 

4. The term chosen as substitute has, therefore, 
the great virtue of suitableness. Other etymons 
for the word good have been assigned by the 
learned : not one of them, however, could have 
been selected as an eligible substitute. But 
the term chosen by us is, from its established 
associations in men s minds, admirably adapted, in 
every respect, for the situation it has been fixed on 
to fill. 

5. In fine, in substituting " God," we are in 
possession of a word expressive of an idea tanta 
mount to the last predicate. The term conveys 
the great attribute, the latest element, as yet, in 
the demonstration. A Being, perfectly Good, 
necessarily exists : that is, there is necessarily a 

$ G. It will be understood, therefore, that, so 
often as the term (rod shall henceforth be employed, 
reference is always, though tacitly, nuide to this 
present Scholium. 


1. Again, for the terms themselves, The Simple, 
Sole, Bcirnj of Infinity of Expansion, and of 


Duration, who is All -knowing, All-powerful, en 
tirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly 
Good ; or, for the neuter pronoun " it," as standing 
for these terms, or so many of them ; a or, finally, 
for the substitute noun on which we have fixed ; b 
the word "He" shall, on every suitable occasion, 
be employed to denote the same thing. Not that 
there can be an intention to attach any idea of 
specific sex c to the Being denoted by the more 
noble pronoun : but the one word will be more 
suitable than the other. To us, the inhabitants of 
Great Britain, and, in general, the peoples who 
speak our English tongue, it is more decorous and 
reverential, and in every way becoming, to apply 
the word He to the great d and good e Being in 
question than any such word as it. Such the 
genius and contexture of our language. 

2. It need hardly be observed, that, in sub 
stituting the more noble personal pronoun, in the 
place of the impersonal pronoun " it," and its 
cognates, we shall, of course, embrace, with " He," 
the cognates "His" and "Himself," in the sub 
stitution. And for the justification of the 
employment of "He," "His," or "Himself," in 
every future instance of the use, we shall be 

a As used, ex. gr., in Div. III. Prop. i. 3, & Sub-Prop. 4. 

Vide tfcliol. pneccd. 

c Confer Div. IV. Prop. ii. Schol. 13. 

d Div. I. II. e Div. III. Sub-Div. i. 


understood to make (it may be, silent) reference to 
the sanction accorded by this Second Scholium of 
these Scholia Prceposita. 


God is necessarily True. 


1. Viewed as an affair of language, the pro 
position, God is True, may be taken in one or 
other of two distinct senses. First sense : God is 
True, may be held to mean, that He truly, or in 
truth, or according to truthfulness, is God. So, 
we say, or may say, "This is the True GOD." 
Again : " Ye turned to GOD from idols, to serve 
the Living and True GOD." 

2. Second sense. God is True, may mean that 
He acts truly, or with trueness, or truth, or truth 
fulness. In this way, we may say, " Let GOD be 
True, but every man a liar." Or, " He that hath 
received His testimony, hath set to his seal that 
GOD is True." 

3. These two meanings are not only dis 
tinguishable, but they are quite different, from 
each other. Nevertheless, they may be (for they 
have been) injudiciously blended, or more or less 
confounded together. 

4. Our English word, True, with its two 


meanings, is alleged to be of Anglo-Saxon, and even 
Gothic descent. And there is significance in the 
fact, that the same sort of distinction is preserved 
in the Latin adjectives, Verus and Verax. Of 
course, it is only in the latter of those senses, that 
our Proposition, God is True, is to be taken. The 
Proposition in the other sense has been well, if 
only virtually, elaborated, and, tis trusted, most 
successfully established, in the previous portions of 
this demonstration. 


1. Now, there is one thing involved in, or 
rather implied by, this proposition, which must be 
considered at the very outset. For we can 
righteously advance not so much as a single step 
without the aid of the supposition in view. 

2. The supposition in question whether 
expressed, or only tacitly understood ; for it is by 
no means always necessary that a necessary 
supposition should be formally expressed is, that 
there are objects of God s Truth, objects in relation 
to which God s Truth must be. This becomes very 
evident on reflection : tis a position containing its 
own evidence within itself. The notion of God s 
Truth clearly implies that God has objects for the 
manifestation of that truth. Without these, there 
is palpably no place for the truth. No possibility 
of its existence. God cannot act with truthfulness 


in relation to nothing. Tis, then, quite plain, 

that the supposition in question is actually in 
volved in our Proposition. 

3. And this being so, the distinction of 
absolute Attributes, and relative Attributes, has 
been therefore brought, fairly and thoroughly, into 
the field. Now, the distinction between an 
absolute attribute, and a relative one, lies in this, 
that the former expresses what God is in Himself, 
or without relation to anything beyond Himself, or 
His own Essence : while the latter, or a relative 
attribute, expresses what God is in relation to 
something which exists besides Himself, and be 
yond Himself, as a creature, or, at least, as in some 
way objective. If one wishes to study instances 
of the purely absolute Attributes, choice may be 
made among the predicates of former Propositions 
in Divisions I. and II. of this demonstration. 

4. Tis, therefore, quite plain, that in the Pro 
position God is True, it is involved that there are 
objects. But it is a totally different consideration 
of what character the objects are. These may be 
(observe, it is not said that they must be) creatures, 
that is, Intelligent and Moral creatures ; for no one 
with whom we will have to do will insult mankind 
by contending that God can be considered Truth 
ful in relation simply to mere Animal Natures, 
destitute of intellectual and moral qualities. And 
to speak of Truth in relation to the Vegetable 


World, were lamentably out of the question : while 
to talk of Truth as manifested to any portion of 
the Mineral Kingdom, would be to suggest a sheer 
impossibility, and to mock our understanding by a 
shameless pantheistical absurdity. 

5. The objects of the Truth in question may 
possibly not be creatures like men. Nevertheless, 
some persons would, doubtless, contend, that the 
objects present to the mind, when we treat of God s 
Truth, must needs be creatures like us. These 
persons would assever, None but men, None but 
men can be. We shall (they say) admit the 
existence of no Intellectual and Moral inhabitants, 
whether man-like, or angelic, i.e., having faculties 
analogous to those of men, only higher in degree, 
no inhabitants, we repeat, of any other planet in 
our system or of our own Central Luminary or 
of any other self-luminous Sun or Star or, finally, 
of any other sidereal system among the countless 
constellations, or larger systems, of the wide 
Heavens. So decide these self-confident, most 
rigid humanitarians. Narrow is their horizon : 
within it, themselves the only visibles. But tis 
enough to advance, in opposition to the tenet, that 
only creatures that are men upon this earth can be 
objects of God s Truth, that this tenet has not yet 
been proved to be true ; neither has it been 
rendered at all probable. a 

a Vide, infra, Prop. IV. Schol. ii. 14. 


6. But further : There are objects, indeed, of 
God s Truth ; but whether the object be necessarily 
conceived to be a creature at all, even this must 
be reckoned to be an open question. A question, 
however, on which we mean not at all to enter. 
For, to do so, would involve the entering upon the 
subject of the constitution, the internal constitu 
tion, as it were, of the Godhead ; and it is, as a 
matter of course, far removed from our present 
purpose to investigate such a subject, especially, 
if the investigation should naturally tend to bear 
us to the deepest foundations, in our minds, of that 
most profound of metaphysical topics.* 

7. There is, then, to be supposed the other 
than GOD, in proceeding to our demonstration. 
And in treating of the other than God, we shall, 
for reasons which may be gathered from the pre 
ceding sections, cast out of the account all but the 
intellectual and moral creatures. And, in the next 
place, our view shall be, for the most part, if not 
always, limited to man. For, should we, in any 
place, speak of other creatures, or, in plainer 
language, spirits with intellectual and moral 
natures superior to man s nature ; we shall do so 
as a matter of grace, or of mere hypothesis. \\ e 
shall do so only for the sake of some illustration, 
or for the mere purpose of widening the range of 
our horizon. A statement, indeed, which may be 

a Vide, infra, Prop. IV. Dem. 14, &c. 


found to be more applicable to subsequent places, 
in our demonstration, than to this place. 


1. Let it be granted, not only that the other 
than God exists as objective to Him, but that God 
does, in actual deed, act, or make communications, 
towards the other, the objects being men. 

2. The Postulate now laid down for use in 
this Proposition, shall expressly, or tacitly be 
made to hold with regard to the immediately 
ensuing Corollary, and the Proposition succeeding 
it. But such postulation shall cease whenever we 
shall have arrived at Proposition IV., under which 
the postulated position shall change its character, by 
becoming a proved point. The proof, too, will hold 
with regard to each one of the three specified Pro 
positions alike. For the evidence of all which, weigh 
Scholium I. 1 9, of the Proposition referred to. 


1. We come now to the demonstration itself 
of the truth of our Proposition, God is necessarily 
True. And to demonstrate this, in the exactest 
manner, not a great deal will be required to be 

2. For a mind to be true, is, to consciously 
act as things are, and not as they are not. Tis, 
in a word, to consciously energize in accordance 


with the reality. Now, to act as a thing is, 
requires no foreign element : but it does obviously 
require the introduction of a foreign element, to 
act as a thing is not. God, a Conscious Mind, a 
in acting h as He is, to men as men, goes not 
beyond the reality of things. But suppose it 
otherwise : Suppose, to wit, God consciously 
acting as if He were not what He really is, or as 
if He were what He really is not ; and to men as 
not being what they are, or as being what they 
are not ; you thereby necessitate the introduction 
of a supposition to account for this acting falsely. 
Obviously, you require something out of God, and 
beyond God, to account for His (presumed) con 
scious falseness. His acting truly requires no 
reason no reason certainly beyond the fact, that 
God is God, and men are men. c Can an extraneous 
reason be needed to account for God manifesting 
Himself as God, or for God communicating with 
men as being what they are ? Impossible. But once 
say, that God acts as if He were not God, that is, as 
if He were ceasing to be, or made to cease to be, 
God ; and as if men were no longer men, but non- 
human ; once say, in any form, that God acts 
towards the other than Himself as if He were what 
He is not, or as if the other be what it is not : and 
you have, in the most decided manner, introduced 

a Schol. under Part i. Div. II. Postul. 

c Lemma, 7. 


the necessity of the supposition of a foreign element. 
And what foreign element can there be ? Most 
evidently, there can be none. Out of, or beyond, 
the necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is 
All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, com 
pletely Happy, and perfectly Good, what can there 
be to necessitate His acting falsely ? No such 
foreign element can be assigned, or so much as 
thought of, by the most unbridled imagination in 
its very wildest flight. Tis plain, there can be no 
being independent of that Being : None, therefore, 
to cause Him to energize falsely. 

3. But an additional absurdity would be in 
volved by the introduction of the supposition of 
such foreign element. There is no place for such 
element But on supposition of it, a fresh absurdity 
would come into the field. At all events, the 
absurdity which there unquestionably is, will be 
presented in a somewhat new, and greatly stronger 

4. At this stage, we consider Falsity on its mere 
intellectual side or simply as opposed to the True. 
But under the future a Proposition concerning 
Justice, the False will appear in its true colours, or 
as the Immoral. Yet, although precluded from 
occupying higher ground, by taking in the element 
of morality, still Falsity, Falseness, Falsehood, of 

a Viz. Infra, Prop. III. 


any kind, and of every degree, involves imperfec 
tion in the being who is false. Falseness can only 
have a place in a nature defective in some respect. 
Now, defect or imperfection cannot be supposed in 
God. What defect or imperfection can there be in 
that One Necessary Being, of utmost Simplicity, 
who, being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, 
is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, com 
pletely Happy, and perfectly Good ? 

5. In fine, to suppose God otherwise than 
True, that is, as acting falsely, were equal to the 
absurdity of alleging, that the necessarily Un 
limited One is, in point of fact, limited : most 
limited too. For, no limitation can be greater than 
that defect which would bring about the adoption 
of falsehood. 

G. Thus, even as it is involved in the proposi 
tion, that God is necessarily True, involved in the 
proposition as what it essentially means ; so, it 
has been rigorously demonstrated, 

That God, as a Conscious Mind, acts towards the 
other than Himself, 

As if He is what He is, not what He is not. 

As if the other is what it is, not what it is 

To state the same thing otherwise : 

God must manifest Himself as God. And 
He must manifest Himself to Man as Man. 


Both relations being, at same time, preserved; 
or, in other words, 

God, as God, must communicate with Man, 

as being what he is Man. 

7. So, there is a sufficient reason for our 
position, that God, in acting, must act as things 
are ; and, therefore, we conclude, that God is 
necessarily True. 

8. God, then, is, necessarily, the True. 


God, wlio is True, is necessarily Faithful. 


1. A presupposition is implied by this proposi 
tion, God is Faithful, in addition to the pre 
supposition implied in the preceding proposition. 

2. Faithfulness demands the positing of true 
objects, as well as Truth does. a But Faithfulness 
not only demands objects (specific and peculiar 
objects, indeed), but itself, as subject, necessitates 
the supposition of a thing, not, like a pure object, 
beyond itself. For Faithfulness plainly can only 
come to be exercised with reference to Promises, 
Covenants, or Engagements of some kind. And it 
is not difficult to see that all these are at bottom 
one. A covenant, an engagement, an obligation of 

a Preced. Prop., Lemma. 


any description whatsoever, come under, or entered 
into, by God, is just a promise in another form. 
All the rest are resolvable into the first : Logically 
speaking, the whole genus contains but one species, 
Divine Promise. 

3. As, therefore, there are relative attributes ; 
among the relative attributes, this attribute of 
Faithfulness is by no means the least relative. 


1. In the proof of the Proposition, no great 
measure of force will need to be expended. The 
attribute of Truth being once established, the 
foundations of the Faithfulness have been laid. 

2. Indeed, Faithfulness, as an attribute, 
implies not a great deal more than Truencss. 
Truth is not Faithfulness, but the latter involves 
the former, arid is neither more nor less than an 
application, a particular application, of Truthful 
ness. To be faithful, is to be something more than 
being true, for it is to be true as to engagements 
contracted. Faithfulness is simply Truth as to 

3. As, therefore, tis so that Faithfulness holds 
so directly of Truth, a separate and lengthily drawn 
out demonstration is by no means necessary : such 
might not even be expedient, since it would, or 
might, have a tendency to obscure rather than to 
enlighten farther. If a separate demonstration be 


not absolutely necessary, such might serve the 
same sort of purpose which works of superer 
ogation do ofttimes accomplish : it might give 
birth to the thought, that a mountainous diffi 
culty ought to be removed, where, behold, all 
is a plain already. 

4. A Divine Promise, however, is a serious 
thing. The Faithfulness of God is an attribute 
which, more than many of the attributes, depends 
on, i.e., implies as objective, the other than God : a 
Nevertheless, the faithfulness in question is the 
true heavenly archetype, or (should you object to 
such form of words) the real archetypal ground of 
every law which altereth not. God s Faithfulness 
to a promise, is the God of Truth b Himself with 
reference to a promise. A divine promise, once 
made, is sure, yea unchangeable. A promise by 
God, is God Himself promising. A divine promise 
broken, would be God no longer God, and the 
pledge of intellectual and moral chaos and 
universal ruin. In fine, it is impossible for God, 
having covenanted, to lie, because it is impossible 
that God sliould cease to be. 

5. We cannot hesitate, therefore, to maintain, 
that the doctrine of the necessary Faithfulness of 
God is necessarily sound doctrine. 

6. So God, who is the True, is, necessarily, 
the Faithful. 

" Lemma. }> Proposition II. 



God, who is True, and Faithful, is 
necessarily Inflexibly Just. 


1. If the preceding Proposition demanded 
a great presupposition to be previously grounded, a 
the present one equally, or much more, makes the 
same requirement. If to manifest Truth, or to do 
the Truth (as one saith), objects are required ; 
to manifest Justice requires, no less, object* on 
which the Justice is to be exercised. 

2. And not to repeat at length considerations 
advanced under that previous Proposition, the 
objects presented to the Justice must be, or, at any 
rate, shall be, considered to be men. They must 
be so considered, taking the nature of the lower 
animals, and all beneath the lower animals, into 
account. And the objects of the Justice shall, or, 
perhaps, must be considered to the exclusion of 
angel-spirits, or any possibly existing higher 

3. But it falls to be now noticed, that another 
element, with special regard to one at least of the 
factors, must be introduced. While the proposi 
tion, God is True, regards, or may regard men, 
simply as men ; the proposition, God is Just, 

:i Prop. II. Lemma. 


regards, always regards, men in the farther light 
of beino; 


Men, Men, 

Virtuous, or Un-virtuous, or 

Vicious : 
In other words, 

Good, or Bad, or Evil ; 

Righteous, Un-righteous. or 

In fine, 
Moral, or Im-moral. 

All the subdivisions 

Truthful, &c. False, <tc. 

A moral designation, therefore, is added to the 
objects. The men are always considered to be 
Virtuous, or Moral, or. on the other hand, Un- 
virtuous, or Immoral. 

4. The propriety of the introduction of that 
new element will not be seriously gairisayed. To 
be True, nothing more is required than to do as 
things are, and not as they are not; and the 
notion is complete without considering whether 
the creatures, who are the objects to whom the 
Truth is manifested, be good or be bad. But it is 
different in the case of Justice. God cannot be 
the Just God to men unless their moral condition 


be taken into account. Justice, in fact, is a quality 
having necessary reference to the deserts or merits, 
and the demerits, that is, the goodness or the 
badness, of its objects. Take away moral states, 
and you obliterate the possibility of the exercise 
of Justice. 

5. There needs no elaborate proof of the 
propriety of what is now advanced. Tis involved 
in the propositions themselves, as the use of 
language shows. No necessity can lie upon one to 
prove that common language means what it means. 
The use of language must proceed, no doubt, from 
the source of the firm realities in the region of 
absolute ideas, (the certain regulators they of 
affairs in the sphere or plane underneath,) as an 
effect involves the existence somewhere of its 
cause ; a and the good use of language has fixed, 
that to be True is different from being Just, and 
that to be Just requires that there be some merit, 
or some demerit, in each one of the objects. 
Unless men be considered to be good, and bad, 
they are not fit objects for the display of Justice. 
Justice, in fine, has a distinct additional element 
in it over and above that which Triteness of 
necessity involves. Truth has to do with exist 
ences simply : Justice, with moral existences only 
as such. 

G. The present Proposition, therefore, not only 

a Confer, infra, Schol. III. 35. 


relates to a relative Attribute ; but, if there be 
degrees in relati\ 7 eness, this Proposition were more 
relative than even the penultimate one. 

$ 7. Our Proposition is tantamount, then, to 
this, that God must be Just to men, as Moral 
Beings. God is Just : that is, He acts towards 
the good man, as being a good man : and towards 
the evil or bad, as being so. 


1. Now come we to the demonstration of the 
proposition, that God is inflexibly Just, and that 
necessarily. This is a proposition second to none 
in importance, and the greatest care must be taken 
that, to the keenest eye, no lack of cogency, or the 
exactest accuracy, shall be discernible in our 

2. We have already a adverted to the peculiarity 
connected with the objects of this attribute of 
Justice. Man is specially, if not exclusively- 
regarded by it as a moral being. 31 A characteristic, 
in truth, of the human race is Conscience. Every 
genuine member of the family of man isdistinguished, 
and honoured, and blessed, by the possession of this 
admirable mental power. This it is which, even 
more than his Intellectual pre-eminence, gives man 
(the undisputed sovereign lord of all this kosmos] 

a Lemma. 


his vast superiority over even the very highest of 
the lower animals : this it is which most assimilates 
man to every higher order of minds, more 
especially to The Mind over all minds. a By this 
Conscience, or Moral Sense, man approves or dis 
approves of the actions of moral agents, praises, 
or blames, the doers of the actions, good and ill, 
recognises the one kind to be worthy of reward, 
and the opposite kind to be deserving of punish 
ment. The faculty, susceptibility, or power of 
mind in question, has been called, by some philos 
ophers, Conscientiousness : a good word enough, 
perhaps, to express, distinctively, the thing meant. 
3. The next point is : Is there convincing 
reason for attributing to God such a quality or 
property of mind as that denoted? In answering 
which question, it may at once be fearlessly 
advanced, that, as far as regards man, this faculty 
of Conscientiousness is a most undoubted perfection. 
Not only so : for Conscience asserts, and vindicates 
in asserting, its rightful supremacy over the whole 
man, as a Moral Being. It claims to be above all 
the emotions, as well as all the passions, above 
all the feelings, indeed, let them be called by any 
name one likes ; and, above them all, Conscience 
reigns as rightful absolute monarch. In fine, if 
Conscience be no perfection, there is no perfec 
tion in, or connected with, man. That man has 
a Schol. Part iii. Div. II. 


Intellectual excellencies or perfections, few will 
dispute, and none can establish, since a complete 
proof would itself denote a most unexceptionable 
excellency of reasoning. But man s power to take 
in intellectual truths in the pure mathematics 
themselves, to discern, say, the relation of equality 
between twice two (2 + 2, or 2x2) and four (4) 
the comprehension of the simplest equation being 
accepted as evidence of aptitude for the abstrusest 
geometrical, or algebraical, calculations ; could yet 
be reckoned as appertaining to no perfection of 
man s nature, if the power to distinguish between 
right and wrong virtuous action and unvirtuous, 
to perceive merit and demerit, to award praise 
and blame, and to distribute reward and punish 
ment, accordingly, if such, we say, be no perfec 
tion. But the power of mind under notice is not 
only a perfection, but it is manifestly an original 
and distinct perfection of mind. Indeed, this is 
implied by the very nature of the case : For, how 
could such a perfection grow from nothing, or 
result from any congeries of powers destitute of 
Conscientiousness themselves ? Twere ridiculous 
to contend, that Conscience, rudiments and all, 
could have been (not cultivated and improved, but 
acquired) absolutely acquired by education ; for tis 
but too obvious, that a conscience cannot be the 
product of factors themselves wanting all conscience. 
In fact, every genuine representative of our race 


will admit yea, he will glory in the uniqueness, 
and the lawful supremacy, of Conscience. Those 
persons only who, malformed, or ill-constituted, as 
individuals, are deficient, as to degree, in this grand 
faculty, will seek to lower its claims, and represent 
them as baseless pretensions. These individuals, 
in speaking, may draw from their own experience 

-in which they are most unhappy. But their 
mishap must l>e corrected by the general verdict. 
Taking in all the landscape, exceptional infelicities 
are lost sight of by the large-minded spectator. 
And tis well that it be so. In fine, Conscience in 
the greatest of perfections in man s whole Intellectual 

S 4. In the next place : It beins* to be taken for 

o L O 

granted, as a most certain truth, that Conscience 
is a perfection ; wo proceed to consider the identi 
fication of God as the ( )ri<nnator of man s conscience 1 , 


Himself the Conscience of consciences. Now, tis 
to be noted, that there is an Axiom as sure as any 
axiom, or any truth whatever, in any Science 
whatsoever, even inclusive of the exact sciences. 
The Axiom, so much to our purpose, is : An ejj cct, 
qua effect, cannot possess any original, distinct, 
perfection, which is not in the cause, cither actually, 
or at least in a higher degree. It has been proved, 
that man is a creature, 11 which is another way of 
saying that he is an effect ; and to affirm, that man 

:l Schol. under Part iii. Div. II. 


is a creature, or an effect, is equivalent to the 
affirmation that man has a Creator, or that (regard 
being had to the nature of the proof) there is a 
First Cause. Therefore, in the Creator, or Mind of 
minds, qua First Cause, there must be an attribute 
corresponding to this perfection, the Conscience to 
wit, in man the creature, qua effect. For, no Effect 
can possibly have a perfection which is not, in 
some respect, in the Cause : Otherwise, the perfec 
tion might be effected by nothing. 

5. If any one should, by way of objecting, 
urs;e that such arguing from man s moral sense to 

O o o 

the mind of God, is a posteriori; the reply is: 
Granted, that an a posteriori element has been 
allowed to enter here. But the continent of the 
element the larger ground, in virtue of which the 
entrance of the element became a possibility was 
by no means a posteriori ground. The larger 
point, that man is a creature, or an effect, and, 
correlatively, that there is a Creator, or First 
Cause ; the proof of this was sufficiently a priori. 
Let it be remembered, therefore, of what nature is 
the demonstration as a whole. The method which 
has been followed, in the present instance, is of a 
mixed character, but what of that ? The perfec 
tion of this demonstration consists not in this, that, 
from beginning to end, there are no a posteriori, 
or purely empirical, elements to be found, however 
diligent may be the search. Because, where man 


is concerned, and is, indeed, a main factor, it is 
impossible to be altogether without momenta 
drawn from (what is called) probable evidence. 
And any expectation that all such momenta would 
be altogether absent, would be the height of 

o o 

extravagance.* The very introduction into the 
subject of Matter, as a thing to be reasoned about 
Matter, which is the only and very God of the 
Atheists, who must be presumed to lie ever in the 
posture of hostile critics; Matter, we say, brings 
with it a posteriori elements, if, indeed, Matter 
itself be not to be regarded as an entirely empirical 
existence. Certainly, Expansion and Duration, on 
the one side, and Matter, on the other, do not fall 
under the same category : Matter being admittedly 
contingent in this, that we are not obliged, by the 
constitution of our minds, to conceive of it as 
always existing ; while, again, Expansion and 
Duration exist to us as things the non-existence of 


which is not possible. Besides, too : When we 
shall have arrived at a succeeding Proposition, 1 it 
will be seen that there is a special reason, of 
a peculiar description, for the exceptional treat 
ment of the Attribute under notice, the Justice, to 
wit, of God. But the perfection of our demonstra 
tion lies in this, that, in all the main features, and 
specially as touching the Being, and the Absolute 
Attributes of the Chief Factor, the method is 

Confer, infra, Schol. I. 9. \"r:. Coroll. from Prop. III. 


purely a priori, synthetical, deductive, abstract. 
The perfection, too, of the demonstration, when its 
final cause is in view, will (in fine) be found to be 
in its being convincing, and irrefragable by any 
objector. In these regards will consist the real 
perfection of the demonstration : not in its having 
received no aids, anywhere, from human observa 
tion, or general experience, in matters relating to 
man, and his to him most weighty concernments. 51 

6. Upon the whole : Tis, therefore, clear that 
in the Supreme Mind there is the Quality or 
Property of Conscience. Reason shows, that God 
is the Just God : Consciously Just. Justice is 
most assuredly one of the Divine Attributes. 

7. Tt being, then, established, that God is 
Just, and it having been laid down (what is 
sufficiently incontrovertible) that the just and the 
unjust among men are the proper objects of God s 
Justice ; b we are prepared to approach another 
point in our extensive horizon, and edge off our 
workmanship by an a priori finishing. God s 
Truth and His Justice impinge upon each other ; 
but they do not, for all that, coalesce. The Truth 
and the Justice coincide, to a certain extent : so 
far they go on the same road ; but, while Truth has 
been proceeding in a wider highway, Justice goes 
farther along the route. The fact is, that the Just 
God acts towards moral agents according to their 

O O 

a Confer -, infra, Div. V. Prop. i. 1C. b Lemma. 


true states, that is, towards the good as being 
good, and towards the evil as being so. This is, 

~ O 7 

however, in virtue, not of God s Trueness, but of 
His Justness. This latter it is which specializes in 
the common objects, men, fixing, exclusively, on 
the moral principles of the nature. But, never 
theless, God s Justice involves the Trueness. A 
matter of moment, since a highly important con 
sequence follows. 

8. Inasmuch as God s Justice is, indeed, little 
more than His Trueness applied to the good, and 
to the bad, as being, respectively, good and bad, 
morally : The supposition that God is un-just, 
involving that He is false ; as the absurdity of 
God s being false has been demonstrated/ 1 the 
absurdity of the supposition which would involve 
that absurdity is also, at same time, made manifest. 
For God to be false, were impossible : a Therefore, 
the supposition of God being un-just, as implying 
the same impossibility, were impossible also. 

9. Again : For the Just God to act as if He 
were not Just, or for God to act to the good as 
if they were bad, and to the bad as if they were 
good ; were to be (not only not True, i.e., False 
but, moreover) un-just and im-moral. But the 
simple supposition of God s injustice is so absurd 
in itself, that no position can by any possibility be 
more absurd. For, to suppose God to be unjust, 

a Fupra, Prop. II. 


were to suppose that God has need to be unjust ; 
and to suppose this, would be to suppose a cause 
without, or apart from, God, compelling Him : 
and tis absurd, in the case of God, as we have 
demonstrated His Existence, and so many of His 
Attributes, 8 to suppose a cause, cib extra, or outside 
Him, determining Him. In short, nothing more 
absurd than, without reference to any other 
absurdity, to suppose God to be necessitated, from 
without, to act as He is not to be obliged to act 
as He is not, to men good, and men bad, as being 
otherwise than they really are. 

10. Thus, there can be no reason why we 
should suppose the possibility of God being unjust : 
but there is sufficient reason why we pronounce the 
impossibility of there being injustice in God. 

11. We can have no difficulty, therefore, in 
arriving at the conclusion, that God and Justice 
stand to each other as necessary inseparables ; and 
so we maintain, that God is necessarily of inflexible 

12. Then, God, who is the True, and the 
Faithful, is, necessarily, the inflexibly Just. 


1. Tis incumbent upon us now to enter upon 
another part of our subject. We have noticed a 

a See the Propositions in Divisions I. & II. 


special clement which falls to be introduced when 
treating of Justice, 8 - and we are arrived at the 
place where we must take notice of an additional 
element, one, too, of the gravest importance. The 
former element was weighty in one respect : this 
one will be seen to be so in another. The former 
went to make up the idea of what Justice implies, 
or what is Justice : and therefore it behoved to 
appear before the demonstration. But it may 
perhaps be, that the present element looks more 
towards the consequences of Justice, than the con 
stitution itself of the idea thereof: and, so, its 
natural position is after the demonstration. Its 
fit place is in our posterior analytics. 

2. We have seen, that the Justice of God 
implies that lie act to the good as good ; to the 
bad, as being really bad. 1 But we now allege, 
that the good man is, as such, naturally happy : 
he is happy so far as he is good, or as the good 
which is in him is uninterruptedly operative. 
Analogously, the bad man, as such, is infallibly 
unhappy, or, to adopt as plain a word, miserable. 
Goodness or virtue, in short, implies happiness, 
and vice implies misery, of a greater or a less 
degree. God, therefore, must act towards the 
good man as being a happy man, and to the 
evil man as being a miserable man. And we 
shall have an opportunity of observing how much, 

a Supra, Lemma. * Supra, Demonstration. 


of even tremendous significance, is involved in 
these things. 51 

3. It is, then, to be shown, that goodness in 
men involves happiness ; and badness, unhappiness. 
Afterwards, we shall attend emphatically to what 
is implied in God acting to the good or happy man, 
as being truly a happy man, and to the evil or un 
happy man to be plain with you, the sinner as 
being indeed an unhappy, yea a miserable man. b 
Not omitting neither the consequences of such 
action in the one way and in the other. At the 
point indicated, the grand doctrine of Rewards and 
Punishments will break in upon us ; and, in self- 
luminous flashes of light derived from the source 
of that doctrine, we shall have, at a certain point 
in our progress, glimpses of the unutterable blessed 
ness of heaven ; as well as be obliged to admit 
within the scope of our gaze (although blasting 
will be the vision) the lurid darkness of the horrific 
damnation of hell. Such the dire necessity of the 

4. Thus, we are to address ourselves, in the 
first place, to the doctrine, that virtue involves 
happiness ; and vice, misery. 

5. Now, when we say, that the virtuous, or 
good man is, as such, happy ; we mean, that this is 
so according to the constitution and course of nature, 

:i Vide, infra, Schol. TT. Sect. 13, 14 ; aliasq; 
b Vide, infra, Schol. II. Atque, Schol. III. 


the constitution and course of nature as experi 
enced by us. But goodness is not the only thing 
or cause in operation, in any case. As Conscious 
ness testifies, and as Observation of others, and 
Experience generally make plain, there is no man 
thoroughly good, and that continually : and there 
are other disturbing forces at work besides those 
flowing from the man himself, directly, or in 
directly ; voluntarily, or hereditarily. There are 
other lines, some of them of course traversing 
lines, besides the main line of life. All those 
disturbing forces, from whatever quarter, being 
resolvable into the evil that is in the world. And 
the consequence of all this, the experienced, and 
the admitted consequence is, that goodness is not 
so much productive of, and attended by, happiness 
simply, as it tends, always tends, to be so. Virtue, 
so far forth as it is virtue, involves happiness, so 
far as the virtue is singly operative. This length 
we must indeed go. But the confusion which 
there is in the actual world prevents us from being 
able to go farther. Still, let it be believed, that 
length is quite far enough from being a short way. 

6. And, similarly, the same sort of thing holds 
with regard to the opposite, unvirtuousness. As, 
according to the constitution of nature, the good 
man is happy, so, after the same fashion, the 
vicious man is miserable, more or less miserable, 
and he always tends to become so, and more and 


more. But no wicked man alive is as evil as it is 
possible he might have been, or may hereafter 
come to be ; by reason if for no other reason of 
the good, the great good, which there is in this 
world of sense, with all its deficiencies : The good 
will not allow the evil to be so evil, as, without the 
good, the evil would assuredly be. The good is 
always striving (such is its nature) to keep the evil 
within bounds, and to lessen the effects, at least, 
of its malignity. And the experienced consequence 
is, that evil, or vice, is not attended by so much 
misery as it invariably tends to produce. For the 
same reason that is, this is the reason Sin, most 
prolific mother, does not sooner bring about Death, 
true, absolute Death. There are counteracting 
agencies at work, which keep the whole of the 
dreadful sin-brood in a sort of half-life, or lingering 
death. It is only when Sin hath conceived, in a 
completed way, that the dread monster-mother 
effects the legitimate end, and bringeth forth 
unsightly Death. 

7. If there be any qualifications of the doctrine, 
above-delivered, of Virtue leading to Happiness, 
and Vice leading to Misery, any qualifications 
other than have been already advanced ; these of 
course should have a hearing. But it does not 
appear that there are any other qualifications. 
The subject might, indeed, be much drawn out : 
many particulars might be brought in, in the way 


of details. But besides the great fact of the 
incessant conflict, the ever-waged battle, of Good 
against Evil, and Evil against Good, and the con 
sequent limits and constraints set by the one to the 
actual progress of the other ; there cannot be 
adduced any distinct consideration. In fine, how 
can there be any qualifications but those denoted, 
however dimly ? Apart from the limitations set 
by The Good, and its kingdom, to the Evil, with 
its shadowy likeness of a kingdom, and by the Evil 
to The Good : what should hinder each working, 


without let or hindrance, on and on? Good tend 
ing always to happiness, more good and more 
happiness ; evil tending always to evil, and misery, 
more and more, without assignable end. 


8. Those effects, namely, happiness and the 
reverse, are, then, the natural consequences, 
certainly the natural attendants, of Virtue and 
Viciousness. And if any one will, the effects in 
question might be designated Rewards and Pmtix/i- 
ments. Happiness may, indeed, be said to be 
the natural Reward of the good man ; as Misery 
maybe said to be tin- natural Punishment. of the 
evil man. 

9. All this which has been advanced is nothing 
but an appeal to those facts with which knowledge 
of ourselves, and external observation supply us. 
A demonstrative proof, therefore, as it were out of 
the question, so it is quite unnecessary. In truth, 


we can demonstrate no fact regarding men : that is, 
we cannot demonstrate, in the strictest sense ; we 
can only prove in virtue of postulates.* There is 
no more than one fact, in cell the universe, which 
is truly strictly demonstrative, the fact, namely, of 
the Existence of God. Nor can those statements 
regarding human nature be supported by authority ; 
because the facts are so, or they are so and so, 
whatever any one may urge. Authority, as such, 
would go for nothing. Yet, in a question, as to 
any matter of fact, whether a thing be so and so, 
or not, it is quite competent and pertinent to 
adduce the testimony of those who are the best 
judges of what is really the fact. It is quite 
competent to produce witnesses, who could testify 
as to what they have observed, in regard to the 
matter in hand ; and it would be quite pertinent, 
were the facts of the case doubtful. But they are 
not so. 



1. Tis the case, then, that, by the constitution 
and course of nature, the moral are actually happy ; 
the immoral, the reverse. 13 This is true, but true, 
however, with the conditions and qualifications 
stated in the preceding Scholium. The imperfect 

a Vide, supra, Dem. 5. b Schol. proceed. 


virtue which obtains among men tends to produce 
happiness, while the actually existing vice, with 
all its checks, has a tendency to produce unhappi- 
ness and positive misery. So far as virtue operates 
unimpeded, it has such a tendency : so far as 
untrammelled vice extends, it has a tendency 
drawing in the opposite direction, or to wretched 
ness within and without the man. Such is indeed 
the constitution and course of nature, as made 
known to us by our own consciousness, and as 
observed regarding others, in the way of daily 
experience. The moral are, comparatively, the 
happy : the immoral, the unhappy. Now, an 
important immanent question awaits us here : Is 
such constitution founded in the eternal fitnesses of 
things, or not? is it intrinsically necessary, or is it, 
on the contrary, purely contingent and arbitrary ? 
Let us put it otherwise. Is it an inherent power 
of virtue that it produce happiness ? and, Is it 
inherent in vice to produce misery ? Or, Is the 
reverse true ? And, Are the happiness and the 
unhappiness merely arbitrarily superadded qualities 
superadded, that is, by the arbitrary fiat, the 
mere will or good pleasure, of the Creator ? a 

2. But whereas the question, as put, does, 
though secretly, yet really, distinguish between 
the nature of the Creator, and His good pleasure, 
or fiat, insinuating, too, that the nature and the 

:i Scholium under Part iii. Division II. 


particular will could possibly be disjoined and 
disconnected : it is to be preliminarily observed 
that the disconnection is impossible. This follows 
from Proposition II., where it was proved that 
God, the Creator, is necessarily True. Being most 
Truthful, He must manifest Himself as He is ; He 
cannot, therefore, reveal Himself by a fiat, declara 
tive of a general law, inconsistent with the reality 
of His character. God s fiat, in fine, must be but 
the pure expression of Himself, as willing from, or 
in accordance with, His nature. 

3. This may be said to be an answer to the 
question by objecting to it, by objecting to an 
assumption radically contained in it, and by 
raising a previous question. Nevertheless, it 
appears to involve, in any view, an answer to the 
interrogatory. It answers by a decided negative 
as to the possible arbitrariness of any such fiat. 

4. Thus, the course of nature determining that 
virtue should produce happiness, and vice misery ; 
it seems to follow, that the connection between the 
virtue and the happiness, the vice and the misery, 
is not arbitrary but necessary. That is, taking the 
constitution of things as an expression of the will 
fiat, if you prefer the word of God; it seems to 
be evident that the constitution of things, which 
fixes the connection in question, is unalterable. 
The expression of will being grounded in the 
nature of that God whose attributes have been 


demonstrated, is therefore unchangeable. The 
essential attributes of God are immutable, if 
immutability be. 

5. But as the relation of virtue to happiness, 
and of vice to misery, is an important subject ; 
and it may be attended with good results to dwell 
upon the character of the connection in question ; 
let us consider the matter yet a little further, by 
letting in new lights, and looking at the objects in 
other attitudes. Let us, starting afresh, put the 
question over again, while the ground of the 
objection which was sustained is dropped out. 

6. Is it inherent in virtue to be accompanied 
by happiness ? and in vice to be accompanied by 
the reverse ? Or, on the contrary, could virtue be 
followed, as a matter of course, by misery ? and 
could vice be followed, by reason of the same law, 
by true happiness ? 

7. Virtue leads, at present, to happiness ; and 
vice, to misery. a IS ow, this human virtue of 
whatever it may consist, i.e., of whatever par 
ticulars it may be composed, or into whatever 
elemental bases it may be resolved must be held 
to be, generally, expressive of conformity to the 
moral nature with which man is endowed ; while 
vice, shortly, denotes departure from such con 
formity. Next, the virtue, which is simply con- 
a Schol. 


formity to the true moral nature of man, must be 
also allowed to be in conformity, so far, at the 
very least, with the moral nature with which man 
was originally endowed by his Creator; while the 
contrary holds as to vice. This is just what is 
meant by Virtue, or Morality; what, by the 
opposite, Vice. This is just the virtue and the 
vice about which the question asks : Otherwise, no 
question can be legitimately before us, as at this 
stage in our argument. We cannot logically 
ignore now the supposition of God, the Creator of 

8. This being so, the question before us 
almost answers itself. In viewing human virtue 
as a conformity, partial conformity it may be, to 
the moral nature with which man was at first 
endowed, it must view virtue as being, to a certain 
extent at least, in conformity also with the nature 
of the Creator Himself. How, then, were it 
possible that virtue should not be followed by 
happiness, since the Creator Himself is happy ? a 
Could conformity, in a variety of ways, to the 
Creator s own nature, lead to anything but some 
thing else equally in conformity with the nature of 
the Creator ? Could living as God would have us 
live ; being, so, like Himself ; conduct but to some 
thing like Himself? Could it possibly conduct to 
anything unlike Himself? So, too, regarding vice. 

il Div. III. Prop. i. 


This is disconformity to the true nature of man, 
and, so, to the nature of God. How, then, could 
it lead to happiness, or aught but the reverse of 
happiness ? How could disconformity, in im 
portant regards, to the God-like, lead but to some 
other un-God-like disconformity ? Could the vice, 
the unlike God, lead to happiness, the like God ? 

9. Thus the question which was raised a is to 
be met with a decided negative, approaching it by 
the track pursued. But while throughout the 
preceding, the elements of Virtue and Vice pre 
dominated ; in what is to follow, certain other 
elements will be the predominating ones. 

10. The question, then, being looked at with 
the element of Happiness, and that of Misery, its 
reverse, prominently in the foreground ; it is 
fortunate that we can, at once, answer, that any 
alternative, such as the question presents, cannot 
be entertained for one moment. The connection 
between virtue and happiness, and vice and 
misery, is indissoluble, being grounded in the very 
nature of things which are themselves immutable. 

11. The reason why the connection in question 
is unalterable, is, because the supposition of aught 
else were quite inconsistent with the nature of that 
Supreme already demonstrated. He is, for example, 

6, sub Jin. 


necessarily consummately Happy/ 1 And, so far as 
He produces anything like Himself, He must effect 
creaturely Happiness, only creaturely Happiness. b 
That is, by the constitution of things established 
by God, the creature man, following the laws of its 
highest or inmost being, must be happy. Un- 
happiness is the un-like God ; unhappiness, there 
fore, can only be the attribute of creatures unlike 
God. There will be no dispute as to whether the 
moral part of the nature of moral beings be the 
main seat of happiness, worthy of the name, and 
of unhappiness. True happiness, if not itself a 
moral quality, is necessarily associated with moral 
qualities. Perhaps it is an index to their state and 
condition : the greater the true happiness, the 
more the genuine moral qualities are in exercise. 
Happiness, in fine, if not a moral faculty, is at 
least a quasi moral faculty ; and it is certainly a 
very important quality, whatever else it be. It 
follows, that moral creatures, unlike God as to 
happiness, presuppose a change to have taken place 
with regard to them since the time of their being 
created. Thus : Certain creatures are unhappy, 
that is, habitually so. Being unhappy, they are 
unlike God. A race of moral creatures, unlike 
God, must in time have become so ; that is, they 
must, in some way or other, have degenerated, or 
become sinners. God cannot be supposed to have 

a Div. III. Prop. i. J Sub-Prop, under Prop. i. Div. III. 


for creatures, the direct work of his hands, or 
(should you object to the anthropomorphize 
language) his own workmanship, beings unlike 
Himself, opposed to Himself, in their moral 
qualifications ; as this would involve an effect 
without a cause ; or, rather, it would involve an 
effect proceeding from an inadequate and impossible 
cause, a thing, if possible, even more absurd than 
the other. The creatures, therefore, as they came 
from God, at their creation, must have resembled 
God ; in other words, they must have been in His 
image and likeness. They must have been, there 
fore, happy. That is, as moral beings, with their 
moral natures entire, and in legitimate exercise ; 
which in other words is just saying, truly and 
thoroughly virtuous beings ; they must have been 
happy. .Being like God, being virtuous or innocent, 
man (very properly we, under our present circum 
stances, shall by no means be allowed to call him 
the Adamic man] was necessarily very happy. 

12. All this is, unless a huge mistake has 
entered into the reasoning, a demonstration, 
founded upon the nature, or the attributes, of God, 
of the real connection which exists between virtue 
and happiness, and, consequentially, between vice 
and misery ; when one ascends to the source of 
things, where, only, things at their perfection can 
be seen. In the foregoing Scholium, the connec 
tion between imperfect virtue, and imperfect 


happiness, in man. as lie at present is, is stated as 
a fact of experience : and herein we have been 
greatly busied with an enquiry as to human 
virtue and happiness as man must have existed 
when he came fresh from his Creator s hands. To 
this enquiry, the application of strict a priori 
reasoning is quite practicable and legitimate. And 
should any one deem it to be otherwise, in general, 
or in particular, he has no more to do than put his 
finger on the place where is the wrongness in 
what is advanced. An objector has only to shew, 
that a priori reasoning is totally inapplicable, or 
point out wherein it has been positively misapplied 
in the detail. 

13. And now to enforce that for which much 
of the foregoing is an excellent preparation. But 
before proceeding in our course, we may take the 
opportunity to make, or to repeat, an observation. 
When certain expressions (such as, " a good man ; " 
" a happy man : " "a bad man ; " an " unhappy," 
or a "miserable" man) and others coined after the 
same fashions, are employed ; they are, of course, 
to be taken in connection with their proper qualifi 
cations. It cannot be deemed to be necessary to 
qualify, on every occasion, propositions, or expres 
sions, which have been qualified once for all. a 
To return now to that which we were about to 

a Scholium I. 5, 6 ; also, above, 1. 


enforce : Goodness and happiness are intimately, 
yea, inseparably, associated ; as well as are the 
opposites, badness and unhappiness. a When, 
therefore, God acts in relation to a good man, as 
such, He is in contact with a happy man. And 
when God manifests Himself towards a happy man, 
the man is, of course, made to be more happy. 
The good man is naturally happy : moreover, he 
necessarily becomes more so, in the case where 
God, The Blessed One ( O Ma/capo?), 1 in acting, just 
reveals or communicates Himself. 

14. In like manner, when the consummately 
Happy Being specially reveals Himself to a bad 
man, the man, naturally unhappy, is necessarily 
made to become more miserable. Just because, in 
the case supposed, a Nature diametrically opposite, 
and contrary, is in contact with the evil of the bad 
man. It is, indeed, an awful thought but one of 
the most pregnant with high consequences of any 
which deal in the great concernments of moral 
matters that the mere contact of goodness and 
evil, where the goodness is over-powcringly 
influential, should result in misery, or, rather, an 
increase in misery, to the bad. But it is inevitably 
so. Such is the constitution of things : and it 
could not be otherwise. It could not be otherwise, 
simply because God is God, and cannot cease to be 

a Schol. I. preceding portion of this Schol. h Div. III. Prop. i. 




1. One thing is now clear : Sinners have 
a reason for hating God. Men who are conscious 
of sinning against Him who is the True, the 
Faithful executor of the laws of Nature, as being, 
so far, but the outside expressions of His inner 
Character, and to which, by once establishing them, 
He has engaged to adhere, the inflexibly Just 
One, rendering to every man according to his 
deeds ; men, we repeat, who are conscious of being 
sinners, may well hate God, because He increases 
their misery when He draws nigh unto them. 
Sinners, however, and Sin, are not the same, and 
not everything which is true of the one, is true of 
the other also. Inasmuch, then, as the domain of 
Sin is intensified, and so increased, by the contact 
of God with the nature in which Sin reigns, she 
(if it be lawful to personify Sin) may yet be 
imagined to rejoice herein. Sin, in becoming 
more conscious to herself of her exceeding sinful- 
ness, becoming enlarged, or intensified, by contact 
with God, may be imagined to rejoice at this the 
extension of her borders. Still, Sin, the monster- 
mother of all human anguish, should she, in 
portentous audacity, court for such reason the 
thought of God, should also remember, that she 
courts the contact of her bane : not wise, after the 
pattern of the wisdom of the serpent, but foolish, 


after the fashion of fatuous self-murderers, to allow 
herself to be drawn within the vortex of that 
mighty influence which shall at last be her inevit 
able destruction. When Sin hath fully conceived, 
by reason of her visions of God, her offspring will 
assuredly be Death. And Death, once brought 
fairly forth, will have an insatiable maw, maw 
never to be satisfied until Sin herself, own mother 
of Death, shall be consumed. And then his 
occupation being entirely gone, and his subsistence 
no longer possible, but thoroughly impossible, 
Death himself shall die. 

2. Therefore, it is pre-eminently sinners, miser 
able sinners, who yet madly cry, in their hearts, to 
God, Depart from us, for we desire not the 
knowledge of Thy ways, who, as actuated by self- 
interested motives, should desire the contact of the 
Good One, even though He approach as the Just 
God ; for in the increase, and the ever increase, of 
their misery, lies the direction of the only door of 
hope. For to have hope, the sinner must forsake 
his way, and, as unrighteous, his thoughts, the 
very thoughts however which constitute, as it were, 
his radical nature, as his nature has come to be. 
Then, indeed, repenting, or changing his mind; 
ceasing to do evil, and learning to do well ; 
becoming, in fine, a new man ; God can be the 

O 7 7 

Just God to him, and yet a source of blessedness. 
3. But although the preceding be nothing but 


what is legitimately consistent with doctrine deal 
ing only in a priori principles ; alas ! neither a 
priori principle, nor application of any a priori 
principle ; no a priori reasoning, and, in fact, no 
reasoning whatever; can tell how a man, being 
evil, is, in consistency with the strict rules of the 
attribute of Inflexible Justice, to be changed into 
a good being : For this would involve a new 
creation, and, so, it would utterly transcend the 
region of purely Moral Law. Reasoning, not 
ascending above the plane of this attribute of 
Justice, can do no more than tell how the Just 
God acts towards the good and the bad, the happy 
and the unhappy, as such, and the results, in 
accordance with the established course of nature, 
in the first place, and, in the next, with the 
constitution of things, as related to each other by 
eternal fitnesses. 


1. It has been stated, a that Happiness may be 
said to be the natural Reward of the good man, 
and Misery the natural Punishment of the evil man. 
This brings us, in a general way, to the great 
topic of Rewards and Punishments. May it not 
be said with truth, that, for us, men, and sinners, 

a Schol. I. 8,aliisq_; 


(as we unquestionably are, on the supposition of a 
God of Truth, a and of Justice, b who created us in 
His own image and likeness, morally,) not the 
least important subject falling to be discussed, 
under this Proposition relating to God s Justice, is 
this same subject of Rewards and Punishments ? 
Or, might it not be said, with propriety, that the 
doctrine of PUNISHMENTS, solely, is, for mankind as 
they commonly are, the important matter in this 
whole inquiry "? A form of the question which 
would surely fit the topic more accurately to the 
occasion, than one which introduced the subject 
of REWARDS as an equally prominent element. 

2. Connected, then, with the great subject of 
Good and Evil, of Happiness and Unhappincss, of 
Reward and Punishment, there is still a question 
remaining for consideration ; a question yielding, 
in importance and interest, to none whatever. 
The particular subject is that of future Rewards 
and Punishments, or, to express it more accurately, 
Rewards and Punishments in a future state, if a 
future state there be. And how are these Rewards 
and Punishments of the future assumed to be 
certain to be affected by that Inflexible Justice 
of God? 

3. There are, therefore, two great questions 
before us for consideration in this place. Do the 
premises to which we have acquired right, entitle 

a Prop. II. Dem. preced. 


us to infer that there shall be a future state of 
existence for man ? Such is the first question, and 
the second is, What saith the Justice of God as to 
the moral arrangements of the future state, 
ascertained, and held to be certain ? 


4. Looking, then, in the direction of these 
topics, we ask, Does the doctrine of the reality of 
a future life, with its Rewards and Punishments, 
belong in truth to the subject of Natural Religion ? 
and, in particular, does the doctrine fall under our 
a priori argument, appertaining, with perfect 
propriety, to its procedure ? These queries deserve 
to be answered in the most decided affirmatives ; 
and it is to be remembered, that the affirmation 
of the latter implies the affirmation of the former. 
The general consideration of a future state of 
Rewards and Punishments, does evidently belong 
to the subject of Natural Religion, and, most 
incontestably, the consideration does, specifically, 
belong to the domain of the a priori Theology. 
For, everything which undeniably follows from, or 
is a strict application of, the Jlrst principles of our 
Science, which themselves must be unimpugn- 
able ; every such thing, tis repeated, is legiti 
mately introducible, and, in a question of title, 
must be allowed to remain, as lawful adjuncts, 


among the fitting accessory pertinents of the 
principal theme. But tis not less than a duty to 
make this whole matter level to the commonest 
understanding. Of the most weighty concern 
ments of every man we are directly treating at 
this present ; and here, therefore, if any where, 
the deliverance should be clear, and devoid of all 
uncertainty or ambiguity. Tis a most serious 
thing to consider the judgment of imperative 
Justice itself. It behoves us, in sooth, to make the 
matter quite plain to the dullest of intellects. 

5. It has been demonstrated, that there is a 
God of Truth, and of Faithfulness, and of Inflexible 
Justice, and we have seen what demonstrations of 
such a character do, of necessity, involve. To the 
Justice of God, as the acme of the series, a there 
must be now adjoined the facts made clear regard 
ing man : to wit, that, to him, happiness comes in 
proportion to his advances in virtuousness in 
proportion, too, to the absence of traversing 
influences, those, more especially, running quite 
counter to the line of virtue ; while, in a reverse 
way, unhappiness, or misery, is the unfailing 
concomitant, and dread follower, of immorality and 
active viciousness : that this is, because there 
exists an indefeasible connection between these 
things themselves, between, that is, the virtue and 
the happiness, on the one hand, and the vice and 

a Supra, Prop. III. Dem, 


the misery, on the other. So that God, by simply 
communicating with man, increases, by the 
necessity of the case, increases, the happiness 
of the good, and the unhappiness of the bad. a All 
this has been made very clear ; and a considerable 
portion has been matter of the strictest demonstra 
tion, direct, or consequential. 

G. It results, then, that, although the good 
have their reward, they are by no means fully 
rewarded, in this world. Nor are the wicked 
adequately punished here. Often, indeed, they 
seem to be hardly punished at all, certainly, far 
from punished according to the measure of their 
deserts, which, at times, are very great, the 
iniquities (which are also sins) being appallingly 
flagrant and rampant. What is deducible ? What 
is the conclusion to which our consciences are 
infallibly led ? Must not it follow, that Inflexible 
Justice requires a future state in which all those 
inequalities shall be rectified ? the rectification 
doing away with all the confusion in which moral 
existencies are enveloped and enclosed in this 
present scene ? In fine, is it not necessary that 
the Moral Governor of men (for a Just God at the 
head of affairs in the universe, is, to all intents 
and purposes, a Moral Governor) should accomplish 
that which the heaven-bestowed Consciences of His 
creatures cry out is necessary to be accomplished, 

a Supra, Schol. II. , 13, 14. 


in order that the behests of irrepressible Justice 
may be obeyed ? 

7. In this world, and before our eyes, a 
scheme of Moral Government is evidently 
established, and, the operations being visibly and 
palpably in progress, the plan may be said to be, as 
a whole, in course of fulfilment, having attained 
a certain amount of actual development. There is 
a Moral Government, the principles and begin 
nings of which are evident on all sides : will there 
be no completion of the system ? Beyond all 
dispute, there are discernible, in the present con 
stitution and course of nature, the first principles, 
and the commencement, of a scheme of government 
carried on by moral means working to an end 
consonant thereunto : Is it now a possible 
supposition, that the undeviatingly Just One 
should stay the initial operations by a fiat of, No 
farther? that the Supreme, denying Himself, 
should go contrary to His own plan, or that He 
would allow His purpose to fall, through desuetude, 
into complete and final inefficacy and abortion ? 

8. Would not such inetficacy and abortion 
amount to a direct breach in the integrity and 
continuity of things ? Would not it amount to an 
actual positive violation of the Veracity, and Faith 
fulness, and Justice of the Universal Ruler ? There 
are laws of Nature established by Him, and they 
encompass us before and behind, and 011 all sides : 


but none is more weighty and abiding than the 
moral laws written by His finger on and in the 
hearts of His intelligent creatures, whereby they 
are obliged to infer, that in consonance with 
the present experience, and with the past, since 
the earliest records of man upon the earth, in con 
sonance also with the unmistakable aspirations, 
and not-to-be-suppressed yearnings, of our natures 
projecting themselves, as twere, into the antici- 
patingly realized future ; to infer (we repeat) 
that there shall be a time of complete reckoning 
for the just, and for the unjust. For the just 
among men, in order that they may receive the 
due reward of all their difficult and painful 
strugglings, through so many toilsome days, after 
perfect conformity to the Will and Character of 
God, their Maker, and for the unjust, that they, 
arraigned before the universe, may receive the 
recompense of their unrighteous deeds too often 
cruel deeds, committed at the expense of the 
suffering of their more righteous neighbours. 

9. As a legitimate conclusion from our premises 
(sure as these are) it is, therefore, a matter of moral 
certainty that there shall be a future state for man : 
and a future life is the foundation of all human 
hopes and fears of any considerable weight. No 
wise person ever thinks of laying down grand 
plans with reference to a casual residence in a road 
side inn, to be left behind whenever the journey 


towards home sliall be resumed. A wise man 
reserves his fine architectonic devices, and measures 
of general amenity, for that permanent abode 
where all that he most loves is to be found abiding. 


10. Taking for granted, therefore, that there 
shall be a future state of Rewards and Punish 
ments, Rewards for the righteous, and Punishments 
for the unrighteous or wicked ; we proceed to the 
remaining portion of our undertaking, and ask, 
How does the inflexible Justice of God stand in 
relation to the future life ? How are we to apply, 
in a particular way, to the denizens of the 
kingdoms beyond the grave, the doctrine that God 
is inflexibly Just ? The point has, indeed, been, 
to a certain extent, anticipated by the foregoing 
observations. We found, that God s Justice, and 
man s earthly condition, being conjoined, a valid 
practical proof emerges, shewing that a future 
state must be inferred. At present, our business 
lies with the future world as our postulate, and we 
are concerned with the moral administration which 
shall prevail in that world. That is our datum : 
this, the qucBSitum. 

11. In grappling with our subject, the solution 
of whatever difficulty there is, or may be imagined 
to be, is to be found in the circumstance that there 


is no radically and essentially new element intro 
duced into the case put, except the (assumed) fact 
of the existence being after the death of the body 
on earth. Now, the introduction of this element 
of mere continuance of the life of men cannot 
disturb, in any way, or to any extent, the applica 
tion of the rule valid for the Inflexible Justice ; 
that is to say, the application, to the same objects 
as before, substantially the same, of the same rule. 

12. It must be plain to every mind, that the 
strict Justice of God is the same this year as it was 
the last year, and as it will be the next year, and 
for ever. The Justice is the same now that ever it 
was ; and it will be for ever the same as it is now. 
Mere continuance, any amount of perpetuity one 
likes to imagine, of existence of the objects, can, of 
itself, make no difference in the application of the 
regulating principle. And, by hypothesis, the 
continued existence is the sole new element in the 
matter. a 

13. The law, or rule, is : 
The inflexibly Just God acts towards 

Good, who are also happy, men, as being, in 
reality, good, and happy, men ; and towards 

Evil men, who are likewise unhappy or miserable 

men, as being, in truth, such. b 

Now, no difference can arise when the scene for 
the display of the Justice is in one state of being 

a Sect, preced. b Supra, Dem., & Schol. II. 


rather than in another ; is in word it this way, 
if you please the spiritual world rather than on 
this earth ; the future world, as contradistin 
guished from this world, at any rate. The 
Inflexible Justice of the Supreme, which renders 
to every man according to his works, proceeding 
from the state of his mind, cannot alter itself, nor 
submit to alteration brought about from without, 


even if causes for alteration could exist, as they 
cannot ; a and the objects presented to the Justice 
being the same, to wit, good and blessed men here, 
and bad and miserable men there, the result is the 

14. The result is the same. The good are, in 
consequence of the manifestation of God, in His 
Justice, to them, made to be more happy ; and the 
more manifestation, the more blessedness : While 
the evil are, by the same means, to become 
more miserable, ever more miserable. And so on 
with regard to both classes of men, without 
determinate end. 1 

1 5. But tis time that an objection, which may 
not unnaturally occur, should be favoured with a 
hearing. An objector, then, might urge the 
following. Has not one important point been 
omitted ? Is there not an additional element, of 
great weight, to which, as yet, no allusion has 
been made ? Is it not true, that this life is a 

a Supra, Dem., Sect. 9. b Schol. II., 13, 14. 


state of probation, of trial, and of discipline, the 
future life being one, not of probation at all, but 
of retribution, full and final retribution : and is 
not this vital difference between the two states 
a matter of the very highest moment, the considera 
tion of it being quite indispensable in the rendering 
of an answer to the question which has been 
raised ? 

16. No doubt can be entertained about the 
importance of the point, but a doubt may be 
entertained about the entire novelty of the same. 
If you take the additional element, as suck, to the 
problem, it will, doubtless, be contained in it, and 
must go along; with it. But what if the element 

O O 

pre-existed in the problem before this handling of 
it as a distinct thing ? With great propriety is 
the mooted point to be weighed : the only doubt 
concerns its existence beforehand, in the matter 
which has been before the reader. 

17. The essential of a state of future retribu 
tion, as distinguished from the present scene, where 
men are upon their trial, is, that, in that future, all 
the checks, impediments, and limiting conditions 
of all kinds, will be removed out of the way. So 
that virtue, or goodness, will reap its full reward 
in unalloyed and perfect happiness : while vicious- 
ness, as a permanent disposition, no longer counter 
acted by direct or immediate influences from the 
kingdom of The Good, will be allowed to meet 


witli the extremest punishment in the dire misery 
which is the necessary consequent, no less than the 
appropriate accompaniment, of vice let loose with 
out restraint. This representation appears to be, 
in all its parts, correct. But it only shews, that 
the administration of the Divine Justice will go on 
without the limiting conditions which restrained 
its exercise, and were hindrances to its complete 
manifestation, on earth. In fact, the representa 
tion quite harmonizes with the whole course of the 
argumentation pursued throughout these Scholiums. 
The element, which has been made prominent by 
being singled out, was latently it may be, but 
yet really and truly, in the premises, and the 
conclusion, which had been previously submitted 
to the critical reader. 


18. Answer has been returned to the query, 
How, there being a future state, how shall Justice 
be administered therein 1 But, after all, there is 
no denying that the real gist of the inquiry relates 
more to the hidden import, than to the precise 
form, of the words in which the inquiry is embodied. 
In all probability, the questioner does not ask, or 
care, so much about the nature of the future 
Rewards and Punishments, as he would ask, and 
is naturally curious, about the continuance of the 
Rewards and Punishments ? Shall they last for 


ever and ever ? It is of some importance that no 
miscarriage should take place in conveying these 
things. A rash inconsiderate critic might be 
ready to come to an erroneous judgment, simply 
because he had laid hold of the wrong premises. 
Let this, therefore, be impressed on the reader s 
mind, that our precise question, at the present 
moment, is, Are the natural, and consequentially 
necessary, Rewards of the righteous, and the 
natural, and consequentially necessary, Punish 
ments of the evil or wicked, in short, are the 
complete retributions, whatever these may be, to 
continue in the future state ? are they, indeed, 
to endure coeval with Duration, and coexist with 
Eternity itself? 

19. But at this stage, and for a sufficient 
reason, (the goodness of the reason will be apparent 
by and by, a ) we may drop out of view one of the 
two constituent data of the subject-matter, which 
we have hitherto carried along, imbedded in our 
interrogation. As we have been asking about the 
Rewards of the Righteous, as well as the Punish 
ments of the Unrighteous, about the former as 
much as about the latter ; so, we may advantage 
ously let go our hold now of the former of these 
topics, the Rewards of the righteous or good, 
and confine our attention to the latter, the Punish 
ments of the unrighteous or bad. It shall suffice, 

a Vide, infra, Prop. IV. Schol. iii. 


that, in what remains of this Scholium, we adhere 
to that latter topic alone, and exclusively. Treat 
ing, then, of the Punishments of the wicked, we 
ask, Shall these be continued without end ? 

20. Without end ? Without end, in truth, 
should you lay down that the men, the bad men, 
have no end. But if your position were, that the 
men had an end ; then, the natural, and consequen 
tially necessary, punishment would, of course, have 
an end too. How could it be otherwise ? But 
what ? shall the men, then, themselves have an 
end, or shall they continue in existence forever? 
Of course, their punishment cannot go on without 
the men as subjects of inhesion : but as to the 
continuance perpetually of the men, themselves, 
the bad men, how is it? 

$ 21. Justice cannot tell. She can mve no 

* o 

dogmatic, apodeictically certain, reply. This 
attribute must admit, tbat the ground for a 
confident answer is not in her. Justice can, in 
fact, throw no light, not the faintest ray, upon 
this topic. If we want more light let in, we must 
be humbly and gladly ready to receive, and admit, 
rays coming from above, coming through a sky- 
lightened window, exposed to another region of 
the heavens above us all. 

22. An ample light shines around us at the 
point where we stand, illumining things to a 


certain distance ; hut beyond the limit within 
which the full light is confined, all is obscure, a 
faint light only being discernible in rare directions, 
at a few favoured spots. Endeavouring, to the 
best of our power, to cast our eyes in the direction 
of the more luminous portions of the region which 
is beyond the space of the clear light, and fixing 
our gaze intently on the partially enlightened 
places ; let us note, and set down carefully, the 
result of the experiences. 

23. Shall those dread Punishments be without 
end ? Justice, by herself, cannot tell. Justice 
alone, in answering such a query, and speaking 
with a voice of authority, can do no more than 
pronounce what the rule must be : the punishment 
shall be adequate, or proportionate to the wickedness. 
But if it be assumed, or subsumed, by the questioner, 
that there shall be no such proportionateness, 
namely, no proportion, to the wickedness, in the 
measure of suffering, and, so, punishment, borne : 
this would involve, or plainly be, an outrage on 
all the requirements of Justice. The intenseness 
of the misery, or the punishment, shall be propor 
tioned to the greatness of the wickedness : other 
wise, things are made to run counter to the 
elementary principles themselves of all which this 
unbending attribute demands. 

24. In this connection, it may be noted, that, 
while every act of wickedness (a life of wickedness 


being merely the sum of so many wicked acts) 
should be punished by an adequate, or propor 
tionate, i.e., measurable amount of suffering; end 
less suffering would appear to be, very plainly too, 
measureless, or incommensurable suffering. 

25. Two things, indeed, go to make up the full 
idea of adequateness in suffering and punishment, 
so that nothing can be added to the notion of 
adequacy to make it more complete. The first 
element, is, intensity in degree in the suffering ; 
and the second, is, the length of time during 
which that degree of suffering is to be endured : 
and the two elements are to be added, or multi 
plied, together, in order to the production of the 
completed compound of misery, and punishment. 
But if, for one of the constituents, or any assigned, 
or assignable, period of time, you put in, as an 
ex >o.s facto coefficient, endless duration, you 
thereby render the process of calculation, as to 
adequacy, impossible. 

26. One thing, however, by way of a qualify 
ing observation, deserves to be attended to, while 
we are discoursing, perhaps glibly enough, con 
cerning the endless life of contingent beings, 
who, besides, are sinners. Let it be borne in 
mind, then, that the intensity, that is, of suffering, 
is, to Justice, the chief ingredient, among the 
elements, or in the product; length of time, or 
continuance of the suffering, being merelv the 


adscititious accessary. And you cannot, with 
deference to Justice, suppose that, by prolongation 
of the time of suffering, the due measure of 
intenseness may be withdrawn, the adequate 
degree of intensity in the suffering being justly 
compensated for by that prolongation. 

27. But, at this point, an objection may 
possibly be started. The natural, or conse 
quentially necessary, Punishments of wickedness 
consist in sufferings, or miseries, proportionate to 
the wickedness itself, the effect being according 
to the measure of the potency residing in the cause. 
Justice, however, can award suitable punishment, 
for the wickedness, to the doer of the wickedness, 
only while he lives. Is it not, therefore, within the 
province of Justice to take all possible, or requisite, 
care to prolong life, in order to render the criminal 
capable of enduring the due amount or for the 
specified number of days, or months, or years of 
so much minimum in suffering ? True : yet only 
so far. In the case of human Justice, the principle 
of the representation may be allowed to be un 

28. In the case, however, of the Divine 
Justice, which possibly may be concerned with 
myriads, or millenniums, of years of suffering, or 
punishment, the representation is defective, and 
the principle animating it is even untrue. The 
Supreme Judge who appoints the retribution, runs 


no risk of losing the object of Divine Justice 
untimeously ; because the life of the object, and 
the retribution, do both depend on Him who has 
decreed the one not without equal reference to the 
other. In fact, such a difficulty as the preceding 
is only applicable to a human legislator and judge, 
who has no power of making his sentence, and the 
existence of the criminal, be bound up together, in 
one indissoluble connection. The Divine Law 
giver, and Judge, however, punishes by natural 
laws, self-acting, and self-enforcing, or by infliction 
of connected sufferings, intense in proportion to 
the degree, or measure, of evil done : and all 
eventualities are alike provided for, and made to 
be mutually inter-dependent, by the original 
decree. No danger that any criminal will escape, 
by putting himself out of the way, in the case of 
this Judge, and Executor of this law. In fine, the 

O * 7 

objection, drawn from, and misapplying, one of the 
ingredients in the compound giving the full notion 
of complete adequacy of suffering ; forgets, at least 
the maker of the objection forgets, that the one 
element (that, the non-essential element) cannot 
be can, to no extent, be substituted for the 
other. Indefinitely prolonged time cannot be 
substituted for a certain amount of intensity in 
suffering. A certain high degree of intensity in 
suffering is, as the sign and representative of a 
certain measure or amount of criminality, a definite 


and fixed quantity which can never be superseded 
by substituted time, be the time ever so long. 

29. But here we are reminded, once more, 
that, though a full light illuminates certain places, 
that light finally borders on the most profound 
darkness, with only regions of more or less un 
certain vaporous gloom, interspersed with partial 
and fitful irradiations. We were speaking of the 
adequacy of punishment, in the guise of Buffering, 
and specially of the main ingredient intenseness ; 
and we had been remarking, that the intensity 
could not be abolished, and the vacuity filled up 
by a substituted prolongation of the time of suffer 
ing. Nay, it seems to be a law of suffering, 
applicable, therefore, to all suffering, that, the more 
intense suffering becomes, so much the nearer the 
sufferer is to extinction. We are familiar with the 
workings of this wide law in our little, and low 7 , 
sphere. Some of us are only too familiar with the 
workings of the law. But for the benign anaesthetics, 
exemplifications of the law might be seen, any 
hour, in domestic hospital practice. Pain, carried 
up to a certain point, causes fainting, and utter 
insensibility, to ensue. And, in like manner, with 
regard to more purely mental suffering, namely, 
sufferings from moral causes : Inflict measure upon 
measure of calamities, growing worse and worse, 
upon a man, and (unless a miracle shall prevent) 


the necessary consequence is, madness, or delirium 
in some form, or stupor, and accompanying in 
sensibility. No kind of suffering can be continu 
ally laid on and increased, without incapacity for 
farther suffering being induced at length. This is 
one of the ways by which kind Nature, the outside, 
or ultimate, of God, shews her pity and active com 
passion for her children, when the cup of human 
distress has been filled to the brim, and runs over. 
The blessed anaesthetic, producing insensibility to 
pain, if not utter unconsciousness, is a resemblance 
to the operations of Nature herself, in that the 
copy effects that very insensibility to over great 
a.fonv which the original, and greater cause, had 

O , O O 

before pointed out (only men were blind) as 
the fit amelioration in the case of extremest 

30. The reason of that merciful law is pro 
found, and yet the evidence of its existence will be 
convincing. It should be observed, however, that 
we must keep in mind, beforehand, the original 
and most intimate connection between sin and 
suffering, whereby so much suffering indicates the 
existence somewhere, and in some form of so 
much previously contracted sin and guilt, the 
unfailing precursors, they, of the co-relative : A 
truth which, in the present connection, must by no 
means be lost sight of. A good man, then, has his 
face turned to God, who, as the highest or inmost 


Sun, and the Sun of suns, a the great focus-centre 
of all attractive power, is the life-giver ; and, so, 
the good man is in the way of receiving life-in 
fluences. But a bad man is he who has his face 
turned away from God, and the bad man, his back 
to God. is always withdrawing farther, and farther 
from Him who is Life, and the life of the world ; 
and, so, from the source of all life-influences goeth 
the man, his atmosphere becoming more and more 
darkened, and chilly, and inimical to all health and 
life. Consequently, the evil man is ever drawing 
nearer to death. He is a living thing, in the 
course of evanescing;. Now the law in view seems 


to be a necessary law of dependent moral being : 
which nothing; can counteract but a miraculous 


intervention to sustain, by supplying, life contrary 
to that moral law. 

31. When, therefore, the incorrigibly bad 
man s positive wickedness, as the cause of a 
diminishing series, and his proportionate sufferings, 
at the head of another series of diminutions, shall 
be added together, or multiplied together ; what 
an abundance of the causes and circumstances, 
tending to extinction of being, will be at work to 
increase the fearful stock ! 

32. But it may be urged, in the way of 

a Confer, infra, Prop. IV. Schol. i. 10. 


objection, that the law referred to a is a law but for 
man s body, or, at most, for man as existing in this 
temporal scene. When the blood recedes suddenly, 
and in undue quantity, from the brain, the person 
who has received the accession of agonizing pain, 
or the agitating mental shocks, becomes pale, 
feeling-less, and faints right away. But this is 
merely by virtue of a law applicable to the 
corporeal system applicable to the corporeal 
system, and limited to it. And so of all the other 
particular phenomena, whether the exciting and 
proximate causes be strictly corporeal, or more 
purely mental. All the causes are inert, until they 
reach to, and operate on, the nervous system, or, 
rather, centre, and the terminus of the cranio- 
spinal axis, the white and grey medullary and 
cerebral matter. Such is the medical, and, so, 
fittingly technical, objection, and, as materialistic, 
it is one of a class common enough, and very old. 
If, therefore, the reply to the objection should be 
of an ancient, and characteristic nature likewise, it 
need not surprise any. 

33. Tis admitted, that there is such a law for 
the body, admitted, happily, on both sides ; for 
the existence of the law, as applicable to man s 
material frame, was exactly that which the objec 
tionable, or (by your leave) objected-to section 1 * 
had been trying to enforce. But tis verily another 

a Supra, 29. b Ibid. 


point, whether the law be applicable to the human 
body, in the sense that it has no wider applications, 
and that it is not founded on profounder and more 
enduring realities, appertaining to the region of 
a higher, and more potent causation. This, indeed, 
raises another question, to which, therefore, tis 
riofht that we now address ourselves. 


34. The law applies to the human body. But 
does not the law, as it is, adumbrate a more interior 
law ? or, rather, does not that outside working, on the 
plane of ultimates, shadow forth, that, archetypally, 
there is a more Universal Law, of which the time- 
manifestation is only the external exponent and 
index ? 

35. Now, in answer, let us consider the follow 
ing. Things on the earth, if made, and regulated, 
by a Contriving Mind, (and that this is so, is, at 
this point, our postulate, and no matter of 
question,) earthly things, we say, must have been 
made according to a plan, or after a pattern : there 
must, therefore, be, in the higher sphere of causes, 
the models, of which the earthly objects and effects 
are the resemblances ; and according to the laws of 
these causes, the earthly operations are conducted 
and go on. The earthly images may be affirmed, 
or may be denied, to be the representatives of the 
most real and ever-enduring archetypal ideas: 
but certain it is, that, whatever be the names by 
which these likenesses are designated, the causes 


of them must have pre-existed in, or been present 
to, in some special manner, the Divine Mind, which 
was the depository of the model-thoughts, until 
they \vere actualized in this lower theatre. Tis 
from the very nature and intrinsic necessity of the 
case that this should be so. Postulate a Divine 
Mind, the creative cause of men, and of all earthly 
things : the men, and all their surroundings (and 
the mental constitution, and the corporeal system 
of man, cannot be permitted to be overlooked in 
such a circumstantiating) become matters of the 
utmost moment, not, for an instant, to be forgotten. 
But all these are ultimates, in the world of effects ; 
and not one of the general laws which rule 
substances, and all operations here, can be without 
its representative in that higher world of causes, 
where the real and abiding exemplars exist : where 
they must exist, else there could have been no 
manifestation, in time, of things on that plane of 
ultimates, which is, now and here, their continent. a 

36. What is the nature, or what are the 
characteristics, of that higher law, to which those 
phenomena of Man, and of Nature correspond ; is 
a question which, in many regards, would be a 
most difficult one to solve. 

37. It may be, that to pile agony on agony, 
ceaselessly, upon a man s body, or upon a man s 
soul, upon a man, at any rate ; is impossible, 

a Confer, supra, Lemma, 5. 


regard being bad to that finite nature, by which, 
and within which, man is necessarily environed 
and confined. A finite spirit cannot bear the 
weight of agony, infinite in any respect : this 
appears to be clear and certain. The two things, 
a creature, to wit, and infinite agony, seem to be 
incapable of approximation, far less, of junction. 
The two factors would obstinately refuse to be 
blended, and wrought together. Possibly, this is 
the nearest approach which it is permitted us to 
make to the solution of that awful mystery. How 
much torture, keeping within the bounds of finity, 
can a human being, a pure spirit, or a spirit 
clothed with a body, it matters not, endure, and 
be yet consciously alive ? this is that Secret 
profounder than the Sphinx s riddle, and more 
terrible than aught save lowest Hell which may 
Heaven s pity and compassion never allow to be 
solved in the person of any mere son of man ! 

38. Finally, Our immediate topic has through 
out been a definite one. It was this : So far as 
the single attribute of Justice is involved, (for 
with that sole attribute we were concerned,) How 
about the Rewards of the Good, and the Punishments 
of the Wicked, in the future state of existence ? 
How shall the Divine Justice be exercised there ? 
Is the natural, and consequentially necessary, 
Punishment of the Evil, as well as the natural, and 


consequentially necessary, Reward of the Righteous, 
to continue in the future state for ever and ever ? 

39. There is, however, another, a far wider, 
and, probably, more deeply interesting, question, 
awaiting decision ; although it might, with some 
truth, be said, that the question which has been 
before us concerned us all the more that we were 
obliged, in strict logical procedure, to pass over, 
here and now, the wider, and more interesting 
topic. The new question is this : So far as God, 
with all His attributes, including, of course, yea 
pre-eminently, His perfect Goodness, harmonizing 
with His consummate Happiness, (these two 
animating mutually, and animated by each other,) 
the very Attributes from the activity and action of 
which the creation itself of men arose : we say, 
taking into account all the Attributes of God- 
specially, those concerned with calling the men 
themselves into being, What about the Reward 
of the Good, not forgetting the Punishment of the 
Bad, in the future state ? How will God act 
towards them in the eternal world ? Will the 
natural, and the necessary, Rewards, and Punish 
ments be for ever, or to all eternity ? This, 
indeed, is a question very different from the other 
interrogatory, different as to stand-point, and in 
all the circumstantials. It will fall to be answered 
in another, and a more fitting place. a And as the 

a Vide, infra, Prop. IV. Schol. iii. 


questions are so very different, it is possible that 
the replies thereunto may turn out to be as 
different as are the questions themselves. Possibly, 
too, as the latter of the two may deserve to receive 
a different answer from that due to the other, so 
the answer itself appertaining to the wider and 
profounder question, may be found to be more 
worthy of all acceptation, acceptable, in sooth, as 
cold water to a thirsty soul in a parched and 
thirsty wilderness. 


God, who is True, and faithful, and inflexibly 
Just, is necessarily altogether Righteous. 

1. It has been demonstrated, that, making 
certain pre-suppositions, God is the Inflexibly Just 
One. a Now, to be just, is unquestionably to stand 
in a certain relation to the other. But justice, in 
act, must proceed from a capacity of being just : in 
other words, justice points back to a principle, 
or a something in the mind distinguishable from 
the justice itself. The act must be regarded as the 
consequence of the capacity, or (if you object not 
to the term) the faculty. Most decidedly, and 
most specially, is this the case with respect to 
God, as the Supreme Mind, absolute in Himself. 
If He be just to His moral creatures, there must 

a Preced. Prop. 


be considered to be in Him a mental principle, as 
a something other than the justice itself, considered 
as act ; the act proceeding from the faculty giving 
birth to it. 

2. Now, what is the absolute principle in the 
Divine Mind which gives birth to the justice, on 
supposition of the existence of the suitable objects, 
and of communications therewith ? Absolute 
Justice it cannot be, because, Justice denoting 
necessarily relation,* the terms, "absolute justice," 
are expressive of an impossibility, or rather 
absurdity. In reality, there can be no Justice 
but one sort. All Justice is necessarily relative 
to its objects, its own objects. Unrelative 
Justice would be a chimera. In fact, not a little 
nonsense has been vented, both in this region. 

o * 

and in the approaches to it, or byways from it. 
Alas ! it is quite possible to utter nonsense on 
almost any topic. 

3. No error, however, will be fallen into, 
should we denominate the absolute principle in 
question by the name of Righteousness. With 
all correctness we may say, that there is in God, 
as absolute in Himself, the principle of right, 
rectitude, or righteousness; from which absolute 
principle proceeds, on occasion, justice as act, 
whereby God exercises the strictest justice to His 
Intelligent, Moral creatures. 

a Prop, preced. Lemma. 


4. We conclude, therefore, that there is in 
God an absolute principle of Kectitude, or 
Righteousness, by reason of which He is, ever and 
necessarily, determined towards that which in 
thought is, in itself, right : No matter, whether 
the thing thought of be a purely abstract concep 
tion, or be a thing leading to positive acts in 
relation to the other. 

5. The unalterable Rightness of the Divine 
Nature, which we have arrived at by the course 
actually taken, which we may admit has been 
forced on us by the progress of our ratiocination ; 
that unalterable Rightness, or Rectitude, we say, 
might have been demonstrated otherwise. The 
truth in question might have been proved, in the 
most strictly logical manner, by considerations 
withdrawn from any notions of Justice as a 
positive series of relative acts : and the student 
who shall diligently weigh the elements of a 
demonstration to be found in our Fourth Di vision , a 
will not be far from a perception of a mode of 
proof by which the Absolute Rectitude, here as 
well as the Ineffable Moral Purity, there might 
be most satisfactorily established. 

6. In fine, absolutely speaking, the Divine 
Being must be Righteous. But, as logicians, we 
dare not, at this point, make a stronger affirmation 
respecting the relative act than that God must be 

a Vide, infra, Div. IV. Prop. ii. Dem. 


Just conditionally. For, as we have seen, the 
Justice depends on there being suitable objects, 
and on communications being established with 
them. Thus, God is necessarily undeviatingly 
Righteous in Himself : and He is, by consequential 
necessity, of inflexible Justice in His relations to 
the other. Justice began (it might be affirmed) 
with the creation. Yea, tis not without its own 
significance that, in the progress of our proof, the 
Justice of God was (first) reached by an a 
posteriori step. The proposition as to Justice 
supplies, in fact, the only instance where a simple 
argument from effect to cause is introduced into a 
demonstration ; and this circumstance may be 
held to tell its own tale. Rectitude, however, was 
ere the universe of finites was : it was from 
eternity ; and from eternity it was a necessary 
constituent of the Divine Mind. A condition of the 
Divine Mind is to be always thinking : and the 
thoughts of the Divine Mind were, of necessity, 
always Riirht. 


7. It is, therefore, undeniable, being a most 
evidently true position, that God, the True, the 
Faithful, the inflexibly Just, is, of necessity, 
altogether Righteous ; and we formulate the certain 
and most weighty truth accordingly. 

8. So, God, who is the True, and the Faithful, 
and the inflexibly Just, is, necessarily, the 
altogether Righteous. 



God, ivho is True, and Faithful, and inflexibly 
Just, and altogether Righteous, is, necessarily, 
All-Loving, yea, Love Itself. 


1. Having the Proposition, God is Loving, 
given as one to be evinced by strict demonstration, 
is exactly equipollent to the obligation to prove, by 
reasoning the severest, and impervious to the shafts 
of the keenest logic which may be opposed, that 
God is Love. Let, then, what has been already 
advanced be carefully remembered and pondered : 
namely, That every position which undeniably 
follows from our first principles, themselves 
altogether unimpugnable, is introducible, and, in 
fact, has a real title to remain among the truths of 
our science. 31 Let this be weighed, likewise, That 
any objector, who may present himself, has some 
thing not so very inconsiderable to do. An 
objector is under the necessity of shelving that a 
priori reasoning is totally inapplicable, or he must 
point out wherein it has been positively misapplied 
in the detail. b 

2. But to facilitate our progress in demon 
strating the proposition before us, and in deducing 

a Sect. 4 of Schol. ill. xinder Prop. iii. Div. III. 
b Sect. 12 of Schol. n. under Prop. iii. Div. III. 


correctly the suitable inferences, and making the 
proper applications of the demonstration ; let us, 
first of all, lay down two pre-suppositions, in a 
distinct form. They might indeed have been 
subsumed as we went along, without any such 
explicit enunciation, and verily in a noiseless and 
unpretentious way. Unpretentiousness is generally 
commendable : yet tis laudable only where no 
illicit assumption is concealed under the affected 
reticence ; and every assumption (metaphysical, as 
well as ethical) is improper which is not meant for 
the eye, or honest inspection of some sort. An 
assumption not meant for inspection, but kept 
sedulously out of sight, is dishonest ; and, so, it 
discreetly courts the shade. In fine, twas deemed 
best to proceed in the most undisguised and open 
manner. Besides, what ill consequences need be 
feared from the formal exposure of the postulates 
in question ? The more they are considered, the 
more their truth will be conceded, and appreci 


1. On the supposition of a creation of the 
world, the continuance of the same in being is 
equal to (not, observe, identical with) the continu 
ally repeated creation of the particulars and their 


2. Tis clear, that created existence implies the 
relative Creator. Existence, by reason of a Being 
having made the things begin to be, is dependent, 
of course, on the Being. In fine, conservation, or 
preservation of existence, is plainly tantamount to 
continued creation, on supposition of a creation. 


On the supposition of the conservation of things, 
consequent on a creation ; the supposition of the 
possibility of an annihilation of any, or of all, of 
the things actually existing, involves no contradic 
tion, nor even difficulty. The supposition, that 
things began to be, involves that they may, as a 
possibility, cease to be. Creation involves the 
possibility of annihilation. A Creator, therefore, 
may annihilate. 


1. It has been demonstrated, that the Supreme 
is consummately Happy, a and that the motive to 
create was the overflowing Happiness, in alliance 
with a desire coincident with the perfect Goodness, 
of the Creator. b Now, a great deal is contained in 
these positions ; and it will be necessary that we 
weigh well their fulness of meaning. 

2. In the next place, we must consider the 
force of the indisputably true proposition, that 

a Div. III. Prop. i. b Div. III. Sub-Prop, after Prop. i. 


preservation or conservation is tantamount to 
continued creation ; a not overlooking what is 
implied thereby. 

3. For the consequence is truly important. 
Creation involves Happiness and Goodness : the 
conservation, therefore, must also involve the 
Goodness. Conservation (we say) being equivalent 
to continued creation ; while creation itself 
proceeded from the Goodness of God : the con 
servation must be regarded as the product of the 
same Goodness. 

4. But to come a little closer still to our point. 
The attribute of Goodness it was which brought 
the race of man into being. b Preservation is just 
creation indefinitely prolonged : a The preservation 
of man upon the face of the earth, is, therefore, due 
to that attribute of Goodness. 

5. Now, Goodness, culling men into existence, 
and preserving them in being, after their creation ; 
this is Lore to men. If, in fact, Goodness be 
viewed as a permanent condition or state of mind ; 
Love may be viewed as the same Goodness in 
exercise, or in its acts. In truth : Given Goodness, 
preserving the men whom the Goodness created, 
and have you not Love \ What else could be 
meant by Love ? Verily, such Goodness preserv 
ing men, is but another name for Love to men. 

:t Lemma I. 
h Schol. under Part iii. Div. II. ; and Sub-Prop. Prop. i. Div. III. 


6. We must bear in mind whereabouts we are. 
Our exact stand-point will be seen in the following 
recapitulatory positions. The world, with all it 
contains, began to be. a In particular, our race was 
created ; b and the Goodness of the consummately 
Happy Supreme was the cause or reason of the 
creation. In fine, Man became, is to us equal, in 
logical force, or apodeictically, to saying, Goodness, 
creating, was in lively exercise. The living Good 
ness, as a potency, was put forth in acts. And 
now tis added : Conservation involving continued 
Goodness ; d the Goodness, in such continuous 
living act, is Love. 

7. On the supposition, that it has been demon 
strated that God is All-loving, a question arises, 
naturally arises from the subject itself, but arises 
also from reflection on the case of the attribute of 
Justice. 6 In the case referred to, we have seen 
that Justice is a purely relative affection ; while, 
to express what is, in God, the absolute principle 
from which the Justice on presentation of the fit 
and suitable objects derives its birth, we are 
obliged to use another term, standing for another 
idea, namely, Righteousness, Rightness, Rectitude. 1 
Analogously, must we adopt now another term 

a Sub- Prop. & Coroll. from same, after Prop. iv. Part ii. Div. I. 
b Schol. after Part iii. Div. II. <l Supra, 3. 

Prop. i. and Sub-Prop. Div. III. e Supra, Prop. III. 

t Supra, Coroll. from Prop. III. 


when we would denote that which, in God as 
absolute, corresponds to Love to mankind ? Or, 
does it suffice, to denote the original absolute 
principle from which that Love proceeded, that we 
abide by the same word itself, saying, That, as 
God loves men, so, from eternity, there was, in Him, 
the principle of Love, or (to express it so) He is 
Love itself: Love from eternity, or absolutely, as 
a source, in posse, of the Love which, in esse, a 
creation, or real becoming, of Intelligent and Moral 
creatures capable (because of their nature) of 
loving God in return would develope, or bring- 
forth as a time-manifestation ? 

8. To the query thus started, the correct 
answer must indubitably be, that here, unlike 
what holds in the case of Justice and Righteous 
ness, the very same word which expresses the 
relative affection towards the creature-objects, will 
properly serve to express the absolute principle in 
which the time-manifestation has its origin. Love 
to men could not have come to be, unless there 
had been in God the source, and immediate cause, 
of such a becoming : and the absolute principle, or 
the principle in God as absolute, could be 
righteously denoted by no term better than by 
the term itself which stands for the relative 

9. Thus, God, as He is Loving to His creature, 
so is He, as in Himself, Love itself, or essentially. 


10. But this solution of the inquiry only gives 
rise to another question or the same question in 
another form or the same question, but raised (to 
speak the language of science) to a higher power, 
or (in language less scientific) advanced to a 
profounder phasis. God is loving to men : and 
God is Love itself: But does not Love, whether 
as a relative affection, or as an absolute principle 
in (or of) Deity, equally demand an object ? It 
may be said, and truly, that God is Righteous in 
Himself, or without the supposal of any object. 
But can we suppose Love in God, any sort of 
Love, without supposing, at the same time, an 
object some object or other, to which the Love 
must be directed, and on which the Love must be 
exerted and expended ? In short, are not Love, 
and objectivity, so related that the former cannot 
be, or be conceived to be, without the latter ? 

11. The answer to this query, must be in the 
most decided affirmative. It is formerly and 
absolutely impossible an impossibility in the 
inmost nature of things that Love can exist 
without there being Love exerted towards, or in 
connection with, some object or other. 

12. But if this be so, (and very plainly it 
must be so,) does not the supposition farther 
demand, that there should be the eternal, i.e., 
beginning-less, object of the eternal Love ? Of 
course, that supposition does demand the farther 


concession ; and, of a truth, there is no denying, 
nor evading either, the consequence. 

13. Well, then: that being so, is there not 
necessitated thereby the supposition of the exist 
ence of the creation, or actual beginning to be of 
creatures, as the objective ? Is not the creation 
the necessary eternal effect of an eternal efficient 
cause ? Is not there such a necessity ? By no 
means. Nothing of the kind must, or need, be 
supposed. For, as we have already had a 
demonstration of the impossibility of the con 
ception of the eternity of the material universe, a 
so there is now no reason why we should feel 
the need of a created object to meet the re 
quirements of absolute Love, or Love in God as 

14. Of necessity, Love demands the objective 
to it. True ; but the object may be existing in 
the Supreme Mind Itself, and discoverable on an 
analysis of the outer part at least of the internal 
constitution of the Godhead. The Divine Being, in 
being conscious of His own thoughts, 13 must be 
capable of reflection upon Himself, also. Without 
such capability of self-reflection, or apperception, 
there were no mind : True mind demands, necessarily 
demands, this power of apperception, or self- analysis. 1 * 
Well : the mind reflecting has, as objective to it, 

a Div. I. Part ii. Prop. iv. Sub-Prop, and Coroll. from same. 
b Div. II. Part i., Schol. Vide, etiam, Div. III. Prop. i. 3. 


the niind reflected on. All the consequences 
resulting necessarily from the circumstance thus 
referred to, it can form no part of our present 
business to follow out. A single suggestive hint, 
however, in addition to the cardinal fact alluded 
to, may be dropped ere we retire from this ground 
a region admitting to, and abounding in, the 
most fascinating speculation on the sublimest of all 

15. The Supreme Mind, in reflecting, and in 
being, simul et semel, reflected on, supplies, in the 
active, and the passive, attitudes involved, the 
strikingly pronounced duality necessarily inherent 
in the very conception of such a mind. Now, the 
reflection must be accompanied by perfect com 
placence, entertained by the agent reflecting, to 
wit, the mind existing as agent, towards and upon 
the reflected on, or the mind existing as patient. 
That is, the Divine Mind reflecting, is delighted 
with = loves the Mind reflected on. Necessarily 
so, because the reflecting on perfections (whether 
attributes or thoughts) must causally necessitate 
perfect complacence, delight, love pure felicity, 
in short in the very reflection. Thus, the reflected 
on is loved : the Eternal Mind, therefore, eternally 
delights in, or loves, that image, or likeness, 
begotten of itself, which is reflected on. It is 
evident, too, that the reflecting Mind, as the cause 
of the loved reflection, is truly and really the 


Father of the other, which, therefore, becomes, is 
eternally becoming, the Son of that Love. All this 
is evident, because it follows from the postulation 
of premises which themselves have been thoroughly 

16. But is not the relation which has just 
been exhibited productive, by the necessary 
sequence of thought, of yet another relation in 
the Godhead ? Doubtlessly it would appear so : 
but it behoves us to stop short, else, and ere 
we are aware, we shall be certainly landed in 
the study of the verity of the Divine Trinity. 
Indeed, it seems hardly possible to encounter 
the doctrine of the true Love of God, even in 
the abstractest way, without touching on some 
points where the doctrine branches oft into, if not 
Trinitarian ground, ground surely adjoining the 
sphere within which the doctrine of the primal 
Triad is contained. In fact, the two may be 
compared to two circles, or other geometrical 
figures, whereof the one is contained within, and 
forms part of, the other. While, on the other 
hand, the dogma of one God, shut up in but 
one person, is an unprolific datum, and leads to 
very little of any great importance or interest to 
man. The Love to a creature of a Being, loveless 
before the creation, furnishes but a cold sort of 
warmth. That dogma is besides a horrific doQ-ma, 

O O 

holding within it the idea of an utterly solitary 


Mind, existing, for the eternity before the creation 
was, in drear, dread solitude, alone, and un-loving : 
for, the moment Love enters on the scene, agent 
and patient, the lover and the loved, enter too, and, 
in fine, the first step leading to hypostases in the 
Godhead is taken. 

17. As a matter of course, this is another 
relative Attribute : relative it is, at all events, in 
the same way as that in which Truth is relative." 
Both Attributes require the objective, an object of 
some kind. Truth imperatively demands an object, 
and Love imperatively needs an object. The nature 
of Love is such that it incessantly craves after an 
object. Without any object, Love would inevit 
ably cease to be Love, becoming an unsatisfied 
longing for it would not know what : there could 
remain no more than an everlasting pining. Love, 
then, must have its object : Without it, Love Itself 
were unhappy. Completely Happy Love ; in other 
words, the Love of The Consummately Happy One ; 
must have its object : ay, and an adequate object 
too. An insufficient object could not meet such 
Love, or (but language, with its limited power, 
threatens to fail us here) be equal to the require 
ments of the yearnings of the Love of the Eternal 
Infinite One. Anything contained within Time 
and Space were all too little. Love ( tis repeated) 
imperatively needs an object. The objective, of 

a Vide, supra, Prop. IT. Lemma. 


some sort : whether a Hypostasis in the Godhead,* 
or some phase of the creaturely nature ; this latter, 
again, being divisible into the angelic nature, b and 
the human nature. Of course, we eschew the 
particular consideration of every object rising above 
the plane of mankind ; in the same way as was done 
in the case of the proposition about Truth. c 

18. This is a most relative Proposition, if you 
like, or when held to be restricted to a creature, 
and to man. For, should it be argued, that, 
strictly, as Goodness is to all things, or may be 
conceived to regard all things, in creation ; so Love 
is certainly not applicable to even animality 
generally, but, in propriety, can be considered 
applicable to only humanity, the Intelligent and 
Moral, the Rational and Loving, part of the world ; 
no one should be greatly inclined to dispute it. 

19. On the whole, as it has been demonstrated, 
that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, 
All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, 
is necessarily perfectly Good ; (1 the implied Goodness 
being entirely equivalent to Love ; e the conclusion 
is, therefore, inevitable, that that Great and Good 
Being is necessarily Loving, or, to vary the 
phraseology, the All-Loving One. And the Love 

a Weigh 6 of Lemma, Prop. ii. Division III. 

11 Weigh 5, ibid. d Sub-Prop, to Prop. i. Div. III. 

c Ibid., 7. Xupra, Sect. 5, 6. 


to the creature being regarded as to its source, that 
Being is rightly said to be Love Itself. Love, 
unlike Justice, has its foundation in se. Love is 
act, or state, as to time, and aboriginal principle, 
all in one. 

20. Then, God, who is the True, and the 
Faithful, and the inflexibly Just, and the altogether 
Righteous, is, necessarily, the All-Loving One, yea, 
Love Itself. 



1. A great difference exists, and is to be 
noticed between the cases of Truth and Justice, 
and the case of Love ; and it shall be our business, 
here, to distinguish between the cases, as the 
nature of things demands. 

2. Whereas, the demonstrations, in the cases 
of Truth and Justice, are to this effect : postulating 
objects, and that there be action ; God is, necessarily, 
Truthful and Just. But the action itself is not 

3. To particularize. To be True, requires 
objects. a God is necessarily Truthful to man, 
when He communicates with man. b But the 
communication itself is not demonstrated : it was 

a Supra, Prop. II. Lemma. b Prop. II. Dem. 


but postulated. Consequently, Truthfulness, as a 
fact, is never proved under the demonstration in 
view. a 

4. So with regard to Justice. To be Just 
requires objects, b and objects of a special 
description. God necessarily administers Justice, 
in communicating with the good and with the bad. d 
But the actual administration itself of the Justice, 
in reference to those objects, is never demonstrated : 
Consequently, no one exercise of the attribute in 
question is ever demonstratively established. 

5. But, with regard to Love, tis quite other 
wise. For, when there is postulated now, what has 
been beforehand demonstrated, that Love does 
conserve the men whom Goodness created, 6 the 
existence itself of the men, the objects of the Love, 
is irreversibly bestowed. Love does, therefore, 
evidence the existence of its own objects, by its 
intimate living relation to them. 

6. In truth, nobody except, perhaps, a stray 
metaphysician (maddened by all-unadulterated 
egoistic emanations, inhaled imdilutedly, and, by a 
great deal, too incautiously) dreaming in a panthe- 
istically idealistic region hopelessly beyond the 
sphere common to Theists and Atheists, and very 
far indeed away in the clouds ; he (a man himself, 

a Prop. II. Postal. d Prop. III. Dem. 

b Supra, Prop. III. Lemma, 1. e Supra, Dem. Sect. 5, 6. 

c Prop. III. Lemma, 3, &c. 


it is to be presumed) having been expressly 
transported thither by no other machinery than 
his o\vn pure and simple, but rapt, imagination, 
helped, mayhap, by a push from some other unsober 
philosopher, at starting : nobody (we say) but a 
stricken metaphysician, denies the existence of 
men. Nobody denies, therefore, the existence of 
the objects of this attribute of Love. 

7. And this is now to be considered : Whether 
it is credible, that, Goodness having created men, 
and Love being concerned in preserving them, 
God, as possessor of the attributes of Trueness and 
Justness, should never, on any occasion, reveal 
Himself to men, or come, in any way, into living 
contact with them ? Love has men for its cosmical 
objects : God loves the world of men : Were it not 
incredible, therefore, that the God of Truth, and 
Justice, should never draw nigh unto men ; draw 
nigh, for example, unto the virtuous and good, who 
resemble Himself, to bless them yet more and 
more. a Yea, Love makes it plain, that God s 
presence with men is credible, and more than 
credible : the utter absence of God were incredible. 
Incredible, indeed, and impossible, too, that Love 
should never communicate with its objects, whom, 
yet, it conserves from day to day. Love and God 
are the same : b God does, therefore, communicate 
with Love s objects, that is, men. But God is 

a Vide, supra, Prop. III. Schol. ii. 13, &c. b Supra, Dem. 19. 


Truthful, and Just, as well as Loving. In fine, 
Love must be supposed to have Truth and Justice 
in its train. The three Attributes meet in the 
same God, the common Substrate of all the 
Attributes : Therefore, the three do necessarily go 

8. Thus, it is proved, that the condition of 
Truth, as actual fact, and the condition of Justice, 
as actual fact, have been implemented. And so, 
what was before demonstrated as in posse, is now 
demonstrated as in esse ; the only postulate 
subsumed, by the demonstration, being one as 
inoffensive as it is verily unobjectionable, the 
position, to wit, There are men. A position very 
secure from assailment on the side of Atheism ; 
as Atheists are agreed in ignoring, not men indeed, 
but all intelligences, or orders of intelligences, but 
men. So far from denying the existence of men, 
Atheists go to the opposite extreme, and deny all 
mental existence which is not a man s. 

9. The present demonstration is, thus, the 
complement, not only of the Proposition as to 
Goodness, a as it unquestionably is, but also it 
is (though in another way) the complement of the 
Proposition regarding Truth, b as well as of that 
regarding Justice. For which reason, the import 
ance of this Proposition cannot be rated too highly. d 

a Sub-Prop, under Prop. i. Div. III. b Prop. ii. Div. III. 
c Prop. iii. Div. III. (1 Vide, supra, Prop. ii. Postul. 


The referential importance of this Proposition, 
therefore, cannot be rated too highly, even if we 
were to urge nought about its importance on its 
own account. But such importance, in its turn, 
cannot be overrated. 

10. For, Love is, without doubt, a tree of 
Life : in a certain good sense, it is the tree of Life. 
It is, in fact, the true mundane Yggdrasil. To 
vary our view, and enlarge, to the utmost, the 
illustrating medium : Love is the central attractive 
power of the universe. It is the centre, whence 
all influential radiations must depart, and to which 
they must return as their proper home. There is, 
of necessity, an inmost Spiritual Sun to the 
Universe ; a central influence appertaining to the 
sum total of all the forces of every world, and 
every system of worlds. a There must be supposed 
a centre ; in other words, a Sun of all Suns, 
material and spiritual : otherwise, related things 
would be out of proportion to each other, and 
apparent effects would be unlawfully divorced 
from their only possible causes. 

11. GOD is Love; and, when we say so, we 
evoke the omnipotent word, representative of the 
all-radiant idea, which throws warmth upon the 
field of our world. Possessed of this secret, we feel 
we are in possession of the talisman yielding the 
primal causation. When we have reached as high 

a Vide, supra, Prop. III. Schol. iii. 30. 


as Love, we have reached (to use the humanly 
most significant expression) the very heart of GOD. 

12. And if Love is omnipotent at one pole, 
equally so is it at the opposite pole. Strong as an 
aggressive force, it is equally strong as a resisting 
force. Equally positive : equally negative. 

13. What, now, can resist the Love of God? 
What can be stronger than the great motive power 
of the absolute universe ? 



1. In the preceding Scholium there is pointed 
out one great difference between Propositions II. 
and III. and the present Proposition." There are 
other differences ; and it may be wise to take this 
opportunity, so fit and suitable in every way, to 
draw attention to some of those other differences. 

2. Why, or from what cause, Creation ? And 
how do the several attributes of Truthfulness, 
Justice, and Goodness = Love, stand affected to 
Creation, and to each other with reference to that 
relation ? These are the questions to which 
attention shall be now directed : and throughout 
this Scholium our distinctive object must be 
sedulously kept in sight. 

a Schol. preced. 1-6. 


3. Supposing the fact of a creation Supposing, 
in other words, that the world which is around us, 
and the worlds upon worlds, or systems upon 
systems of worlds, which are around our little ball, 
or our small sidereal system, as a centre, with all 
things in those continents, began sometime to be 
(a point demonstrated*) ; when tis asked, Why 
was that world of ours, or the universe at large, 
created ? the answer (as we have seen b ) is : 
Because of the existence of a principle co-incident 
with the over-flowing, as twere, of the Happiness 
of the Being who is the essential Substratum of 
Expansion and Duration, Immensity and Eternity. 
To repeat it : The Happiness of the Infinite One, 
uniting with His Goodness, does, as it were, flow 
over : Over-flowing, the confluence freely out-births 
itself in Creation. And this is Goodness : at any 
rate, one great part of Goodness. 

4. But were one to ask abstractly, that is, 
abstracting in mind creation as fact, with its only 
possible cause ; w r ere one (we say) to ask abstractly, 
Why, or, Whence Creation ? a totally different 
state of things would be presented. Our stand 
point would be different : the objects seen would 
be different : The vision, therefore, would be 
reported (because presented) quite differently. In 
the case now supposed, we would not be in 

a Div. I. Part ii. Sub-Prop, and Coroll. therefrom. 
b Div. III. Sub-Prop. 


possession of the indispensable condition of the 
unspeakable Happiness, in union and unison with 
the aboriginal Goodness, of the One self-existent 
Substance. But this whole matter shall be made 
still plainer. 

5. And to begin at the beginning. Were the 
question put, Will the Great Being create ? the 
question being taken in and by itself, it could not 
be answered. The reasons, or causes, would be 
awanting. In the case at present imagined, the 
fact of creation would be out of sight : creation 
would be only possible. And whether the Great 
Being would, or would not, create, could not be 
declared. The question could be answered only by 
the help of certain assumed positions. a Creation 
being viewed as no more than a mere possibility ; 
and the theorem of complete Happiness b being 
entirely omitted; no creaturely mind, however 
exalted, could by any means decide even this, 
Whether it were likely that there would be a 
creation at all, or nut. The premises warranting 
any decision would be absent. On the other hand, 
the Happiness b being taken into account ; creation 
would be likely : Not necessary, by reason of the 
entire Freeness, but very likely. In fine, when 
we view creation as a possibility, and not yet 
actually being, the absolute attribute of Happi- 

a Confer 3 of Lemma, Prop. ii. Div. III. 
b Div. III. Prop. i. c Div. II. Part. iii. 


ness is the attribute to which we must mainly 

6. But another datum shall next be postulated. 
On the supposition of a creation of men, a point 
itself demonstrated elsewhere, a we have demon 
strated Goodness to be an Attribute : b the transi 
tional Attribute ; intermediate between the absolute 
attributes of Divisions I. & II., and the really 
relative attributes of this Division. We have 
demonstrated, we repeat, Goodness to be an 
attribute. That is ; accepting the creation of man 
as a fact; then, applying to the attribute of 
Happiness/ 1 we prove that the one must be assigned 
as the cause of the other : e Happiness resulting in 
Goodness, and Creation, are in relation to each 
other as cause and effect. 6 Thus, the question of 
creation is one about Goodness. This is the 
attribute to which creation must be attached. 

7. Of course, we may affirm nearly the same 
thing of Conservation, so far forth as conservation 
is tantamount to continued creation.* Conserva 
tion, as well as Creation, is the result of Goodness. 

8. Thus : If the question, Taking for granted 
creation, why creation ? be put ; the attributes of 

a Coroll. from Sub-Prop. Part ii. Div. I. ; & Schol. Part iii. Div. II. 

b Div. III. Sub-Prop. 

c Vide Div. III. Prop. ii. Lemma, 3. Coroll. from Prop. ii. 

Lemma, 3. Prop. iii. Lemma, 6. Vide, etiam, Prop, iv., 

Dem. Sect. 17, 18. 
d Div. III. Prop. i. e Div. III. Sub-Prop. * Supra, Lemma I. 


Happiness and Goodness give us the answer. And 
they only are capable of entering into the solution. 

9. But when we are abreast of Justice, tis 
quite another case. Another attribute has been 
introduced, and a quite different field is before us. 

10. These topics, though they may be com 
paratively uninteresting, are yet highly important 
in themselves ; and therefore, and to attain 
exceeding plainness in so grave a matter, we shall 
go over the ground again. When we regard 
creation as only possible, man is viewed, of course, 
as not yet actually existent : he is only to be. 
He exists in the ideas of the Supreme Mind, and 
there only. And when, postulating man, we speak 
of the cause of man s existence, we must look to 
Happiness, and the accompanying and resulting 
Goodness. But when we have in aspect man as 
really existing ; and God s dealing with man, the 
reality : there is taken in another attribute, that, 
to wit, of Justice. AVe say, we take in the Justice 
of God ; not merely His Truth. Yet, doubtless, 
the Justice of God involves the Truth of God. a 

11. And, in the same way, when we regard 
God as the Just God, man is held as created ; not, 
to be created. God created man : b and He acts 
towards man, the real existence, not only as the 

a Vide, supra, Prop. III. Dem. 7, et seq. 

b Schol. after Sub-Prop, under Prop. i. Div. III. ; in conjunction 
with Schol. after Part iii. Div. II. 


Good One, who conserves the creatures He brought 
into being/ 1 but as the Just God, who must act 
towards each man as he truly is, and who, there 
fore, must render to every man according to his 
state of mind, and resulting works ; the good man 
being treated as being so, and the bad man being 
treated as such. b 

12. To glance once more at the ground we 
have gone over. The question concerning creation 
can have 110 reference to the attribute of Justice. 
But it refers to Goodness. The fields of the two 
attributes are, so far, entirely distinct. 

13. Truth and Justice, as in God, have, thus, 
nought to do with creation, old or new. id est, 
the creation of man in the beginning, or his 
re-creation now by the impartation to him, as a 
deteriorated being, of a better nature than the old 
one, defaced and all-degraded as it has become. 
Yea, these attributes require, not a possible 
creation, but the creature as an accomplished fact, 1 
as the field for their exercise. GOD is Just = GOD 
is Just to creatures, or at least to men* It is 
never to be forgotten, that the Good One, who 
creates, conserves man ; and, as Conserver or 

a Dem. preced. Sect. 3, 4. 

b Supra, Prop. III. Dem. 9, & Coroll. 6, multisque aliis locis. 

c Confer, ut supra, Prop. III. Schol. ii. 11, & Schol. sub Schol. 

ii. 3. 

d Conftr Sect. 10, 11, ut supra. 
e Div. III. Prop. iii. Lemma, 2, etc. 


Preserver, has, therefore, to do with man as a 
real existence.* 

14. There is one thing which must be admitted, 
and which (if our conceptions were capacious and 
clear) should and would be borne in mind, that, 
in one great special respect, tis somewhat different 
with regard to Truth, from what strictly holds with 
regard to Justice. Truth may be conceived to be 
occupied, not only concerning creaturely intelli 
gences other than men, for instance, angelic spirits ; 
but also concerning uncreated hypostases, if there 
be such, if there be (let us say) a Second Hypos- 
tasis, and a Third, in the GODHEAD.* Justice, 
however, Justice in, at any rate, its essential 
aspects, can be exercised only in the case of 
creaturely objects ; that is, as far as our demon 
stration is concerned, only with regard to human 




1. A question was reserved d for this place ; the 
question, to wit, Will the Rewards of the Righteous, 
and the Punishment of the Wicked, continue for 
ever ? And, on a first view, it appears as if, in 
this quarter of our a priori horizon, the question 

a Dem. preced. Sect. 3, 4. 

b Confer Div. III. Prop. ii. Lemma, Sect. 4, 5, 6. 
Div. III. Prop. iii. Lemma, 2, etc. 
d Vide 39, Schol. in. Prop. iii. Div. III. 


might be decided very easily. For the Love of 
God, founded on His Goodness, being in the field 
of argument, as now to be postulated, what great 
difficulty can there be ? 

2. We have seen a what is the decision, upon 
the matter in hand, of the attribute of Justice, the 
origin, this, of so many prominent and differential 
masculine characteristics. Justice cannot decide, 
dogmatically and unconditionally, whether the 
rewards of the righteous, and the punishments of 
the wicked, shall last for ever, or not. Justice can, 
in truth, say nothing apodeictically on these points. b 
This attribute informs us, that impartial retribu 
tions shall be inflexibly and accurately administered 
to every man, according to his works ; whether the 
administration takes place in this world, or shall 
take place in the next world. But, taking for 
granted that the rewards and the punishments, or, 
at any rate, the punishments, shall be finite in 
duration, Justice, at the utmost, can do no more 
than decide precisely how long the punishments 
shall last, by declaring that they shall, or at least 
may, last long enough to allow of the infliction of 
misery adequate to the enormity of the wickedness 
calling for punishment. Yet Justice hath no power 
to decide even this by abstract information as to 

a Supra, Prop. III. Schol. iii. 

b Supra, Prop. III. Schol. iii., 21, &c. 

c Prop. III. Schol. iii. Sect. 11-14, &c. 

how loner the men themselves will live ; whether 

O * 

for a long time, or for a very long time. Justice 
did not make the men begin to be : Justice does 
not conserve them : This attribute has nought to 
do with such matters. 8 

3. But is the same decision to be come to by 
the attribute of Love ? Love, on one, at least, of 
its sides, the seat, as it were, of the femininism of 
Deity, namely, Love, as long-suffering patience, 
and pitiful compassionateness, to the low and sunk, 
and mercifulness to the miserable and lost, Love, 
the source, consequently, of the feminine excel 
lencies of our race. Does Love answer the question 
with the same, / know not: it is not in me? 
Surely, one need not be reckoned over- hasty who 
would at once say, Xo : Love must reply with a 

4. As far as the Rewards of the Righteous are 
concerned, there will be no difficulty at all, from 
any quarter. The ground of the decision he re is 
clear ; the decision itself easy. Goodness called 
the men into being : b Love preserves them : c In 
the spiritual world, or in heaven, good men will be 
only more like GOD than they were when they 
lived on earth : d On the whole, therefore, the 

a Schc.l. prececl. Sect. 9-13, &c. 

b Sub-Prop. Div. III. c Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. Sect. f> & 9. 
a Vide, supra, !!,& 13, Schol. ii. ; and 11 to 14, Schol. iii., 
both in Prop. III. ; aliosqj loc. 


answer must be, It is certain, that the men will 
exist for ever. All the causes of their existence, 
and conservation, are at work. And no inexor 
able attribute demands, or even seems to demand, 
aught else to be accomplished. The Righteous, 
then, will continue for ever and ever. They are 
attached (if the strong anthropomorphitism may be 
pardoned a ) by strong connecting links, to the throne 
of God. As God liveth, they shall live also. Star- 
suns, they shall shine ceaselessly in the Eternal 

5. Such is the answer to the question, so far 
as the one class of men is concerned. 

6. But what is the answer which is to be 
returned as to the other class ? A very different 
sort of men are the Righteous from the Wicked, 
and a very different solution must be accorded as 
to the case of these latter. The true gist of the 
whole question, as one of difficulty, is undoubtedly 
in this direction. 

7. Will the Punishment of the Wicked be for 
ever? Or, as we might now put the question, 
without just offence to the unalterable laws of logic, 
Will God punish sinners, or, suffer sinners to be 
punished ( = to punish themselves) eternally ? In 
any case, Will sinners be punished eternally ? 
This, then, is the question ; and there can be no 
doubt, that this is a fearfully momentous question 

a Vide, supra, 11, Schol. ii. Prop. III., etc. 


for sinners to ask, and to have answered for them. 
The great reason is, of course, because of the 
tremendous weight attached to one of the terms in 
the query : "for ever," or "eternally," or whatso 
ever the word, or rather words, mayhap the phrase, 
may be. Whatever was the case at first, with 
regard to the equivalent terms, or rather expres 
sions, in the original Greek and Hebrew languages 
from which source the current English meaning 
was doubtless taken ; the term has come to have a 
most particularly emphatic meaning with us. By 
"eternal" existence, as employed in this question, 
the ordinary superficial theologian of the day means 
(though perhaps he knows it not) an existence 
enduring alongside of, and coincident with, the 
duration of the existence of God Himself: true 
co-existence. Tis but proper to avoid enlarging, 
on the present occasion, on this portentous topic ; 
but, nevertheless, tis not easy to omit the 
suggestion of a single reflection : Only think, then, 
of the full significance of that affirmation which 
attaches the miserable damnation of the wicked in 
hell and, consequently, infernal blasphemies, the 
absolute acme of all evil to the o-lorious high 

O O 

throne of the Eternal : which binds up the existence 
of evil, and the existence of GOD, in one indissoluble 
attachment. Speak we not of the accumulation of 
horrors, to every individual member of the universe, 
implied in the dreadful position : But in what 


sense can God be the One Living One, if an 
antagonistic element, centred in a monstrous 
Monarch, be bound up with the eternity to come as 
much as God Himself ? For, no condition of things, 
even hellish, can exist without the shadow at 
least of a government. No kingdom without a 
king. Even an abhorred kingdom of darkness 
could not maintain itself through one of the days, 
nights rather, of hell, without its appallingly 
hateful and hating Ahriman. 

8. But in touching on the immense significa 
tion covered by one of the terms of that query, 
have not we been betrayed into something like a 
proleptical objection to the doctrine itself of 
Eternal Torments ? The excuse must be, that the 
drifting into objection, proceeding from exposition, 
is only too natural. Yet it must be remembered 
that, whatever be implied in the position, The 
torments of the damned shall be to all eternity ; 
our inquiry at present is really this, Is the doctrine 
true ? Whatever be involved in the fundamental 
idea of the junction of such a predicate to such 
a subject, Is the proposition itself true, or false ; 
to be accepted, or rejected ? 

9. What great difficulty can there be, after all, 
in deciding the question ? 

10. Namely, what difficulty can there be in 
deciding, that those attributes of Goodness and 
Love will be always exigent in demanding that, 


if possible, the torments of the miserable damned 
should be made to cease to be : While not one of 
the other Attributes, as demonstrated, necessitates, 
or even seems to necessitate, the everlasting 
continuance of the misery of those unhappy 
damned ones, most miserable they in their minds, 
and most grievously tormented perhaps in their 
responsive bodies ; those most pitiable sufferers, 
most to be pitied as suffering tortures by reason 
of their own evil passions, strong and victorious 
over all their lawful feelings and thoughts, strong 
and victorious even in hell, the place of not-to-be- 
comforted lost souls. Certainly, not one of the 
other Attributes does, in the merest seeming, 
necessitate the everlasting continuance of misery, 
if Inflexible Justice do not so. And this Attribute 
does not, even in seeming, demand the everlasting 
misery nor any such appallingly, unutterably, 
horrific consequence. 11 

11. If, then, the misery be to come to an end, 
How (say you) shall the misery come to its end ? 
Who can tell ? and it is not necessary that any 
one should know. Enough, if we know that 
Inflexible Justice is silent, while Divine Love in 
the shape of gentle pity and compassion, or (better 
yet) soft-hearted Mercy Mercy, which is simply 
Love = Goodness to the abject and miserable, 
Divine Love (we say) unceasingly pleads and prays 

a Vide, supra, Prop. III. 


for the cessation, as soon as possible, of all the 
unutterable wretchedness in the wide domains of 
God. Love to men is very fain to become Mercy, 
on the presentation of the truly miserable among 

men : and Divine Mercy what, in this wide 

universe, can refuse to yield itself thereunto? 
Enough is it for the good to know so much : and 
humbly must they wait, in hope, for that consumma 
tion, the greatest, and the last, of all the creaturely 
consummations. For, by that consummation, 
the whole creation, which, so visibly and pitifully, 
groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, 
shall, finally, be delivered from the bondage of 
corruption. In fine, Then the end ; and God 
shall be all in all. 


1. But though no one can tell, in a positive 
way, or dogmatically, how the misery is to come 
to its end ; one may surmise how the misery will 
be terminated. The misery will assuredly end : 
But very likely not by the ceasing to be of the 
evil, or (to give the most proper term) the wicked 
ness, abstractly taken the cause of all the misery. 
For, no way of ending evil is patent, or even 
comprehensible, so long as the wicked persons 
themselves remain. The evil tree must first be 
made good, before the poison-fruit will become 


good, and safe for food, and wholesome in every 
way. It seems, indeed, a moral proposition as 
certain as any in metaphysical science, or mathe 
matical, that the intensely wicked will not cease 
from troubling even in hell : (whatever they may 
l>e compelled to be, or not to do, in the grave.) 
But, at all events, the wickedness, and its effect, 
the misery, might be made to cease to be, by an 
Almighty fiat, commanding the wickedness, with its 
subject, to cease to be. a That Power which called 
all men into being, can cause men to be no more : 
yea, it could cause all the things of Time itself to 
be no longer, and that in the very fullest of 
senses. a No contradiction, no impossibility, no 
absurdity, yea, no difficulty, of any kind, would 
be implied in an act of Omnipotence, directed to 
such a purpose, and bringing about such an end as 
contemplated. About the existence of the power, 
there can be no doubt : The question is solely 
about the exercise of the ability. The annihilation 
of the wicked in hell is quite possible to the 
Creator. a Some of the Moral Attributes demand 
it : Not one Attribute says, Nay ; the wickedness, 
and the misery, multiplied into each other, and 
increasing in more than any geometrical ratio. 
must last for ever. The final annihilation, there 
fore, is possible : And, being possible, it is 
absolutely certain. The Creator, and Conserver, 

l Lemma II 


as the All-Loving One, must be the All-Merciful 
One too, since, in Him, Mercy is but Love regard 
ing the disconsolately afflicted. a Hence, the 
certainty follows from the possibility of final 
annihilation, as the ceasing to be of all misery in 
the universe. 

2. Thus, the doctrine of the final annihilation 
of the hopelessly abandoned and reprobate wicked, 
arid therefore the unutterably tormented and com 
fortless, is a doctrine from which there is no 
escaping. It is a tenet of reason, and it is, there 
fore, in perfect accord with the reasonings of the 
argument a priori. 

3. Not the philosophically-sounding annihila 
tion, however, but the morally-characteristic 
"destruction," is the ethically correct (not to say, 
the Scriptural) expression, to denote the awful 
utter close of the career of incorrigible, and finally 
impenitent, wicked men. ; Twere not lawful to 
seek to found any statement, in a demonstrative 
work, upon the testimony of a Bible-writer, or 
upon any authority whatever : but as there is here 
but surmising, and not laying down the law 
apodeictically, b each of the writers in the Bible is 
entitled to be heard, as well as, and as much as, 
any author, whosoever he be ; even taking that 
low ground wherefrom the authors of the books in 
The Book are viewed as purely human authorities. 

a Supra, Schol. III. 11. b Supra, 1. 


" Destruction," tis repeated, is the ordinary 
Scriptural expression, though, occasionally, we 
meet with the idea in even stronger words or 
phrases; such as, "everlasting destruction from 
the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of 
His power." Everlasting destruction, indeed, just 
because from the presence of the Lord, the 
Demiurge, the " express image " of the person 
(vTToo-Tc ia-eux;) of Him " who only " "hath Life in 
Himself," the sole source of life to all the creatures. 


1. One circumstance there is, on which an 
observation, not to be forgotten, must be made. 
It is only by a licence, that Truth, or Truthfulness, 
rigorously construed, is included among the Moral 
Attributes. Considered apart from other modes of 
Mind, Trueness belongs rather to the Intellectual 
class of faculties. a But, being (in its turn) a main 
constituent in Justice, or the Moral faculty , b Truth 
fulness is drawn over to the great Moral group of 
mental susceptibilities. 

2. The proposition as to Trueness constitutes, 
indeed, the link between the Intellectual Attributes 
and the strictly Moral powers of Mind. Just as, 
in a similar manner, the principle of Freeness 
might be said to be a link between the same two 

a Vide, supra, Prop. II. Dem. 4. 

b Vide, supra, 3 of Lemma, Prop. iii. Div. III. 


sets of powers : Freeness being capable of being 
viewed as connected with the large Will branch, 
and, so, as being a Moral faculty ; as well as it is 
capable of being viewed as connected with the more 
purely Intellectual Attributes, or those appertain 
ing to the domain of the Understanding, Freeness 
standing in relation to the power of beginning 
motion, being itself beyond the reach of, and 
unconstrained by, all ab extra influences. 

3. Here terminates the consideration of the, at 
once, directly Relative, and purely Moral, Attri 
butes. The propositions of this group carry on, of 
course, the series of the Psychical Attributes ; 
and they close the series of those Attributes which 
have been denominated the Simple, in opposition to 
the Complex or Compound, which are yet before 
us, remaining for consideration in the Fourth 
Division of this demonstration. 





1. In place of such words as, God, u ho is the 
True, and the Faithful, and the inflexibly Just, 
and the altogether Righteous One, ivho is also the 
All-Loving One, yea, Love Itself, as occurring in 
the last section of the preceding Proposition a ; in 
future, there shall be employed, for the most part, 
these terms, GOD, THE LORD, or, THE LORD GOD. 

2. The substitution will conduce to an effective 
brevity. It will enable us to avoid circumlocutions 
and repetitions, which might be not only tedious, 
but undesirable perhaps on accounts other than 
those proceeding from mere tediousness, provocative 
of wearisomeness. 

3. The predicates in the various propositions 
demonstrated in the foregoing Sub-Division, express 
relative qualities. These are the attributes expres 
sive of peculiar relations in which the Supreme 
Being stands to the human race ; and the term 

a Viz. 20, Dem. Prop. iv. Div. III. 


LORD shall henceforth be used frequently, at all 
events, shall be used to signify the relations 
denoted by those words respectively. The term in 
question shall stand for all those predicates of moral 


As God, the Lord, is the Best, so He is, necessarily, 
the Wisest of Beings. 

8 1. Wisdom is not the same as Knowledge. 

*J O 

But Wisdom implies Knowledge, as Knowledge 
implies Intelligence, and Intelligence, again, 
implies a Mind. a Knowledge is implied by 
Wisdom as the less is implied by the greater. 

2. In itself, Wisdom may be said to be the 
capacity of designing to employ means to ends, so 
as to bring the ends or purposes about. Wisdom, 
therefore, involves the knowledge of the use of 
the most proper means, in aiming after purposes 
or objects. Wisdom may even be said to involve 
the capability of handling things, so as to turn 
them into causes adequate to produce effects. 

3. Thus, Wisdom is Knowledge of a certain 
kind, applied in a certain way. Wisdom is the 
knowledge of the relations of things specially, 
of the relations of some things, as means, to other 

a Division II. Part i. Scholium. 


things, as ends. Wisdom is also the knowledge of 
the fitnesses of causes to produce effects, in combina 
tion with the power to employ the means, and to 
bring the ends or effects to pass, in combination, 
moreover, with the actual realisations of the mere 
potentialities. For Wisdom implies somewhere a 
power of execution. And power must be measured 
by the actual execution or effect. 

4. The elements, therefore, going to constitute 
Wisdom are, Knowledge of relations, will and 
power to use means, and thereby to realise ends, 
or put in execution affairs. 

5. Wisdom, as it has hitherto been explained, 
is, for the most part, at least, an Intellectual 
function of Mind. AVhatever be the constituents 
of which, exclusively, Wisdom consists (a point on 
which we are by no means obliged to pronounce 
an absolute verdict ;) tis certain, that Wisdom 
appertains to Intellect in this, that every act of 
Wisdom involves a mental act or process into which 
the Intellect enters. Whether or no Wisdom is 
purely Intellectual, Wisdom implies always the 
operation of the Intellectual powers. That which 
containeth not any appeal to. or use of, the faculties 
of the Intellect, is, in no propriety of speech, 
Wisdom of any sort. 

6. So much with regard to Wisdom abstractly, 
or considered apart from all but the essential 
momenta. In fine, Wisdom, so far forth as it is an 


Intellectual function of Mind, is what we have 
been considering. There is, however, another sort 
of Wisdom ; a Wisdom with positive moral 
elements, superadded thereunto. Of which addi 
tional species anon. 

7. The ground being thus opened up, by the 
appropriate definition, or description, we are ready 
to advance to the demonstration itself of the 
Proposition, that God the Lord is necessarily the 
Wisest of Beings. 


God the Lord is, necessarily, the Wisest of Beings. 

1. Now, that God the Lord must needs be the 
Wisest of Beings, requires no very laboured 
demonstration. The media concludendi are at 
hand, and irresistible. 

2. God the Lord has been demonstrated to be 
the Intelligent and All-knowing Creator of all 
things whatsoever ; a and He has also been proved 
to be the Upholder or Sustainer in being of all 
things : b it consequently follows, that He knoweth 
all the relations, actual and possible, of things to 
each other. The Mind which brought the things, 

O O 3 

with all their powers and qualities, into existence, 

a Div. II. Part i. 4, and Part ii. 2. 
b Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. 5, &c. 


and which continues the existence, cannot but 

know all the relations to each other of the things 


made and upheld by it. 

3. To know all the possible relations of things 
to each other, involves the knowledge of the 
adaptability of the powers of things, as means to 
ends. God the Lord, therefore, must be supposed 
to know the fitness of this or that, to effect this 
or the other thing. His knowledge of possible 
fitnesses must be as profound as the knowledge 
of all actual fitnesses throughout the wide uni 

4. But the knowledge is not all that is 
possessed. For as God the Lord is All-powerful, a 
as well as All-knowing, 1 * He must have ability 
to accomplish the realisation of all the adaptations 
of things arising from so many fitnesses. Even as 
He knows the various fitnesses of things to each 
other, so He can bring about the adaptations, and 
the ends had in view, whatever they be. 

5. In fine, it is a necessary consequence from 
what has preceded in this demonstration, that God 
the Lord can bring about all the purposes which 
his All-knowing Intelligence presents, and which 
are desired as effects. 

6. From all which it follows, most evidently, 
that God, the Lord, is necessarily the Wisest 
of Beings. 


* Div. II. Part ii. b Div. II. Part i. 



7. Then, God, the Lord, is, necessarily, the 
Wisest of Beings. 


1. The demonstration just set forth may be 
said to be that of the truth of the predicate. But 
a second demonstration is available, in which the 
subject, qua subject, shall become more prominent. 
The proof shall extend to the subject as much as 
to the predicate, and to both in conjunction 

2. As, therefore, the proof, in the foregoing 
demonstration, was greatly confined to the 
predicate, so, joining subject to predicate after 
another fashion, we must note the result. Con 
joining, then, those two, we have the Perfect 
Goodness and Love of God the Lord, adjoined to 
His Measureless Wisdom. The practical result 
of the conjunction will be, that all the ends 
accomplished by the Being of beings must be the 
most Benevolent, as well as the most Wise, or, 
the Best, at once, and the Wisest. 

3. But the important truth shall be best 
brought out in a separate demonstration. 



As God, the Lord, is the Best : so He is, necessarily, 
the Wisest of Beings. 

1. God, the Lord, not only is the All-knowing 
and the All-powerful Cause of all things in the 
material universe : a He is, also, the Loving One 
conserving all. b He created all the things of the 

D O 

world in Goodness, and He sustains them in Love. c 
What, now, is the necessary result of the addition 
of the precise Moral element in view to the 
Wisdom, the possession of which by God, the Lord, 
has been already demonstrated ? (1 

2. Of course, it follows from the special 
additional elements of the Goodness, and the Love, 
beino- combined with the Wisdom, most mani- 


festly, it immediately follows, that God, the Lord, 
will be always exercising His Wisdom so as to 
bring Beneficent ends about. Only Benevolent 
effects will be aimed at by One who is endowed 
with an assemblage of such Perfections, acting ever 
harmoniously with a view to a common end. 

3. The Wisdom, then, with which we are now 
concerned, is that which is engaged in seeking to 

a Div. II. Parts i. & ii. Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. 

c Div. III. Sub-Prop. 2, & Prop. iv. Dem. 5. 

d Preceding Demonstration. 


bring about Good ends. By no means ends or 
effects irrespective of their moral bearing, but ends 
having distinctly recognisable Benevolent action in 

4. And, thus, it has been made clear, that as 
God, the Lord, is the Best, so He is necessarily the 
Wisest of Beings. 

5. As God, the Lord, then ; is the Best, so He 
is, necessarily, the Wisest of Beings. 


From this demonstration it follows, that, as 
Love and Wisdom act combinedly, so the one must 
be supposed to serve as the measure (as it were) of 
the other. From the very nature of the case, it 
follows that the Wisdom will be the regulative 
measure, the guide and the controller, of the 
Love. Love, in its promptings and actings, will 
be ruled by Wisdom : Wisdom will point out the 
fittest means for Love to employ in accomplishing 
its ends. Wisdom will be restrained and prevented 
from ever resorting to any but beneficent devices ; 
and Love will be prevented from enlisting in its 
service any benevolences but those best calculated 
to bring about the desired effects. Thus, there is 
Love as the Moral motive ; Wisdom as the Intel 
lectual director. The one the mover ; the other, 
the regulating principle of the motion. 



Of course, the influence which Love imparts, is 
not the only influence which will be at work. 
Wisdom will ever consist in what is consonant to 
the dictates of each and all of the other Attributes. 
Justice, for instance, will be represented as well as 
Love, in the case of operations having men, that is, 
actually existing moral beings, directly for their 
subject and end. 


1. It has been suggested, a that there is another 
sort of Wisdom than that which is purely or almost 
entirely Intellectual, a Wisdom, to wit, which has 
a distinct Moral element inherent in it ; and it 
shall now be our business to open up this whole 
matter. The Second Demonstration was concerned 
with the proof of Moral Wisdom, or Wisdom as 
existing in the Supreme Being, and that Demon 
stration has, anticipatingly, prepared the way for us. 

2. In the first place, then, there is the Wisdom 
which has been above defined and described : b 
Wisdom divested of all extraneous elements ; 
abstracted from all non-essential momenta what 
ever. This Wisdom in itself, or most strictly 

a Proleg. 6. b Proleg. Sect. 2-5. 


taken, is, speaking generally, an Intellectual func 
tion of Mind. 

3. But, no doubt, there is, also, a Wisdom 
having Moral elements most distinctly added : 
insomuch that the Wisdom now in view constitutes 
a species widely different from the other. 

4. The Moral Wisdom is, in turn, twofold. 
Inasmuch as the Moral itself is of two kinds, the 
strictly Moral, to wit, and its opposite, the 
Im-moral; a so Moral Wisdom, likewise, is of two 

5. First, there is Wisdom with the addition 
of the eminently Moral quality of Goodness, 
Beneficence, Benevolence, or by whatever term 
the superadded Moral element may be expressed. 

6. And there is a kind of Wisdom which has an 
addition of an opposite character : W T isdom which 
is evil ; aiming at wicked ends, being animated 
by the desire to accomplish cruelties. This kind 
may be denominated False Wisdom, as the former 
kind may be denominated True Wisdom. And it 
may be of use to expatiate, for a little, on the 
topic of that bad Wisdom, as distinguished from 
the better sort, the proper, the genuine Wisdom. 

7. The mere abstract knowledge of relations, 
or fitnesses, and the will and the power of using 
means to ends so as to effect aims, is all that is 
absolutely involved in pure Wisdom : Wisdom 

a Div. III. Prop, iii., Lemma, 3. 


defecated from all extraneous or non-essential 
adjuncts. But when we speak of an end, an aim, 
a purpose, we imply the idea of something truly 
desirable for its own sake, or as a good in itself. 
And desirable things are of two sorts : things are 
desirable by reason of the good, or of the evil, 
which is, or may be, in them. Good ends will be 
aimed at by Good Beings ; evil ends, by Evil 
Beings. Not that evil ends, as evil, can ever be 
sought after by any mind, even a mind labouring 
under mere insane delirations. But ends, which 
are really evil in themselves, are apprehended or 
may be occasionally apprehended to be good 
things by those who, incurably principled in evil, 
are only Evil Beings. It is to be observed, too, 
that the end, in one case, may become but the 
means, in another. There may be a vast interval 
between the primary action of the Efficient Cause, 
and the last operation in the Final Cause ; and 
there may be, between the extremes, a series of 
ends, each of which (except the last) may be, in 
turn, means to a further end. And it is, in great 
part, owing to the circumstance now adverted to 
that the erroneous judgment has been come to, 
that Wisdom is concerned with ends as much as 
with means. 

8. To speak, now, of the True Wisdom. This 
Wisdom always has regard to the nature of the 
ends, or the effects it would accomplish ; and it 


will seek to bring about only good or beneficent 
ends. Hence, tis plain, that True Wisdom is 
simply Wisdom in combination with Goodness, or 
it is the Wisdom of a Good Being. (Wisdom + 
Goodness = Wisdom of a Good Mind.) Such 
Wisdom, in the most exalted form, is handled 
above, where the Wisdom of the pre-eminently 
Good One is treated of. a 

9. On the other hand, the False Wisdom has 
regard to ends of a totally different character. It- 
seeks to accomplish evil effects. It is the wisdom 
of the wicked mind : its motives, therefore, are 
malevolent. But to draw out this subject to good 
purpose, and, by doing so, to illustrate yet farther 
the distinction itself between the Good Wisdom, 
and the Evil, let us go at once to the great fountain- 
head and standard of our language, our English 
Bible. Whatever on this subject is found depicted 
plainly therein, may be taken for granted as being 
in accordance with the true genius of our tongue, 
if not in perfect consistence also with good usage. 
Of course, in no other sense is the Bible referred to 
here as an authority. 

10. Not to be prolix, a single passage will 
serve to illustrate the distinction in question. See 
the General Epistle of James ; the Third Chapter, 
from the 13th to the 17th verses inclusive. The 
section begins by asking, Who is a wise man among 

a Second Demonstration. 


you ? taking ivise, perhaps, in the strictest sense. 
Then the improper, the false, the evil Wisdom is 
treated of. Afterwards, the proper or genuine, the 
true, the beneficent Wisdom is introduced. In 
the one case, as well as in the other, the Epistle- 
writer employs the term a-otyla, >} cro(pla. The same 
sort of broad distinction is to be met with in many 
other places in the New Testament. But it will 
suffice that we keep by the one place in the Epistle 
of James, the practical Moralist among those 

11. The passage in view, then, informs us, 
that there is a Wisdom, whose origin is from 
beneath, which is "earthly, sensual, (or animal,} 
devilish," (or demon-sprung;} and a "Wisdom 
which is from above," this Heavenly Wisdom being 
"full of mercy, and good fruits," or benevolences. 
In short, the one Wisdom is cruel ; the other, 
altogether beneficent. 

12. From which it appears that the false 
AVisdom, when fully developed, is cruel, or has 
cruel ends in view in its aims. It uses the means 
to produce cruelties. While, on the contrary, the 
other kind of Wisdom is essentially beneficent : it 
is gentle, and full of mercy. 

13. Hence, the improper and false Wisdom is 
the wisdom of the evil mind, and the proper and 
true Wisdom is the wisdom of the good-minded 
person. But whereas Wisdom, in and by itself, is 


(as we have seen a ) nowise concerned with ends, 
as in and by themselves, or is indifferent to 
ends as such, whether they be good or be 
evil ; the more natural, and the much more 
common way, is by an association of a cer 
tain kind. Wisdom and Goodness, conjoined in 
the closest embrace, act together in unity, and 
from oneness. But why is such conjunction 
natural 1 

14. The question, and the answer, will bring 
before us a circumstance worthy of observation. 
When, in ordinary speech, Wisdom simply is spoken 
of, the proper, the true, the good Wisdom only is 
meant to be understood. The reason for the 
phenomenon must be sought for in the depths. 
The phenomenon, however, must have a sound 
reason, how profound soever it be. The wisdom 
of the good or gracious character is more natural 
than the wisdom of the cruel character : such is 
the phenomenon of which the cause is to be assigned, 
and the cause of so remarkable a circumstance is 
well entitled to our attention. 

15. The reason is this; Cruel ( = devilish) 
contrivances (i.e., adaptations of means to ends) 
must be supposed to proceed from a Malevolent 
Mind, and a Malevolent Spirit is itself unnatural : 
it is in Nature, but not of Nature. Malevolence 
betokens imperfection within its own sphere, and 

a Proleg., & above, 7. 


such imperfection cannot be, or be properly 
considered to be, truly natural. 

16. While, on the other hand, benevolent 
contrivances betoken the action of a Loving Spirit, 
and this is ever recognised as becoming and fit. 

O O 

It harmonizes with Nature, as she truly expresses 
herself. In Nature, it is also of Nature : in truth, 
a very grand part of Nature herself. 

17. No malevolence can be, or be supposed to 
be, in the Supreme Cause, the Cause of causes, for 
this very reason, that Malevolence implies the 
unnatural, and the imperfect. And to bring 
together the idea of the First Cause and that of 
Imperfection, of what kind soever, or degree 
soever, it matters not, were to associate together 
things which are in irreconcilable opposition.* 
Things which could be brought together only to 
expose their irreconcilable variance and antagon 
ism. They would ny asunder with an immense 
rebound. On the contrary, all benevolent and 
worthy consummations have their origin in God 
the Lord, the fount of all creaturely life and 

18. And thus it has come about that Wisdom 
is associated by us with the Moral. If we speak of 
men, Wisdom, as a birth of the Intellect (even as a 
Minerva is feigned to have sprung from the brow 
of Jove), and the Emotional or Moral part of our 

a Div. III. Prop, i., 2, & Prop, ii., Dem. 4. 


nature, are held to be in the most intimate 
connection with each other. 


From all that has been advanced, it will be 
evident, that Wisdom, considered as an Attribute 
of The Supreme, belongs, so far, to the Relative 
Attributes, and that, moreover, it is not a pure 
and simple Attribute, but forms one of the class 
of Compound Attributes of which class, Holiness 
(to which we are rapidly advancing) is another, 
and a most notable instance. We have seen that 
there are more elements than one in that complex 
mode of mind which goes by the name of Wisdom. 
It is, indeed, abundantly apparent, that Wisdom 
is not one pure and simple element, in what 
relation soever it stands to Mind generally. 


God, the Lord, ivho is the Wisest of Beings, is, 
necessarily, of ineffable Moral Purity. 


1. According to our highest standards of 
English, the term Holiness, when applied to the 
Supreme Being, has two meanings. It means, 
either, entire absolute Moral Purity ; or, the 


Excellency involved in, and flowing from, the 
confluence and conjunction of all the Attributes. 
When each one of the Attributes is conjoined with 
the rest, and the whole of the Attributes or 
Excellencies are considered as an assemblage of 


constituents acting together, a vision of Holiness, 
in the comprehensive sense, is the result. The 
same remark is applicable to the cognate words. 
Holy, for instance, may be employed in one, or 
other, of the two senses. The same sort of remark 
might be extended to the corresponding words in 
other languages, such as the Hebrew, representative 
of the Shemitic class, and the Greek, as repre 
senting the Japhetic, or Aryan, class of languages. 
But it behoves us to be more particular with the 
statement of the distinction of the meanings. The 


distinction is a most important one, and carries 
great things in its train. 

2. In the first place, then, the term Holiness 
is used as expressive of Moral Purity, or the 
opposite of Moral Impurity. Hence, Holiness is 
moral stainlessness, spotlessness, unsulliedness, 
immaculateness, in fine, freedom from polluting 
taint of any kind, in moral respects. And, 

3. In the second place, Holiness is used to 
express the combination of the Excellencies, even 
the commingling lustre or glory of all the Divine 
Attributes. It has regard to the union, and the 
result of the union, of the Divine Attributes, 


especially the Intellectual and Moral Attributes, 
but emphatically the Moral Attributes ; and, of 
the Moral Attributes, it regards emphatically the 
presence of the Moral Purity of our Proposition. 

4. It is only with the former of the two mean 
ings, that we have to do as under this Proposition. 
The other sense will fall to be handled in a 
Proposition devoted to itself. a For the future, 
then, Purity, or Moral Purity, shall be, almost 
exclusively, employed to express the idea proper 
to this place ; reserving Holiness, in the latter of 
the two significations, for after consideration. 


1. That God, the Lord, is necessarily of 
ineffable Moral Purity, that is, cannot possibly be 
considered as being, in any, even the least, respect, 
Impure Morally ; shall be made as clear as any 
truth can be. The proof lies not very far off, and 
it will be found to be quite irresistible. 

2. The reason why God, the Lord, must be 
conceived of as Morally Pure, or cannot by 
possibility be conceived of as being otherwise, is, 
because tis most plain that Moral impureness 
signifies, or involves, some defect or imperfection. 
And no absurdity could be greater than the absurd 
ity which would couple the idea of any defect or 

a Succeed. Prop. 


imperfection with God, the Lord.* What defect 
or imperfection, of any kind, or degree, can there 
be in that Being who is the subject of all the 
predicates in our preceding Propositions ? The 
preceding Demonstrations must all be taken now 
for granted. What imperfection, then, can there 
be in the One Necessary Being, of utmost Sim 
plicity, who, being of Infinity of Expansion 
and Duration, is Intelligent and All-knowing, All- 
powerful, and entirely Free, completely Happy, 
and perfectly Good ; who, in addition, is neces 
sarily True, Faithful, inflexibly Just, altogether 
Righteous, and most Loving, and withal of 
absolute Wisdom ? To attribute any imperfection 
to such a Being, were to utter a mere contra 
dictious impossibility. 

3. Moreover, a stain of impurity must needs 
be something impressed from without, or brought 
about from within. In the case of the Lord God, 
a stain would involve a change from the pre exist 
ent immaculate cleanness, inasmuch as foulness 
could never be considered, by even the wildest 
flight of imagination, to be the original condition 
of the subject of our Proposition, the Being to 
whom so many excellencies do so undeniably 
appertain. The foulness must needs be separable 
from the subject of inhesion. 

4. Now, a stain involving a change from the 

a Vide Gen. Schol. under preced. Prop., 17. 


preexistent immaculateness : In the first place, 
nothing can be more palpable than that the Being 
demonstrated in the preceding Propositions, cannot 
be subject to being changed, or acted on, from 
without. There can, indeed, be no without in 
reference to the Substance that fills Infinite Space, 
or is the Being of Infinity of Expansion, and that 
inhabits Eternity, or is the One Being of Infinity 
of Duration. And if it be so palpable that the 
Lord God cannot be acted on from without, much 
less (to speak so) can He be subject to be stained 
from without, or by any object or cause without 

5. And, in the second place, equally clear it is, 
that no change, from a preexistent condition of 
purity, can be conceived as passing upon the Lord 
God from within Himself. For as to the supposi 
tion of a change wrought from within in the case 
under contemplation a change from immaculate- 
ness to a state of some foulness or other, such 
a supposition would involve as great an impossi 
bility as can be, the supposition, to wit, of an 
effect without there being any possible cause. To 
assign, as the cause of a polluting impurity, the 
Immaculate, and the absolutely Pure, were simply 
to present an incongruous absurdity. An utterly 
impossible and contradictious cause, is no cause, 
and something more even a heap of nonsensical 


6. The demonstration is, therefore, complete 
and perfect, and, accordingly, we say, without 
hesitation, that it has been irrefragably proved, 
that God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, 

O * 

is necessarily of ineffable Moral Purity. 

7. God, the Lord, then, who is the Wisest 
of Beings, is, necessarily, of ineffable Moral 



1. The demonstration of the present proposi 
tion might have been dispensed with, but for one 
circumstance. In demonstrating the inflexible 
Justice of God, a it was demonstrated that the 
character of God is, with respect to Justice, 
without flaw. The Divine Justice is perfect, or 
altogether pure. And so of the rest of the Moral 
Attributes. 1 We demonstrated the Attributes as 
the necessary Modes of the One Necessary 
Substance : which is just snying, in other 
words, that the perfection of each Attribute, or 
each Attribute in perfection, was demonstrated. 
Nothing more could be righteously required. 
Quite superfluous, to prove no decadence, no 
deterioration, no decay, in necessarily existing 

a Prop. iii. Div. III. > Vide Div. III. Sub-Div. ii. 



Excellencies. A work of idle supererogation to 
evince, that Perfect Attributes are Perfect. 

2. A circumstance, however, intervenes, to 
prevent us from arguing in such a manner. One 
essential element in Moral Purity has not as yet 
been touched on anywhere. It is incumbent on 
us, therefore, to supply the desideratum, and to 
shew how indispensable was a separate demon 
stration under the present head. 

3. In opening up this most important matter, 
it will be necessary to take a more than ordinarily 
extensive sweep. It has been demonstrated, that 
the race of man began to be. a As a constituent of 
the universe, there was a time when the race was 
not, since the whole Material Universe itself had 
an absolute commencement. 13 Whatever begins to 
be must have a cause : the human race, therefore, 
had a Creator. 

4. A necessary consequence of man s having 
had a Creator, is very weighty. Speaking 
psychologically, man is but a congeries of certain 
mental powers and faculties. From which un 
questionable truth it is righteously deducible, 
that each one of the original powers or faculties 
of the human mind was the free bestowment of 
the same First Cause. 

5. To every distinct faculty or quality, and 
relative perfection, of mind possessed congeni tally 

a Schol. under Part iii. Div. II. b Sub-Prop. Part ii. Div. I. 


by man, there must be a corresponding Attribute, 
and absolute Perfection, in the mind of the 
Creator, the Father of spirits : Otherwise, there 
would be in the creature a perfection, without 
there being aught answering thereunto in the 
Creator. There would be a distinct quality of 
mind which, with its subject of inhesion, began to 
be, without, however, there having been any 
cause whatsoever. An arrant absurdity. In fine, 
tis an axiomatic truth, That an effect cannot 
possess any original, distinct perfection, which is 
not in the cause, either actually, or at least in a 
higher degree. a 

6. Now, tis unquestionable, that there is in 
man the feeling, or there are the feelings, which 
lead to marriage; and perhaps we shall not 
greatly err if we give, as the result of the last 
analysis of that feeling, a certain disposition for 
communion, or, a disposition for a certain com 
munion, to end by means of thorough unison 
in complete union, and absolute oneness. The 
question, thus, arises, Must there, therefore, be, in 
first principles, a perfection, in man s Creator, the 
Great First Cause of all things, corresponding to 
that disposition for communion ? Indeed, we 
shall not much err if we so estimate, and so use in 
argumentation the cardinal feeling in view. 

7. That the feeling indicated, to wit, the 

:i Vide, supra, 4, Dem. Prop. iii. Div. III. 


feeling which brings together individuals of 
opposite sexes, strangers hitherto, for life-long 
association, is a fundamental part of our mental 
constitution ; this is undeniable. That, moreover, 
the feeling is a distinct part of our nature, admits 
of as little doubt. That it is not a mere imperfec 
tion, but, on the contrary, is a true (relative) 
perfection, is, also, a point which cannot be with 
propriety contested. Call the feeling in question 
2^assion, if you will ; still, tis certain and indis 
putable, that the feeling does really exist : that 
it is a radical and distinct part of man s nature, 
and cannot be classed among the mere imperfections 
and blemishes of our mental constitution. All 
these are, indeed, points which the true psycholo 
gist will readily concede. If one, through any 
perverseness, will not admit that genuine conjugal 
love, as an indispensable mental power or sus 
ceptibility not to be confounded with any other, 
presents the most heavenly sight to be seen on 
earth, being too a most blessed thing in itself; he is 
bound at least to give another and a better account 
of the facts in human life which are patent to all. 

8. The inference unavoidably deducible from 
the great fact, or class of facts, adverted to, is, that 
in the Creator, as Father of minds and First Cause, 
there must be that absolute perfection, which, in 
first principles, corresponds to the feeling in 
question call it instinct or passion, or by what 

name soever vou please. To deny this inference, 

*/ 1 tf 

were to deny the Axiom which has been laid down, 
and founded on a : and deny the axiom in view, 

and then Nothing, pure Nothing, might be the 

cause of Something, yea, of all Things. 

9. But if a true marriage is a most beautiful 
and blessed thing, there is, alas ! a reverse side 
to the picture. That which, in happy cases, is 
developed into the beatitude of conjugal love, is, 
in unprincipled or ill-regulated minds, manifested 
in the hideous shape of violent, utterly lawless 
passion. Become ungovernable, the perverted 
feeling susceptible as it is of so great variation- 
is capable of the most dreadful abuses. And just 
in proportion to the excellency of true and pure 
conjugal love, is the vileness of the unbridled 
licentiousness, and demoralization, displayed in the 
abandonment of fornication, or in the form of 
hellish rebelliousness against the ordinances of 
Heaven. The one is outward, and in the body ; 
the other, inward, and in the mind : But both are 
equally, or they equally involve, unclean adul 

10. And as God the Lord is the Originator of 
the blessedness of conjugal love, so He is utterly 
and unalterably opposed, through the Perfect 
Purity of His Nature, to that abuse to which we 
have pointed. If He be the cause of the one ; so, 

a TJi supra, % ">, cum loc. citat. 


with reo-arcl to either of the others, there cannot be 


anything in the Divine Mind but what is immut 
ably opposed to it. To impurity of the character 
indicated, there cannot be in God the Lord aught 
at all corresponding. There is a correspondence 
indeed but the correspondence is only productive 
of, and manifested by, the most determined Con 
trast, and perpetually warring Opposition. 

11. Thus, Moral Purity makes secret allusion 
always to a certain species of contrasted impurity. 
But there is a farther and more profound arcanum, 
well worthy of the deepest contemplation. 

12. Of all the kinds of impurity which can 
defile the soul of man, there is one kind which, by 
emphasis, has received the name of "pollution." 
The reason of this will take us at once among the 
recesses of Nature s most hidden secrets. Tis not 
of sexual impurity that we are now to treat, but 
another and a much worse sort of impurity stands 
before us as our dread, yet uneschewable, topic. 
Our subject, however, is, unnatural sins or vices in 
their generic aspect, not any one sin or vice 
specially. Too dreadful a task would be involved 
in the painting, in true colours, of any single 
species of unnatural depravity. The most general 
allusions must suffice. That there are enormities 
so hideous that they cannot be so much as named 
among us, tells its own tale. Nevertheless, such 


portentous wickedness is, unquestionably, to be 
found among men. 

13. But at this point attention must be given 
to a truth of great weight in order to the clear 
elucidation of the subject. The Lord God is never 
to be conceived of by us as existing without any 
and all respect to sex. On the contrary, He is to 
be considered all-sexual, in the sense that He 
contains within Himself the first principles of the 
perfections of both sexes. He is Male, but He 
is not merely Male, or to the thorough exclusion 
of any excellent principle serving as the ground 
work of the creation of the Female. Else, how 
could the Lord God be, as He i.s, the Creator of 
the human race, with its male and female ? The 
existence of the woman must be accounted for 
somehow. If woman began to be as a distinct 
unit created at first-hand, or without creaturely 
mediation, the Lord God was her Creator, and a 
first principle correspondingly must be supposed in 
that First Cause. If, again, woman, being a 
mediate formation, had no such Creator, then she, 
as an individual, came into (not being, but) 
separate being with the first out-going of sinfulness 
in man, and, as separate, was but an imperfection 
appertaining to the human creature as such. But 
whichever hypothesis be adopted, it comes to the 
same thin^. as the thoughtful student will not be 
slow to understand. The human race is essentially 


Male and Female ; and it began to be : so, it- 
must have had a Creator. And the Creator of the 
human race must have, in first principles, the 
perfections of the same. 

14. So, being such a Creator, the Lord God is 
rightly deemed to be altogether Holy or Pure, in 
direct contrast with every immoral human being 
no matter what the sex giving its personality 
up to the debasement, and untold wickedness 
of the abominable pollution thus shudderingly 
glanced at. 

15. Indeed, it requires no stretch of intellect 
to perceive, that, if the Lord God is rightly 
conceived as being without taint, or the shadow of 
taint, in respect of sexual impurity, as being, in 
that respect, the altogether Pure, or Holy One ; 
much more, must He be considered as the Holy 
One in opposition to the worst kind of human, or, 
rather, the worse than human, impurity and 
depravity. Sexual impurities are, at any rate, 
sins in the direction of nature, and not worse than 
gross aggravations and coarse and vile exaggerations 
of natural instincts, and tendencies ; while sins of 
uncleanness against nature, are sins of the utmost 
possible human (and only less than diabolical) 
wickedness, in the very form of wickedness. In 
truth, the opposition between the Purity of the 
Holy One, and the impurity of an abandoned man, 
becomes greater as the impurity, passing from one 


stage to another, is increased by reaching to a yet 
more monstrous wickedness. 

16. In making the transition from sexual 
excesses to unnatural vices, and the opposite to 
these last in the character of The Supreme, we may 
deem that we have passed to the region of the 
inner ground of opposition. Having traced this 
sort of impurity to its deepest point in interior 
wickedness, we are necessarily arrived at the place 
where the abstractest considerations are the most 

17. The reason of the enormous heinousness 
which attaches to this unnatural kind of wicked 
ness, lies just in this, that here is an offence which 
is, formally and expressly, a sin by a man against 
himself, and his own nature, as such. The germ 
of suicide and murder is here murder and suicide 
at once. 

18. In fine, the Lord God, considered as the 
most Pure Being, must be set in opposition to that 
sort of uncleanness most of all. The portentous 
sin whatever the precise guise assumed is a 
crime against Nature. While all other sins are, 
more or less, in the direction of Nature ; this one 
alone sins against Nature radically against Nature 
herself, and as such. But (as has been decisively 
demonstrated a ) God is the source and fount of 
Nature : hence, He is the most Natural Being. 

a Div. II. Parts ii. & iii., & Div. III. Prop, i., Sub-Prop., Schol. 


The nature of the whole of the other is but an 
efflux, and, in some respects, a resemblance, of 
His Nature. Consequently, God the Lord must be 
conceived of as being removed infinitely, as it 
were from, and opposed to, the very appearance 
of that portent among evil deeds. 

19. The doer of such an enormity is striving 
to overturn the whole course of nature. The 
endeavour is but a beginning, but, in point of 
consistency, there is really the germ of an attempt 
to obliterate, with nature, its Divine Source. All 
sin, indeed, lias, for its inmost essence, a principle 
of hatred to the very existence of the Lord God, 
and the order* of nature instituted by Him. Sin 
would overthrow all. But some sins, more than 
others, aim at the destruction of the foundations 
of things. This sin, perhaps, most of all does so, 
so far as possible to the human sinner. Every 
man, therefore, avoiding the very appearance of 
that awful evil, should reverence himself, the 
creature, and the image, of the Uncreated One. 

20. Emphatically, then, is the character of the 
Lord God set against that sort of Impurity. By 
reason of His ineffable Moral Purity, He is 
opposed to that sort most of all. 


Purity, as directly opposed to such impurity as 
we have dared to glance at, can (as has been seen) 


be rightly ascribed to the Divine Mind ; and there 
can be no direct opposition, proceeding from, 
contrast, unless there be certain jwints of resem 
blance between the two sources of the opposing forces. 
This may be a profound truth, but tis none the 
less true because of the profundity. In fact, but 
for abstract, or most innerly grounded reasons, it 
would be next to impossible to tell, and impossible 
to tell well, why the Divine Cause of all things is 
the purest morally. The doctrine might, no doubt, 
be propounded without any strict proof being an 
accompaniment of the promulgation ; and, as a 
matter of fact, the Moral Purity of the Deity has 
been taught, and most successfully taught, without 
any but the most obvious reasons being assigned, 
so far as anv reasons at all were assigned : the 

* O 

truth being, that the doctrine was greatly rested 
on the argument of the authority of the Promul- 
gator. But the argument of authority being of no 
weight with us, it is fortunate that we are enabled 
to dispense with it. Metaphysically, it is quite 
proper to ascribe to the Great Supreme that which 
was, in point of fact, applied to Him by the most 
excellent of the world s judges, the Shemitic seers 
who caught sight of Divine truths by grand 
intuitions. the seers, we repeat, among the 
monotheistic and theological people of all the 
nations of the earth. The Hebrew Legislator and 
all the Prophets of the peculiar people, and the 


Apostles of a later day, the Missionaries to all 
Adamic peoples, all united in declaring that the 
Lord God is the thrice Holy One, and that His 
very soul hateth the unnatural sins which were 
openly, and at all times, practised by the Heathen 
on every side. The ancient method was by a 
patent track, while our reasons are profound and 
even occult : but both procedures are good, having 
their foundations in the nature of things. 


God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, and of 
ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, the 
Holiest One. 


1. In entering upon the consideration of a 
Proposition which forms a culminating point in 
our progress, a recapitulation of matter already 
advanced will be, to some extent, requisite. a There 
may be even enlargement, in some directions, on 
topics formerly touched. 81 

2. The word Holy, and the cognate Holiness, 
as applicable to the Divine Being, may be used in 
the one, or the other, of two great senses. 1. The 
word may be employed to denote Moral immaculate- 
ness, or perfect Purity or Pureness. 2. It may be 

a Proleg. preced. Prop. 


taken as standing for the result of the Excellencies of 
the Divine Nature being united in a commingling 
whole, and for the gloriousness thence arising. 
And this latter is the sense in which uniformly 
Holiness is to be understood as under the present 
Proposition. In truth, the meaning affixed here to 
the term is the strict and proper meaning of the 

3. Yet, although such the true import of the 
word, one thing ought never to be lost sight of, 
namely, that the Holiness subsumed by this 
Proposition denotes the excellency of God, the 
Lord, flowing from the whole of His Attributes, 
with, however, an onphatic weight attached always 
to Pureness Morally. The Holiness regards the 
union, and the result of the union, of the Divine 
Attributes especially, the Intellectual and Moral, 
but emphatically the Moral Attributes ; and, of the 
Moral Attributes, the presence of the Moral Purity 
of the preceding Proposition is imperatively 

4. In that Proposition, the Holiness of The 
Supreme, in the first of the senses, was demon 
strated : and our business now is to prove, in a 
manner equally irrefragable, the Holiness of the 
Deity, in the other, and more strict and proper 

5. But ere we advance to the demonstration 
itself, it may be well to illustrate the two differing 


meanings, by an appeal to the best usage. In 
both the preceding Proposition, and above, the 
distinction has been formally stated, but as yet 
the reader has had no opportunity of observing the 
distinction embodied in actual examples. It is 
one thing to state the distincton between the two 
senses in an abstract manner, and it is another to 
bring out the distinction in a more concrete sort 
of way, or by vivid illustrations drawn from the 
worthiest sources. It shall be our present business, 
therefore, to illustrate the important distinction in 
question by a reference to the best authorities 
known to the student of the English language. 

6. Now, tis allowed, by all competent persons, 
that, for general purposes, we have no better 
standard of English than our Bible in the vernacu 
lar. But farther, and more particularly, we can 
apply to no other source than our English Bible, 
with regard to a large class of words. For terms 
answering to a number of Moral and Religious 
ideas, no other course than an appeal to the 
treasuries of the Old and New Testaments, is 
practicable. We might, of a truth, go elsewhere, 
but the authorities themselves would be found to 
have drawn from those very sources of the various 
books of the two Testaments, as their oivn fountain- 
head. Where, indeed, shall we find words ade 
quately expressive of the awful Purity, and the 
glorious Holiness, our theme, except in the glowing 


descriptions of the rapt Hebrew seers, the true 
prophets for all times ? Let the fact be accounted 
for how it may, the fact is, and will remain, that 
we have no other repertory at all suitable to go to 
for words answering to our grandest Moral and 
Religious ideas than our correspondents to the 
Testament in Hebrew, and the Testament in Greek. 

7. It need scarcely be said or rather repeated, 
for the statement has been made once and again, 
that, in this demonstration, the argument of 
authority were quite out of place. In citing, there 
fore, passages of Sacred Scripture, no purpose but 
one is entertained, the citations being made for the 
sole sake of illustrating in, however, appropriate 
language the reality of the distinction, by a 
display of the two true meanings of our term. 

8. As instances of the use of the term in the 
sense of Moral Purity, the following passages 
may be adduced : 

"Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with 
any creeping thing that creepeth, neither shall ye 
make yourselves unclean with them, that ye should 
be defiled thereby. For I am the Lord your God 
[Jehovah your Elohim] : ye shall therefore sanctify 
yourselves [make yourselves holy], and ye shall be 
holy, for I am holy ; neither shall ye defile your 
selves with any manner of creeping thing that 
creepeth upon the earth. For I am the Lord that 
bringeth you up out of the land of Egypt, to be 


your God : ye shall therefore be holy, for I am 
holy." Leviticus, xi. 43, 44, 45. "Give not that 
which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your 
pearls before swine, lest they trample them under 
their feet, and turn again and rend you." 
Matthew, vii. 6. " He that is unjust, let him be 
unjust still : and he which is filthy, let him be 
filthy still : and he that is righteous, let him be 
righteous still : and he that is holy, let him be 
holy still." Revelation, xxii. 11. 

9. To which might be appended many 
additional felicitous examples. But the selection 
made will suffice to illustrate the meaning of holy, 
in the more restricted sense of the word. That 
ceremonial physical cleanness was but the outside 
emblem of Purity within even of that Moral 
Purity which was really the ultimate end of the 
great Lawgiver of the Hebrews, and the other 
penmen, his countrymen. 

10. Advance we next to passages which have 
reference to Holy, or Holiness, in the more 
comprehensive of the two senses. The following 
will afford illustrations of the term when standing 
for the Excellency necessitated by the totality of 
the Divine Attributes : 

" There is none holy as the Lord [Jehovah] : for 
there is none beside Thee : neither is there any 
rock like our God [our Elohim]."- 1 Samuel, ii. 
2. " They (the fathers of our flesh) verily for a 


few days chastened us after their own pleasure ; 
but he (God) for our profit, that we might be 
partakers of his holiness." Hebrews, xii. 10. 
" Who shall not fear thee, Lord, and glorify thy 
name ? for thou only art holy : for all nations 
shall come and worship before thee." Revelation, 
xv. 4. 

11. Numerous apt exemplifications of the same 
meaning might be adduced. No place, however, is 
more memorable than the august passage in the 
sublimest of prophets the sublimest, perhaps, of 
all writers where are described the effects, upon 
the most excellent Intelligences of our universe, as 
well as upon the seer himself, our representative in 
that glorious scene, the effects, we repeat, of the 
vision of the unutterable Holiness of the Lord of 
the hosts of all the starry continents. " I saw also 
the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, 
and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the 
Seraphim : each one had six wings ; with twain he 
covered his face, and with twain he covered his 
feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried 
unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is the 
Lord of hosts : the whole earth is full of his glory. 
And the posts of the door moved at the voice of 
him that cried, and the house was filled with 
smoke. Then said I, "Woe is me ! for I am 
undone ; because I am a man of unclean lips, and 

I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips : 


for mine eyes have seen the king, the Lord of 
hosts." Isaiah, vi. 1-5. One of the sublimest 
places in the sublime Apocalypse is founded upon 
that description. " And the four living creatures 
[<Sa = the four representatives of the created 
universe] had each of them six wings about him ; 
and they were full of eyes within : and they rest 
not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord 
God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come." 
Revelation, iv. 8. 

12. In giving a lucid, and, at same time, 
vivid and fervid idea of the Attribute or Excellency 
under consideration, no other language could 
approach the capacities and aptitudes of that 
language. No other language can equal in force 
and complete suitableness the language of our Book 
of books when we would give expression to the 
heights of Moral and Religious ideas. Without 
the aid in question, we should have endeavoured 
in vain to convey, by words, any true idea of that 
Holiness which springs from the concatenation of 
Attributes, each one of which is, singly, an 
Excellency in itself. 


1. That the whole is equal to the sum of the 
parts, is a position equally self-evident as this, that 
the ivhole is greater than its part, which is one of 


the preliminary Axioms of the Geometricians. 
And it will be seen, that the Proposition now in 
hand is on the same footing of indisputability with 
those positions. 

2. For, taking Holy in the sense of our 
Proposition, that is, taking Holiness to denote 
the excellency of the Lord God as implied by, or 
flowing from, the unition of the whole of His 


Attributes ; there is needed but the simplest 
application of the doctrine, The whole is equal to 
the sum of the parts. Take the predicates in all 
the preceding Propositions, and unite them in one 
predicate, applying this to the same subject as 
that which appears in the last demonstrated 
Proposition in our series ; and you have, of course, 
a predicate, or whole, expressive of what is equal 
to the sum of all the individual predicates, or 

3. Our application of that self-evident doctrine, 
is, indeed, unassailable. Tis quite evident (whether 
it be self-evident or no) that the Being to whom 
must be attributed each one of the Attributes, or 
Excellencies, as these have been educed in the 
foregoing demonstrations, must be in possession of 
that greater, or (we may say) absolute, Excellence 
which is the necessary result of the total attri 
bution. He who is conform to each predicate, 
one after the other, is, at the same time, conform to 
all the predicates together. Quite palpably, and all 


undeniably, is this so. No position in the Mathe 
matics is more certain. 

4. Doubtless, then, Holiness may be considered 
as if it were but one Attribute, and no more ; yet, 
none the less true is it that the Holiness which 
expresses the universal Excellence of God, the 
Lord, is a result, and the resultant of all the 
other Qualities or Properties of the Divine Nature. 
The prominence, in the view, of the attribute in 
question, as one attribute, may affect the whole 
vision : nevertheless, the attributes, whose unition 
yields us this Holiness, are clearly distinguishable 
from the glory which is the result of the congeries 
in union. 

5. The Lord God is in possession of so many 
Attributes each one of which is an Excellency in 
itself: Therefore, He is in possession of that far 
greater Excellency which is the result of the 
unition of all the individual Attributes or 
Excellencies. This, the point to which we have 
reached, is a most certain truth, and it forms the 
foundation of the doctrine of the one great Attri 
bute, or Super-Excellency of Holiness. 

6. But there is a truth beyond that to which 
we have attained hitherto. The ground on which 
we have been standing is but the vestibule of a 
much grander temple of truth, into which we may, 
so far, enter. In the region beyond our present 
stand-point, may be beheld, in a far-off way, 


indeed, and through a mitigating medium, a 
dazzling, and, ill sooth, blinding glory, which far 
excelleth that which is the pure resultant of the 
totality of the attributes, or individual excellencies. 
That which is glorious, may be conceived to 
have no glory, by reason of the glory which 

7. There is a law of mind to which very little 
attention has ever been paid : a grand law it is, 
however : a supreme law in Intellectual and Moral 
matters super-eminently dominating in the Moral 
region of Mind. The law in question is this, that, 
with regard to an assemblage of mental excellencies, 
the position, The whole is equal to the sum of the 
parts, when applied to the Supreme Mind, gives 
place to this other and higher containing law, that 
from the whole, or all the assembled, united parts, 
there results an Excellency or Glory greater far 
than could result from, or can be expressed by, 
the mere sum of the parts, or the imition of all 
the individual Attributes. Given the unition, 
each one of the Excellencies increases, or intensifies, 
the action of each one and all of the others : so 
that the resultant bears no (definite) proportion 
to the pure sum of all the Qualities or Properties 
of the Substrate. 

8. For evidence of the existence of the law, 
you may take a survey of the things of creation : 
for, the law of, or rather to, the creature, is 


directly connected with the fiat of the Lawgiver. 
No Law-giver, no law. In Man s little world, we 
may behold images, or reflections in small, of that 
great truth ; and, in this direction, any one may 
verify the law to what extent he pleaseth. Nay- 
leaving behind the whole Animal Kingdom, and 
betaking ourselves, at once, to the Inorganic 
portion of our kosmos, we may see, if we use our 
eyes aright, plentiful evidence of the prevalence of 
the same law, only the law raised there to a 
higher reduced here to a lower power. Exempli 
gratid, in chemical combinations themselves, we 
may see adumbrations of the higher, or wider law, 
which holds so remarkably in Moral matters, or in 
the supreme world of Mind. 

9. Morally speaking, then, a confluence of 
perfections, say the confluence of the Perfections 
of the Divine Mind, as these have severally been 
demonstrated, the confluence, we repeat, and 
conjunction of Perfections is equal to not the 
product of each single Attribute added to the 
remainder : but the conjunction itself, and any 
mere resultant of it, is surpassed by the far greater 
glory which expresses the effect of the unition of 
the Excellencies, as each individual Excellency 
intensifies the action of every other one, and of 
all the rest. Each Attribute increaseth the action 
of every other, to an inexpressible pitch of intensity. 
From the very nature of the case, it must be so. 


10. Just as in a grand display of musical 
harmony. The harmony which is so indescribably 
entrancing, is not merely the amount of the 
different volumes of sounds, from so many instru 
ments, and so many throats, added together 
but is a something resulting somehow from that 
union, but not purely co-incident with it. So, in 
a beautiful landscape, or painting of it, the felt 
beauty is not merely a collection of so many 
primary colours, and shades of colours of all kinds, 
with their various blendings, in their respective 
subjects of inhesion, but it is a something, 
produced by, indeed, yet different from, and 
superadded to, the assemblage of colours, and 
shadings, in all their groupings. 

11. Thus, it is a great law of Mind, that 
Moral Perfections, co-existing harmoniously in the 
same subject, are much intensified. AVhat, then, 
must be the glory of the Divine Perfections 
meeting and embracing each other the multi 
plicity of intensifying and intensified Excellencies 
absorbed in the wondrous unity ? That glory 
must be altogether unapproachable by mortal eye, 
or human conception. No created mind can ever 
see (save through the veil) that vision, and live. 

12. From all which, it is manifestly evident, 
that God the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, 
and of ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, the 
Holiest of all. 


13. God the Lord, then, who is the Wisest of 
Beings, and of ineffable Moral Purity, is, neces 
sarily, the Holiest One. 



1. What chiefly distinguishes Holiness as an 
actual existent force in the absolute universe, is its 
contrariety to Sin, and (the effect of the con 
trariety) opposition thereto. The contrariety in 
question may indeed be said to be a distinguishing 
characteristic of Holiness. Yet such contrariety 
cannot be of the essence of the attribute, because 
Holiness, as result of all the other necessary 
attributes, is inseparable from the Divine Nature,* 
and Sin appertains to but the temporal region. 
That cannot be essential to Holiness, or any 
fundamental Attribute of God the Lord, which 
had its beginning in Time, and which is, itself, but 
departure from, and violation of, the Nature, the 
Attributes, the Laws of God, the Lord, which last, 
again, are but the outside expression of His Nature. 
Unless, therefore, Sin be laid down as necessary to 
the system of things ; if, in other words, Sin be 
but accident, or incidental to the essential constitu 
tion of things as existing absolutely in the 

a Demonstration above. 


universe : then Sin, as reality, cannot stand as 
indispensable correlate to Holiness. The necessary 
Holiness of God the Lord, and Sin as accomplished 
fact in the universe, cannot correlate each other. 

2. The actuality of the contrariety and opposi 
tion alluded to, together with the reason thereof, 
are palpable enough. Holiness is the excellency 
or perfection of God the Lord, resulting from the 
totality of His Attributes. Sin denies the 
perfection. Not only does Sin go contrary to the 
fact of the Attributes, and the resulting Holiness : 
Sin denies virtually the true excellence of the 
Holiness, and, with it, the being of all the 
Attributes. It may even be said, that Sin seeks 
to eat into (so to speak) and destroy the very 
throne of the Lord God, the Holy One. For Sin 
is not merely an inactive passive principle, flowing 
from a pure negation, or privation : since Sin, as 
concentrated source of evil in the universe, is 
active and virulent, and most virulent in its 

3. Though Sin be not the correlate to Holi 
ness, absolutely speaking, yet tis true that Sin, 
being viewed as mere pure potency, stands in 
unavoidable antithesis to, if not in never-ceasing 
conflict with, the Holiness of the Lord God. Yet 
the Holiness, as necessary result of the necessary 
Attributes, cannot be regarded as the unceasing 
and inevitable antagonist of the enemy, Sin. 


Given Sin, given ever present hatred and anta 
gonism to Holiness : Yet, given Holiness, there 
does not necessarily emerge the everlasting opposi 
tion to, and conflict with, the temporal inimical 
force. The one is necessarily existing : not so the 
other. Hence the necessity of not losing hold of 
a distinction so essential, arid withal so important. 



1. As Goodness and Love demand the 
cessation, at some point in duration, of misery, 
their opposite and foil ; a so Holiness, the glorious- 
ness of the Divine Existence, demands, in like 
manner, the cessation, at some period, of sin, 
demands the entire and ceaseless cessation of all 
sin, moral defilement, degradation, degenerate 
disfigurement, of all kinds. 

2. Love in the Lord God, and misery in man, 
as end in itself, are irreconcilable. The two things, 
the Love of the Creator, and the purposed misery 
of the creature, for the misery s own sake, are 
absolutely, and most clearly, inconsistent with each 
other. They are inimical forces which by no 
possibility can ever coalesce anywhere in the 
compass of wide nature. a But not more are Love 
and Misery incompatible, than are Holiness and 

a Schol. in., Prop, iv., Div. III. 


never-ceasing Sin. Not more, but less if less be 
possible : as by the preceding Scholium has been 
made abundantly apparent. 

3. Love, from beginningless sources ; that 
suffereth long, and is kind that never faileth ; 
sempiternal Love, exhaustless, Thou hast companion 
fit in that Holiness, which, as a consuming fire, 
struggles to consume the potency first, and, last, 
the very being of Sin. Sin, ugly and deadly 
excrescence upon the body of man s world that, 
as a malignant cancer, eats away, bit by bit, the 
member it preys upon that, as a loathsome 
leprosy, gradually but too surely destroys the body 
it disfigures, and disgraces ; has, for only possible 
issue, entire annihilation. Sin, devouring, devour 
ing, is a gigantic parasite which, last of all, does 
away with itself. 



1. Having considered Holiness in its two fold 
character as perfect Moral Pureness, a and as 
universal Mental Perfectness b we are prepared to 
weigh the relation which the one bears to the 
other. Both characteristics are expressed by the 
same term, but it has been seen that they are 
distinguishable, and how much they differ, from 

a Div. IV. Prop. ii. b Div. IV. Prop. iii. 


each other. Yet, have they, in reality, a funda 
mental agreement ? Whatever outside appearances 
may suggest, are those two things in radical 
consonance ? 

2. What, if we perceive good reasons for 
coming to the conclusion, that the Moral Purity 
of the penultimate Proposition, and the universal 
Holiness of this last Proposition, do not, after all, 
differ in so pronounced a manner as may have 
been suggested by a cursory examination of that 
precise topic ? In a word, it is our task in this 
place to point out that inner agreement which 
exists between the two things, the themes in those 
two Propositions. 

3. What, then, is entire absolute Moral purity ? 
It signifies, that, in no one respect, is there any, 
even the least, spot of impurity. What, now, 
does this involve ? It involves, that, after a 
review of all the Attributes, one by one, each one 
is reported to be void of the slightest taint. So 
that, in such respect, the presence of all the Attri 
butes is assumed, and a judgment is pronounced, 
declaring that all the Attributes are perfect, or 
altogether pure ; not one of them having the 
faintest shadow of defilement. 

4. It seems to follow, that the proof of 
Holiness, in this sense of the term, may rightly be 
called the negative proof. 

5. What, next, is Holiness, in the compre- 


hensive sense, or as standing for the totality 
of the Divine Excellencies ? It signifies the 
presence of all the Attributes, in all their per 
fection. It involves that Super-Excellency, or 
Excellent Glory, which is the resultant of all 
the individual Excellencies acting in harmonious 
unison, and intensifying each other in all-perfect 

6. May not this be said to be the positive 
aspect of the same thing : and may not the proof 
be denominated the positive proof, as contra 
distinguished from the other ? 

7. Finally, the one method declares : All the 
Attributes being surveyed, one by one, there is not 
the slightest taint of impurity or imperfection in 
any one of them all. The other declares : All the 
Attributes, in all their perfections, are present, 
and from their commingling, and intensifications, 
a great glory is the necessary result. Glory, 
indeed, so dazzling, as to be insupportable by 
mortal eyes. 


1. It need scarcely be observed, that the 
Attributes of this Division are, as a whole, to be 
reckoned as belonging to the great Moral group. 
The same Attributes, too, are members of the large 
Psychical class. But the enunciation most apposite 
to this place, is, that the setting forth of the 


distinctively Complex or Compound Attributes 
terminates here. 

2. The next Division shall carry on, and shall 
also close, the Attributes of the Psychical class. 
Yea, as the handling of the Transcendent Excel 
lencies shall not be, and, sooth to say, cannot be, 
without reference to all the Attributes, of what 
kind soever, the Division in question shall be not 
only the fifth, but must be the last too. 




The Lord God, who is the Holiest One, is neces 
sarily the Self -Beautiful, and the All-Perfect 

1. Keeping out of view, distinctively, the 
Natural Modes, a there remain the Intellectual , b and 
the Moral Attributes, and the Attributes which, 
being compounded of the others, are Complex. 1 
Now, to say that the combined Intellectual and 
Moral Attributes are not Excellencies, would be 
radically tantamount to saying that those Attri 
butes are not Attributes. And it shall be our 
business to evince, that the allegation that those 
Moral Excellencies are not Beautiful, would be all 
one with saying, that those Excellencies are not 
Excellencies at all. Therefore (supposing the proof 
to be eminently satisfactory) those Intellectual and 
Moral Attributes are truly Excellencies, and the 
Excellencies are Beautiful the Beautiful Modes of 
being of the All-Beautiful One who is the Sub- 

* Div. I. Div. II. Div. III. d Div. IV. 


stratum of them all. Such is, in outline, the 
course to be pursued. The Moral Excellencies 
will be seen to be Beautiful, each individual 
Excellency being Beautiful. And, although the 
Intellectual Attributes may not be always expressly 
mentioned, it is yet to be understood that the 
Moral Excellencies treated of are ever accompanied 
by the Intellectual Attributes as the inseparable 

2. One of the Axioms on which this demon 
stration is, to a certain extent, founded, is, Every 
position which ive cannot but believe, is a necessary 
truth.* 1 That proposition which men, everywhere 
and at all times, must believe, or which is neces 
sarily believed by them, is, of course, a necessary 
truth to them : And what is a necessary truth to 
men, as men, is, to them, a necessary truth 
absolutely. Every position, then, which we cannot 
but believe, is a necessary truth. But, we cannot 
but believe that the Moral Excellencies with which 
we are concerned, that is, the Moral Excellencies 
or Attributes demonstrated, in the previous 
Propositions, are Beautiful things, yea, the most 
Beautiful of all the objects of thought. Therefore, 
that those Moral Excellencies are Beautiful, is a 
necessary truth. These propositions constitute a 
valid act of reasoning, namely, a syllogism of the 
First Figure, and in the First Mood, or, they are, 

a Div. III. Prop. i. 1, d aliis locis. 


at least, easily reducible to such. Thus, we have 
here an instance of legitimate ratiocination. 

3. The second, or minor, proposition, namely, 
We cannot but believe that those Moral Excel 
lencies are Beautiful, yea, most Beautiful, is the 
only one requiring, or admitting of, proof ; and the 
proof shall be furnished straightway. In fact, the 
truth of the proposition is easily evinced, as the 
proposition is very near to carrying its own 
evidence along with itself. 

4. As to that proposition, then, it is to be 
observed that it rests, for its truth, upon the 
pronouncement of a great law valid universally. 
It is a law of mind, valid universally, that Moral 
Excellencies, in general, or as such, are Beautiful : 
yea, that Moral Excellencies, of the highest degree, 
or as they exist in the Supreme Mind, are the most 
Beautiful of all Beautiful things. In particular, it 
is a fixed, unalterable law of our moral nature to 
be convinced that Moral Excellencies generally, 
or simply as being so, are Beautiful : and we are 
compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to 
pronounce the universality of the law ; it is a law 
applicable to all Minds without exception. In 
truth, the one position could not be believed 
without the other. The one implies the other. 
It comes, in short, to this, that in the proposition 
which we are handling the minor of the syllogism 
we have a self-evident proposition. If it be not 


intuitively evident, that Moral Excellencies are 
Beautiful, the position is the very next thing to 
being so. 

5. Moral Excellencies, then, are Beautiful : 
and the Moral Excellencies, the existence of which 
has been demonstrated in the foregoing Division, 
are the most Beautiful of all. Moral Excellencies 
are Beautiful, by virtue of a law of mind, which, 
as a first principle, or necessary truth, Conscious 
ness testifies ; and the true testimony of Con 
sciousness, in an affiair of this kind, admits of no 
questioning. There can be no appeal from the 
court of Consciousness, in a matter to which the 
judgment of the court is fairly applicable. It is, 
thus, a necessary truth, that the Moral Excellencies, 
as modes of being of the great Substrate of all 
being, are the most Beautiful objects of thought 
in the mighty universe of universal mind. 

6. Not, indeed, that those stupendously perfect 
Moral Excellencies which have been specially under 
consideration, nor any moral Excellencies, speak 
ing in a general way, are the only Beautiful 
things. By no means. Moral Excellencies are, 
of a truth, Beautiful, yea, the most Beautiful of 
all things : but they are not the only beautiful 
things. They are but the most Beautiful of 
beautiful things. Many things perhaps, many 
classes or kinds of things are beautiful. Some 
more so than others. Those, most of all : and, of 


those the Moral Excellencies of the Being of beings 
most of all again. Who could doubt, even for one 
moment, whether such Attributes or Excellencies 
as consummate Happiness, and perfect Goodness, 
Trueness, Faithfulness, Righteousness and Justness, 
all in the highest degree, and essential Lovingness, 
together with absolute Wisdom, entire Moral 
Purity, and universal Holiness, all existing neces 
sarily and indefectibly, and in indissoluble associa 
tion with each other, and with perfect Intellectual 
Attributes, to say nothing of the inseparable 
Natural Modes of being ; who could doubt 
whether such Super-Excellent Qualities of Mind 
be most Beautiful, or no ? One might as soon 
doubt whether there be any Beauty at all : and, 
in truth, the one doubting would be almost 

7 O 

identical with the other. 

7. Unquestionably, the law which has been 
referred to is an abiding law of our minds. If 
there be sucli a thing as Beauty in the absolute 
universe, Beauty is to be found associated with 
might we say, identified with ( Moral Excellency, 
of the highest or intensest possible kind, and 
which is itself in the most intimate consociation 
with Intellectual Supremacy. Moral Excellencies 
are, in fact, most Beautiful properties of Mind, 
but to combine them in thought with Intellectual 
Perfections is to raise them to the highest pitch 
of possible Beauty. Such union would be com- 


parable to the conjunction of The True and The 
Good or that of Righteousness ( = Justice) and 
Love ( = Mercy). Indeed, the union spoken of 
would be almost, if not quite, tantamount to that 
conjunction. The latter is little else than a more 
generalized expression for the former. If absolute 
Righteousness, and Lovingness, and Purity, and 
universal Holiness be not Beautiful, there is no 
Beauty in the universe. If there exist anywhere 
Beauty, those Qualities or Perfections are Beautiful 
yea, most Beautiful. 

8. What has been delivered is the exposition 
of a grand law of things, a necessary truth in 
relation to the world of Mind. We cannot but 
believe that Moral Excellencies, or Perfections, are 
most Beautiful in themselves, and every position 
which we cannot but believe, is a necessary truth. 

9. We may, then, conclude for it has been 
clearly evinced that The Lord God is most 
Beautiful ; and, being of Infinity of Duration, or 
unoriginated, He is necessarily the Self-Beautiful. 

10. But tis possible that every proposition 
which the wit of man ever pronounced may be 
denied, and we shall suppose that our more 
general position, Moral Excellencies are Beautiful, 
(involving as it does the more particular one, The 
Moral Excellencies, par excellence, are most 
Beautiful,) is denied denied by some person or 
other, by some one individual, or class of men. It 


is denied, then, that moral excellencies are beautiful ; 
and, indeed, every position which men could adopt, 
men can reject : Ay, men can most easily reject 
any position, if the utmost perversity be no 
appreciable hindrance in the way of the rejection. 
Few, in truth, are the propositions which have 
never been called in question anywhere. 

11. Let us suppose, then, that our position is 
actually called in question, by a doubter or caviller. 
Let us, moreover, put the matter of the doubt in 
the most formidable way conceivable. 

1 2. Suppose, therefore, that a sceptic, animated 
(if you like) by materialistic tendencies, affirms 
that it is not true that, generally speaking, Moral 
Excellencies are Beautiful. Beauty is, quoth our 
dogmatising sceptic, not a possible predicate of the 
subject, Moral Qualities. The term is highly 
inapplicable here. Beauty is a word which ought 
to be confined to the objects of our senses the 
sense of sight in particular. In fact, beautiful is 
predicable of only the things of time and sense, if, 
indeed, the term be applicable to any object which 
is not an object of sight. Something to be seen by 
the ei/e : such is the proper indispensable condition 
of being beautiful. 

13. It must be granted, that this objection is 
a wide one. It goes very far, or sinks very deep. 
According to it, no character, as an assemblage of 
moral properties, existing in even the highest 


degree of perfectness in any mind, is or can be 
beautiful. Beauty may be in this landscape, or in 
that ; but beauty can by no means be in the mind, 
or any way predicable of the mind, of the beholder 
of the landscape. The beauty is solely an outward 
quality ; it exists in the landscape beheld : it is 
nowise dependent on the mind beholding the 
collection of (primary, and secondary ?) qualities. 

14. Thus, the most admirable and loveable 
character ever existent on earth, or delineated by 
the pen of man, or imagined in the heart of man, 
is not beautiful. The best moral character 
istics ever united in any mind have no form or 
comeliness : there is no beauty there. The 
objection, in one regard, is an old one : it is as 
ancient as nearly two millenniums can make it to 

15. Let it not be imagined, for a single instant, 
that an intention of denying the force of the 
objection is entertained. On the contrary, the 
intention is to grant it, and found upon it. The 
objection, in all the truth and force it may have, 
shall be admitted for the purpose of turning it to 
account by making it the source and the vehicle of 
an additional argument an argument of the very 
best description, because an argument furnished 
by opponents themselves. It shall be shown, that, 
on the theory of this objection being true, the 
Lord God will be the Self-Beautiful. The objection 


itself will evince, that the Lord God is the most 
Beautiful of all. 

16. As often as, in these latter portions of our 
demonstration, we speak of taking any survey of 
the things of and in our kosmos, creation, as fact, 
is the postulate. That which was proved, in the 
earlier Divisions, a is to be taken for granted at 
present. The material universe itself, and every 
succession of objects in it in particular, the race 
of man, each and all of these, being finite in 
duration, began to be. a Having begun sometime 
to be, they were caused, and the Cause, or Creator, 
was the One Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, a the great Substrate. These positions, 
all proved in formerly occurring places, are postu 
lates now. Creation, then, the creation of all 
things, is our postulate here. In possession of such 
postulate, it is quite legitimate, and in perfect 
accordance with the best method, b to appeal to 
universal nature as the work of its Creator and 
Fashioner, and Preserver, whose Laws, which, 
rightly understood, are an outward expression of 
His Character, which again results from His 
Nature, c regulate the entire kosmos, and every 
department of it. The Laws of Nature are simply 
the exponents, being the consequence, of His Will. 

a Viz. Div. I. Part ii., & Div. II. Part ii., &c. 

h Confer, ut supra, Div. III. Prop. iii. Dem. 2-5 inclusive. 

c Vide Div. III. Prop, iii., Schol. Sub-Schol. II. 1. 


The Laws of Nature are but the Creator s Will in 
continuous or sustained action. 

17. The postulate in question, as our premiss, 
is now to be made use of, or applied to the point 
in hand. The conclusion from the permiss but 
remains to be drawn. That conclusion, however, 
is by no means difficult to be perceived. In sooth, 
it cannot fail to be palpably discerned. 

18. Our world, the world on which we stand, 
as the theatre of our varied preceptions, contains 
many fair landscapes, one landscape differing from 
another landscape in beauty. But the world itself, 
and all that it contains, are the workmanship of 
the great Being, even the Lord God, who was the 
contriver, the maker, the fashioner, of every beauti 
ful object in every beautiful scene. But, as the 
cause must (from the necessity of the case) possess, 
cither actually, or in a higher degree, every 
excellency which the effect displays ; so, the Creator 
of all the diversified beauties of nature must Himself 
possess, in greater perfection too, the very beauties 
which His own creation unfolds to the admiring 
vision of His representative on earth. That man, 
the image in little, perceives the beautiful, were of 
itself sufficient evidence that the grand Exemplar 
has Beauty. 

19. Therefore, if (as the objector affirms) 
beauty be discoverable in only outward scenes, and 
the objects of sight, these, as effects of the 


contrivance and skill of the mighty Workman, 
shew forth the beauty which is in the mind of 
Him whose hand formed all these things. He who 
produced all beautiful things is Himself, the source 
of them, the Beautiful Being. That the Author of 
all Beautiful things should Himself be destitute of 
Beauty, were a position incredible, impossible, most 
monstrously absurd. The Author of the beautiful 
in nature must be Beautiful in Himself. 

20. And adding to the ground thus gained, by 
legitimate conquest, the former lawful possessions, 
we do attain, once more, to the vision of the Lord 
God, the Beautiful One, even the Self-Beautiful. 

21. This is He who is the Good in itself, the 
True in itself, the Beautiful in itself. This is the 
altogether Good, and True, and Lovely. In 
Himself. First Good, First True, First Fair. 

2 2. But having fallen upon a certain track, let 
us pursue it, taking heed whither it may conduct 
us. We have been led to see (and indeed to say) 
that the Supreme Mind is All-Beautiful, because 
the cause must be, in due order, more perfect 
than the effect. In truth, the Mind which is over 
all, because the Creator and Sustainer of all, must, 
in respect of Beauty, be All- Perfect. 

$ 23. But, in the same way, or for precisely 
the same reason, that Supreme Mind must be 
Perfect in all other regards too. The same reason 


which shews the Lord God, the Supreme Mind, 
to be sovereign in Beauty, shews the same Mind 
of minds to be Perfect in all other excellent 
respects. The Perfection of Beauty, the Lord God 
is the All-Perfect. 

24. But, indeed, a very short, and direct a 
priori route to the position, that the Lord God is 
All-perfect, yea, the All-perfect One, was always 
open to us. It has been demonstrated, that the 
Lord God is the Most Holy One, as the possessor 
of all the individual Attributes which had been 
exhibited in succession. a Now, because so uni 
versally Holy, the Lord God must, therefore, 
be the All-perfect One. Each single Attribute 
is an Excellency which is another way of 
stating, that each Attribute or Excellency is a 
Perfection : and the totality of the Perfections 
constitutes All-perfectness. Tantamount to All- 
perfectness are the Perfections in union and com 

25. Nevertheless, something was yet lacking. 
The enumeration of the Attributes leading to the 


demonstration of Holiness might have been 
incomplete. Some property or quality of mind, 
worthy of being ascribed to the Mind of minds, 
might have been omitted : as, in point of fact, the 
quality, or perfection, of Beautifulness was omitted, 
from the list of Attributes separately demonstrated ; 

a Div. IV. Prop. iii. 


and, as a matter of course, it appeared as no item 
in the demonstration relating to the conjunction 
of Excellencies entering into the universal Holiness. 
Whereas, the All-perfectness now under notice as 
a predicate, is intended to comprehend under it 
every Excellency of Mind, of possible existence, 
which is not (as well as which is) already compre 
hended among the Attributes in any way demon 

26. The particular demonstration now in view 
will, therefore, be of this character, or to this 
effect : The Lord God is the Most Holy One, as 
the subject in which so many Excellencies as were 
severally specially demonstrated do exist or reside. 
And being the Most Holy One, in that universal 
sense, He must be also in possession of all 
other mental or spiritual Excellencies, if other 
there be. He who, being over all, is Perfect as to 
so many Attributes, must be likewise Perfect as to 
all other Attributes, if others there be. Perfect 
in those, He must be Perfect in the rest, if they 
exist. The Holiest One must be Perfect in 
all mental Excellencies : Otherwise, an utter 
incongruity would be introduced into the Divine 
Economy, and the Godhead would enclose incon 
sistent constituents. And to suppose any such 
incongruity, or inconsistency, would be to entertain 
the most extravagant absurdity. 

27. By reason whereof, it is true that 


Sublimity, and many other Excellencies, or modi 
fications of Excellencies, are predicable of The 
Mind of minds. The Self-Beautiful, He must be 
also The Sublime, or, in other words, the super 
eminently High and Lofty One. 

28. Therefore, it is evinced that the Lord God, 
as the Holiest One, is the All-Perfect Being. And 
it was before demonstrated, that He is the Self- 
Beautiful. 8 And so we shall formulate our 
conclusion accordingly. 

29. So, the Lord God, who is the Holiest One, 
is, necessarily, the Self -Beautiful, and the All- 
Perfect Being. 


1. What Beauty is, or consists in? Whether 
it resides in the object viewed, of whatever nature 
be the object, when the object is called beautiful, 
or in the mind beholding the beautiful object? 
Holding that Beauty is limited to created things, 
Whether beauty be an external quality of the 
material object, or a purely internal feeling of the 
percipient ? Or, partly the one, and partly the 
other that is, a mixture of both ? All these, and 
many more like questions, have been discussed, 
each side, in every case, having had its devoted 

2. In like manner, Beauty has been used in a 

* Supra, 9, 20. 


very wide sense, and it has also been employed in 
a very narrow sense of the term. 

3. But it would appear, that, in whatever else 
the various patrons and advocates of the several 
opinions might differ, they all agree in one thing, 
that, to wit, there is such a thing as Beauty, and 
that it is perceivable. Wherever it resides, and 
whatever it, in itself, be, there is yet the 
beautiful, and beautiful things may be beheld. 

4. From the preceding, it would seem that, if 
possible, it is yet not easy, to define beauty, or to 
tell precisely in what its essence consists. Is, 
then, the question, What is Beauty in itself? or, 
what is the Self-beautiful ? an insoluble question ? 
A question interesting as having been raised so 
pointedly by one of the majestic master-minds of 
the world, the great poet-philosopher of all 
antiquity. Shall men never be able to do more 
than tell what things are beautiful ? or explain 
certain circumstances about the beautiful things ? 
To demand a strict logical definition of Beauty, or 
The Beautiful, may be, after all, equal to the 
demand, addressed to the faculty or power in us 
which apprehends Beauty, to be answerable, for 
the function of the power, to the dialectical and 
linguistical faculties. And to translate its function 
into their language, may be a request totally and 
absolutely inadmissible. 

5. We have unquestionably, a power, or 


powers, of some kind, by which we apprehend 
Beauty : We may possibly not have ability to 
describe, in or by means of words, what Beauty in 
itself is, or in what the Self-beautiful consists. 
Not everything is susceptible of being denned, or 
described, by sound significant, or by any language 
of any sort save that which appertains, as a 
specialty, to the faculty which apprehends. The 
truly beautiful is understood by a peculiar power 
or susceptibility, or province of susceptibilities, of 
the mind ; but it cannot, perhaps, be transmuted 
into so many terms, the product of other, and quite 
dissimilar, mental powers. Some things are too 
simple, or too peculiar, to be capable of being 
denoted by more words than one. Beauty is, or 
may be, one of those things. 

6. Nevertheless, it does appear to be the 
case, that an approach, at least, to the solution of 
the question, What is the Self-Beautiful ? has 
really been made in the foregoing demonstration. 
Even supposing Moral Excellency, as existing in 
the Mind over all minds, be not a pure synonym, 
or an exact equipollent, for The Beautiful in itself, 
the former words do yet, at any rate, come very 
near to being equivalents for the latter. The 
Moral Excellency of the Lord God, is the Self- 
Beautiful ; and the Beautiful in Itself, is the Moral 
Excellency of the Supreme : this is true, or, at all 
events, it would be extremely difficult to shew it 


to be untrue. And from those equivalent positions, 
many derivative truths, of great pith and moment, 
do follow. As to which it would be exceedingly 
advantageous to treat, in due time and place. 


The Lord God, ivho is the Self -Beautiful, and 
the All-Perfect Being, is necessarily the Ever- 
Blessed One. 


1. As an affair of language, the word Blessed 
ness, when applied to the Supreme Spirit, has two 
meanings, in the one or the other of which it may 
be taken. First, it may denote consummate 
Happiness; and, secondly, it may stand for 
consummate Well-thought-of -ness, or Wc/t-xpoken- 
of-ness. Exempli gratia, in certain writings, we 
read of "the blessed God," and "the blessed and 
only Potentate," where the word blessed occurs in 
the sense of the happy God, or Potentate. In other 
places, we meet with the word in the other sense, 
and "the blessed," or "ever blessed God," is 
another way of expressing, God who ought to be 
ever well thought of, and well spoken of. In 
Greek, the two meanings have two terms to express 
them. Blessed, in the sense of Happy, is denoted 
by MaK(ipio9, or, as applied to the Great Supreme, 
O MKU|0/o?. While blessed, in the other sense, 


that, namely, of being well thought of, is Ei/Ao^-roV, 
or, O EJAo y^To?. 

2. Xow, these two meanings, though covered 
by one and the same English word, express things 
not only distinguishable, but very different from 
each other : as different from each other as the 
two words would have appeared and been to a 
Hellenic Grecian. 

3. The same discrimination in things, leading 
to the same distinction of words, is to be seen 
elsewhere. For instance, the same distinction in 
terms is to be found in the Hebrew language. A 
Hebrew, or Jew, said, in accordance with the 
genius of his speech, Blessed is the man, when he 
ascribed, or wished for, happiness, or fortunateness, 
to the man, or wished, for him, that the blessedness 
would be preserved and continue : the Jew using 
the term Ashrey, oqJN. The Jew would never 
think of saying, Blessed be God (Elohim), or the 
Lord (Jehovah), using the word Ashrey. He would 
assuredly employ, in this case, a different word. He 
would say, Blessed be the Lord God, using Baruch 
(TFTQ)- Of course, the latter word is used indiffer 
ently of the Creator, and the creature : because the 
creature, as well as the Creator, may lawfully be 
the object of good wishes, or laudations. The 
question is not whether both words may be applied 
to the creature, but whether they may both be 
applied to the Creator ; or, if both may be applied 


to the Creator, whether both be applicable in the 
same way. 

4. CWld any thing point out more aptly than 
does the circumstance to which our attention has 
been directed, that these ancient languages, the 
Hebrew and the Greek, are the providential (witli 
your leave !) or the true i.e., fit and proper- 
theological languages ? That, while we possess 
only one word in our English tongue to express 
such very different ideas, as the words "ntTN (0 
the happiness !) and T^na (Blessed bo !) do 
respectively denote, eacli of those languages had 
two words to carry the two so differing meanings ; 
is a circumstance well calculated to make us pause, 
and meditate on the reasons, no less than on the 
fitnesses, of things. 

5. Modern Anthropologists have investigated 
many subjects. But the relations of peoples, and 
their languages, to their uses on the world-wide 
theatre, would be one of the most advantageous 
considerations which could enter into the matter 
of Anthropological Science, or, at any rate, the 
studies of Anthropologists. 

6. In a previous part of this demonstration, 
the complete Happiness of the Infinite Being was 
demonstrated, a and we are come now to the place 
where shall be demonstrated the Blessedness of 
the Lord God in the other sense, the sense, to 

a Div. III. Prop. i. 4. Vide, etiam, Prop. iii. Schol. n. 13. 


wit, of necessary and consummate well-thought- 
of -ness. 


1. One difference, which strikes the very key 
note of the distinction betwixt the two meanings 
of the term Blessed in English, and the two words 
corresponding thereto in Greek and Hebrew, is, 
that we can with propriety say, May the Lord God 
be blessed, or, Blessed for ever be His Name ; while 
we could not say, without the grossest impropriety, 
May He (continue to) be happy. That is, we dare 
not employ the word blessed in this latter sense. 
The expression, May the Supreme be happy for 
ever, would convey that we, His creatures, could 
be in some way witnesses, or at least expectants, of 
an increase (by continuance) of the Happiness of 
the Great Being ; while, indeed, that Happiness 
admits not of the possibility of any increase, as it 
is capable of no diminution, the Happiness being 
as necessary as the very Being itself. In fine, it 
is, and will always be, man s duty to say, May 
He who is over all be blessed (eJAoy^ro ?.) But it 
would be a near approach to blasphemy to express 
a wish, or to wish, for a continuance or an increase 
of that Happiness which is essential to the Deity. 
An approach to blasphemy would certainly be made 
by applying to the Divine Being the term blessed 
in the sense of, Be thou happy. 


2. Such being the state of the case, the road 
to the manifestation of the truth of our Proposi 
tion lies quite patent. Can any ons doubt, if it 
were but for a moment, that the Being to whom 
we must ascribe all the previously expressed 
Attributes, Excellencies, Perfections, ought to be 
well thought of, and well spoken of? Can the 
Infinite Being, who is necessarily All-Knowing, 
All-Powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, 
perfectly Good, True, Faithful, Just and 
Righteous, All-Loving, each of these predicates 
being taken in the widest sense, the Wisest of 
Beings, of ineffable Moral Purity, and the Holiest 
One, who is also the Self-Beautiful, yea, the All- 
Perfect Being ; can that Being be otherwise than 
well thought of? Well thought of, if we think of 
things as they are, and should, and must, be, and 
not as they are not, and cannot be ? Unless, 
indeed, we be false ourselves, it is impossible the 
affair could be otherwise. Only a person whose 
faculties, and whole powers of mind, are in a 
condition of mental disorder utter moral wreck, 
and ruin, and confounded chaos where all is equally 
dire confusion, only such could withhold the 
tribute of his best thoughts as due to the Supreme, 
or ascribe to Him any (even implied) evil or imper 
fection, by wish of heart, or thought of mind. 

3. As their bounden duty, men ought to give 
praise and glorification to Him who is over all, 


who made them, and sustains them in beinsj. with 

* O 7 

all the blessings present and prospective of their 
being. To wish any addition of Happiness to such 
a One, would be, at bottom, to look at things as 
they are not, and deny to that Supreme the posses 
sion of that which is His inalienably. His, by 
actual possession and by right, from the very 
necessity of the thing. How much more, therefore, 
would any denial, in a worse form, be intolerable, 
since even the wish of an addition to the Essential 
Happiness would be so flaringly and flagrantly 
wrong, and in opposition to the eternal fitnesses of 
things ? 

4. So very evident, indeed, is the truth and 
propriety of the predicate in our Proposition, that 
it is extremely difficult to keep from a certain air 
of sermonizing in delivering the media of our 
thesis. Topics so plain are apt to look like mere 
platitudes. That the All-Perfect Being is worthy 
of all praise, and honour, and glory not only 
from us, but from all creatures gifted with 
Intellectual and Moral properties themselves ; is as 
clear a truth as can be entertained by us. Only 
minds in a state of perversion, and hideous collapse, 
that can see things (not as they are, but) as they 
are not, could refuse to ascribe glory to their 
Maker, could decline to say, Blessed be He ! 

5. But tis of little use discussing what a 
perverted mind can be or do. For certain it is 


that every Moral Intelligence, as such, must say, 
and be always ready to say, Blessed be God the 
Lord ! Yea, most true is it, that, as the question 
concerns the innate propriety and truth of things 
themselves, we may pronounce unhesitatingly that 
tis a necessary supposition that the Mind of minds 
must attribute to Itself Ever Blessedness. How 
could it be otherwise ? As long as Moral Excel 
lencies, closed up in All-Perfectness, be as they 
are, so long must a corresponding absolutely 
universal Glorification a, Be Ever Blessed ! be 
due to, and not to be withheld from, the Being of 
beings, the All-Perfect. 

G. One element remains, and the truth to be 
pointed to, if not unfolded, is one which is true of 
created minds, as well as it is true of the Uncreated 
Mind, the ground and direct fount of all other 
Intelligence. Blessedness is beyond Happiness, 
even Happiness the greatest that can be. The 
former is more interior, more profound, and also 
more extensive and comprehensive, than the 
latter. Happiness, if itself a strictly Moral (in 
contradistinction from an Intellectual) Attribute, 
does not at least include, or involve, by any 
necessity of ideas, the remainder of the Moral 
Attributes. But the Blessedness involves, and 
distinctly and directly includes them all. Hence 
the Blessedness is, in truth, a Transcendent 
Attribute, being super-eminently above the Happi- 


ness, the existence of which was demonstrated as 
constituting the step intermediate between the 
Intellectual and Absolute, and the Moral and 
Relative Modes of Being. In fine, the Blessedness 
contains within it the Happiness, and the former 
exceeds and excels and supremely transcends the 
latter ; even as the mightiest of constellations may 
be imagined to surpass in magnificence the real 
glory of a single brilliant star in that vast and 
most glorious assemblage of stars of all magnitudes. 
Only by virtue of the isolation, the individual star 
is a tiny object. A multitude of stars, no one 
greater than it, raises the host unto the dignity 
of a constellation, with its incalculable proportions. 

7. Therefore, in the affirmation, that the Lord 
God, who is the Self-Beautiful, and the All-Perfect 
Being, is necessarily the Ever-Blessed One ; there 
is a most true and righteous alliance between the 
subject and the predicate : and we cannot but 
conclude accordingly. 

8. And, thus, the Lord God, who is the Self- 
Beautiful, and the All-Perfect Being, is, necessarily, 
the Ever Blessed One. 



1. From the very nature of the case, matter, 
be it much or little, which has been gone over 
elsewhere, will fall to be introduced in this place ; 
and the student ought to be prepared rather for 
the application of truths advanced already, than 
for the appearance of considerations fresh in every 
point of view. 

2. As this concluding Scholium shall be partly, 
and indeed mainly, occupied with an application 
of the positions advanced and proved in the 
different Propositions of our discourse ; so, it will 
be extremely proper to begin with a survey of the 
various positions themselves, these being now all 
held as so many established points. The survey 
shall be made to be as short as possible an 
epitome, in sooth, as succinct as shall be compatible 
with clearness. 

3. We shall exhibit, then, a summary of the 
truths established in the foregoing demonstration, 
holding them all as being beyond the reach of 
question ; and, afterwards, it shall be our business 
to make a certain application of the truths held as 



(1.) There is necessarily existent One most 
Simple Being of Infinity of Extension or Expansion, 
and Infinity of Duration. a 

(2.) And Matter, under any aspect of it, is not 
that Being. On the contrary, Matter has inherent 
qualities and capabilities, inseparable from it, which 
are inconsistent with the idea, and the actual 
possibility, of its being other than finite in 
extension and finite in duration. b Thus, it began 
sometime to be. 

(3.) The Being of Infinity of Expansion, and 
Duration, is a Spirit, that is, an Infinite Spirit : c 
which, being so, is everywhere, and of absolute 
immensity. Therefore, It penetrates all matter, 
and every existence of whatever kind, in the most 
intimate manner/ 1 

(4.) Advancing to the Intellectual Attributes, it 
is seen that the Infinite Spirit is All-Knowing ; c 
and It knoweth, therefore, every thing in every 
point in the universe of matter, or of the pure 
space beyond the same. f It also knoweth every 
thing from the beginning to the end of time ; yea, 

a Div. I. b Div. I. Part i. Sub-Prop., & Part ii. Sub-Prop. 
c Div. I. Part i. Sub-Schol., & Part iii. Prop. in. Schol. 
ll Div. I. Part i. Gen. Schol. and Sub-Schol. 
Div. II. Part i. f Div. I. Parti. Sub-Prop. Dem. 6. 


everything in the duration itself beyond or before 
the world, or ere the material universe was, falls 
within the range of the knowledge of that Infinite 

(5.) It is also Ail-Powerful, able to do all 
possible things, or every thing involving no internal 
inconsistency : no contradiction, impossibility, or 
absurdity. 15 

(6.) The Infinite Spirit is, moreover, entirely 
Free : It is the Free Spirit, being Free in the truest 
sense of the term. Being beyond the reach of the 
power, or influence in any way, of aught outward, 
extraneous, or foreign to Itself in any possible 
respect, It is truly Free. Being alone, in such 
regards, It is The Free Spirit. 

It behoves the contained to be, if co-eval with, 
not more ancient than the continent. The whole 
Material Universe having had a beginning : Man, 
therefore, had an absolute commencement ; and of 
the race of man the Being in question is the most 
Free Creator. 1 

(7.) The Infinite Spirit is possessed not merely 
of the Intellectual Attributes: It possesses the 
strictly Moral Attributes likewise/ First of all, It 
is completely, or supremely, Happy. It is of 
essential Happiness : Happy in Itself, and by and 
for Itself.* 

a Div. II. Tart i. Dem. g 4. Div. II. Part ii. c Div. II. Part iii. 
l /6irf. Schol. Div. II. * Div. III. s Div. III. Prop. i. 


(8.) Being essentially Happy, the Infinite Spirit 
is also perfectly Good. It is Good contemplatively, 
or passively : and Good actively, and with regard 
to Its creatures, especially the Intellectual and 
Moral creatures, formed after the pattern of Itself, 
the Exemplar, or, in Its own image and likeness.* 

(9.) The Infinite Spirit, or God, b is now to be 
regarded as in relation to His c moral intelligent 
creatures. God, therefore, is the True, d and the 

(10.) He is, moreover, of inflexible Justice in 
His actings and dealings with his creatures/ And, 
ascending to the fount of Justice itself, He is the 


altogether Righteous. 5 

(11.) God is, also, the All-Loving, yea, Love 
itself. 11 And being so, suffering and misery, on 
the part of His creatures, are doomed to final 
extinction, extinction total and everlastingly. 1 

(12.) The simple, or uncompounded, Attributes 
being exhausted, the complex Attributes enter the 
field of vision. And under this head, it is made 
apparent that God, the Lord, j is the Wisest of 
Beings. k 

a Div. 1,11. Prop. i. Sub-Prop., & Schol. 

b Div. Ill Sub-Div. ii. Schol. Prsepos. I. 

c Ibid. Schol. Prsepos. n. h Div. III. Prop. iv. 

(1 Div. III. Prop. ii. i Ibid. Schol. HI. 

c Div. III. Coroll. from Prop. ii. i Div. IV. Schol. Prsepos. 

Div. III. Prop. iii. k Div. IV. Prop. i. 

Coroll, from same. 


(13.) He is, moreover, of ineffable Moral 

(14.) And God the Lord is also the Holiest 
One. b Before whom, as the All-Holy, sin cannot 
persistently exist through all the ages of ages. 

(15.) Finally, a transition to the Transcendent 
Excellencies being effected, the Lord God, the All- 
Holy, is the Self-Beautiful, and the All-Perfect 
Being. d 

(16.) And being so, He is the Ever-Blessed 
One. e 

And blessed be His Name, for ever and ever ! 

5. After the preceding brief, yet perhaps ex 
haustive Summary, the reader will be prepared for 
the observations which shall be advanced in the 
way of application of the same. 



(a.) There is a Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and Duration, and this Being is Immaterial. Now, 
this Immaterial Substance and Mind, this thinking 
Spirit, penetrates intimately all things. It per 
meates me, since nought is exccpted. 

a Div. IV. Prop. ii. a Div. V. Prop. i. 

b Div. IV. Prop. iii. u Div. V. Prop. ii. 

c Div. IV. Prop. iii. Schol. ir. 


(fr.) In truth, this Infinite Spirit, being every 
where, and of true immensity, passes through, most 
intimately permeating, all matter, and every thing. 
It passes through me my body, my soul, my 
spirit. I do not see It ; nor touch It : but It 
touches me, and perceives me better than I do 
myself. It knows all my thoughts : there is never 
a thought in my heart but It knows it altogether. 

(c.) The Infinite Spirit created all things. The 
worlds were framed by Its Word for, there was 
no created medium, nor any other possible medium, 
before creation was, except the Word, or Fiat, of 
the Infinite Substance itself. The things which 
are seen, were not made of phenomenal visibles. 
That Infinite Spirit, therefore, is the cause of my 
being ; and on It I do continually depend for my 

(d.) All-Knowing, the Infinite One knows all 
my thoughts, yea, understands them afar off. 
This Being, who so understands me, doth also 
love me, since He preserves me from day to day. 
He sustains my life, and, in fact, I am dependent 
on Him in every breath I draw, and for all my 
blessings. I could not be more dependent, 
physically, or naturally, than I am. He wills, and 
I live, and live on : And He has but to will, 
and I should return to absolute nothingness, 
being utterly ignored and forgotten thenceforth as 
a living existence by every mind in the universe. 


Yea, the Spirit on whom all things depend has 
only not to will has only to cease to will my 
continued existence, and my being would be as if 
it had never been. 

(e.) Being thus so wholly dependent, what 
follows ? To Him, my Creator, my Conserver, on 
whom I every moment depend for life, and breath, 
and all things, my unceasing thanks, my gratitude, 
my warmest love, my universal homage, are due. 
If I do not acknowledge, by such feelings, the 
relation subsisting between me, the creature, and 
Him, the Creator, and Conservator, and Bounteous 
Author of all my good, I am virtually a living 
liar denying, so far as I can deny, the fact and 
reality of the relation which does exist, and the 
existence of which is unobliteratable. In with 
holding the thanks which are so absolutely due, I 
am seeking, desperately, to involve the True and 
the False, the Good and the Bad, in chaotic 
disorder, tending to the obliteration of all distinc 
tions in essences, and even of all substantive things 

(/) Wherefore, with regard to Him in whom we 
live, and move, and are, the Being- of being-s, the 

* O O 

Mind of minds, the Cause of causes, certain 
indispensable duties are due, and the tribute of our 
fullest homage is owing, and our obligations are 

incapable of being set aside except criminally, 

and most vainly. Being the offspring of God, and 


depending on Him continually, and without inter 
mission, for all things, it is but becoming in us to 
acknowledge the truth of the case, by acting 
according to the true fitnesses of things : our 
acknowledgement being with the accompaniment 
of the suitable and most harmoniously allied 
emotions. The sense of utter dependence on the 
Creator and Sustainer of all creaturely existence, 
the veneration, and intense worship due from the 
creature to the Creator, boundless gratitude from 
the obliged to the Great Benefactor, the fullest 
reverence and love, in short, on account of all the 
benefits we are ever receiving from Him on whom 


we depend for every blessing, yea, even the 
minutest bestowment of well-being : these are the 
feelings which ought to have the fullest possession 
of our minds. 

(g.) To withhold, to the smallest extent, or in 
the slightest degree, the expression of such feelings, 
were to act in a manner subversive of the order 
actually existing, and appointed for the subsistence 
and well-being of the Universe : a manner clean 
contrary to the true relations and adaptations of 
things to each other. Tis plain, indeed, that to 
act contrary to the relations in question, would be 
equal to a denial of the facts of the case, and the 
truth of things. That to the Lord God, the King 
of kings, and Lord of lords, the ascription, by the 
Intellectual and Moral creatures, of all praise, and 


honour, and glory, is due ; is as certain as any 
truth whatever. That the intensest homage of 
the creature to the Creator, is a fit, and decorous 
tiling ; is a truth as certain (and it ought to be as 
evident) as that to the sum or multiple of 2 & 2 
belongs an equality to 4 as a totality : and one 
might as rationally and naturally deny the 
existence of the latter (intellectual) relation, as 
that of the former (moral) relation. 

(h.) If one thing be more clear than another, as 
the result of the foregoing Summary, and indeed 
of the whole demonstration itself, it is the truth 
that we are the offspring of God the Lord, the All- 
Perfect One, and that He is our Father. 

(/.) The Fatherhood, indeed, of the Absolute 
One, and First Cause, the Fatherhood as in 
relation to us, the creatures, as simply men, has 
no doubt been denied. But the denial is either 
improper, or, being proper, the premises from 
which the conclusion follows, must be very 
different from ours. 

(j.) For, given the premises afforded by this 
whole demonstration, it is unquestionable that One 
is our Father, our Father bein^ the Creator of 


heaven and earth, and all things therein. 


(k.) No doubt, there are necessary supposita, in 
order to the conclusion that God is the Father of 


men a.s men. Certain essential conditions must 

(/.) First of all, if man be the child of God, it is 
involved that in God there be not only the first 
principles of masculineness ; but also the first 
principles of feminity must be in the Godhead 
likewise. How otherwise could God have off 
spring ? How could the human race, as male and 
female, be in the image and likeness of God, unless 
in God, the Exemplar, there be principles corre 
sponding ? Unless there be in the Exemplar the 
first principles of motherhood, as well as of father 
hood, how could the result be a race which, as male 
and female, is in the likeness and image of the 
Exemplar ? And here the special observations 
connected with the feminine principle in Deity, 
and with the all-sexualness of the Lord God, are to 
be referred to as being in point, and of absolute 
service in the establishment of the doctrine. a 

(m.) In the second place, it is necessary, in the 
view of God the Lord being regarded as our Father, 
that man should be considered as made, or framed, 
after the image and likeness of the same Lord God 
( not only in the respect already alluded to but) 
as to the possession of , complete Intellectual and 
Moral nature ; there being, in short, in God the 
Lord, Attributes corresponding to all the radical, 

a Vide, supra, Div. III. Prop. iv. Schol. in. 3 ; & Div. IV. Prop. ii. 
Schol. 13. 


inalienable faculties, and all the as indispensable 
emotional susceptibilities, of man s nature. It need 
scarcely be said, that, in the course of the forego 
ing Propositions, this essential is seen to be most 
effectually fulfilled. 

(n.) Man, then, is the offspring of God the Lord, 
in respect that man resembles his Maker in being 
male and female in one one at first (androgyn- 
ally,) as he shall be one at last, and for eternity, 
and as being in possession of a full complement 
of intellectual faculties, and moral susceptibilities, 
the product of the very Substance of the Divine 
Being himself. 

(o.) The consideration of the principle of the 
Fatherhood, is highly requisite in order to the 
ethical completeness and perfection of our vision of 
God the Lord. Until we can look at, and do 
appeal to, God the Lord as our Father our Father, 
although lie be our Father in the heavens we 


cannot regard Him with those affectionate warm 
feelings without which continual filial approach 
unto Him will never be made, without which 
approach at all is all but utterly impossible. But 
God, the Lord, once regarded as our Father, and 
what should hinder His child from lowlily yet 
passionately urging his need of the Divine 
assistance ? 

(p.) The Lord God, as Judge of all the universe 

of mind, may be seen seated on the throne of His 


glory : but the Lord God, the inexorable Judge, to 
whom, indeed, as the Doer of the Right, innocent 
angels might look up without fear, is the same 
Bcino: who must look down on man, the fallen, the 

O * 

guilty, only with abhorrence at his sin. But the 
same Lord God, seated on His throne as our 
merciful Father, who knoweth not only our needs 
but our frailties, pitieth us, well knowing our 
frames, and remembering that we are but dust. 
The throne of judgment has become a throne of 
grace. In one word, the Lord God, as the judge, 
will be dreaded by guilty man ; while the same 
Lord God, as our Father in heaven, will be 
anxiously sought after by weak man, His sorrowful 
and sorrowing child, borne to trouble, throughout 
his few days, even as the sparks fly upward. 

THEREFORE, the whole course of these reasonings, 
as a connected and consecutive complete discourse, 
can have but one proper and becoming ending. 

We do hang upon God the Lord, and it is 
incumbent on us, as a duty to which we are 
righteously obliged, to give expression to our 
absolute dependence, acknowledging also the just 
consequences of that relation between Him ivho 
is over all, and us the creatures of yesterday. 
WHEREFORE, and as taught by the %>ositions in 
that unimpugnable demonstration, as our immove- 
able ground, we do pray in the ivords of this 



R FATHER who fillcst all space, and art 
everywhere present, who, nevertheless, dost 
manifest Thyself, in a more glorious manner, in 
certain regions, to those spirits, angels and saints, 
and saints and angels joined in one, that are 
likest unto Thyself, who, therefore, dwellest in 
the heavens : Who, inhabiting eternity, art from 
everlasting to everlasting Unto Thee, Our 
Father, do we come, that Thou mayest assist our 
mortal weakness, and aid us, defective in every 
good quality, while we farther pray unto Thee, 

May Thy Name be Hallowed by us, even as 
Thou art Blessed, and to be Blessed for ever more 
by all creatures, especially by those whom Thou 
hast made like unto Thyself by their possession 
of Reason and Conscience. 

May Thy Kingdom come, even Thy Kingdom 
governed and regulated by the laws of unchanging 
Righteousness, and Love, and universal Holiness, 
and may it prevail on earth even as it exists in 
Thy immediate presence in heaven ; so that over 
all the earth men may love each other, and, loving 
their neighbours as brethren, may so love and 
serve Thee, in all lowliness of heart, yet with most 
earnest worship. 


May Thy Will, which is the only rule for the 
heavenly inhabitants, become the rule of our lives, 
who live on earth, that so living we may have, 
even while here, an earnest and foretaste of the 
exceeding great joy to be had in Thy celestial 

And seeing that we do hang so intimately on 
Thee, Lord God, our heavenly Father, 

Give us, according to our need, the things that 
are requisite, as for our bodies, so for our souls and 
spirits : Give us, in particular, this day bread 
convenient for us food to sustain our natural 
lives, and nourishment and quickening for our real 
selves, our minds ; so that our affections may 
become more and more set upon things which are 
above, where is the True Good and the First 

And, seeing that in all things we offend, and do 
come short of the requirements of Thy most Holy 
and Perfect Law, forgive Thou us all our trespasses 
against Thee, and also against our brother whom 
we have seen, so that, forgiving our brother his 
trespasses against us, we do hope for Thy forgive 
ness of us who have so much more grievously 
trespassed against Thee. 

And may we, w r ho are so weak and so frail, not 
be led into temptation : but if, in the course of 
the dispensations of Thy wise yet at present 
inscrutable Providence, w r e be tempted and tried, 


do Thou deliver us, so that we be not utterly 
enclosed in the snares of that Evil One who gave 
beginning to all the evil which is in this world by 
sin, and throughout Thy universe. Evil cannot 
be save in an evil mind ; and we beseech Thee, 
Lord our God, deliver us, Thy sons, from him 
who is only evil, being the father of it. Amen, and 


Now, unto Him, who is able to keep us from 
falling into that condemnation, that so, and at 
the last, we may be presented faultless before His 
glorious presence, with exceeding joy : even unto 
the Only Lord God, who is from everlasting, be 
glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now 
and ever. Amen. 

Yea, Blessed, and for ever Blessed, be His Name. 

AND the responsive chorus, Loth old and new, 
and for ever, of the Church on earth, ix : 



IN offering a Sixth Edition of " The Argument, 
apriori" to the reflective public, a few remarks, and 
only a few, are requisite 011 the part of the author. 
The present edition, then, differs from the preced 
ing one in this, that a Fifth Division, and indeed 
department generally, has been entirely added ; 
while throughout the pre-existent portions some 
slight alterations have been made. These, however, 
being quite unessential and unimportant, do not 
require specific notice and attention. Some inac 
curacies, too, in expression have been rectified : but 
why should such improvements be carefully 
chronicled ? The great difference, therefore, will be 
seen to consist in the new Division, containing " The 
Transcendent Excellencies ; " not to omit mention of 
the concluding portion, "The General Scholium," a 
piece having equal reference to each Division of 
the demonstration. 

No doubt, the inquirers who have honoured the 



former edition with good heed may be taken by 
surprise, seeing that they looked at the book before 
them as containing the true and proper conclusion 
of the affair. And without dispute, " with the de 
monstration of the cumulative attribute of Holiness, 
a veritable culminating point" was attained. a But 
the student is called on to observe, at the same time, 
that it was nowhere said, that the demonstration 
was finished in every sense, or according to the idea 
of it in its author s mind the immediate archetypal 
repository. There was nevertheless no cunning dis 
played in hiding a matter, or, else, the cunning was 
nearly allied to wisdom. The truth is this : A 
provision was made against possible eventualities. 
Not a scornful covenant with death : only, a covenant 
with oneself against death. In case the author had 
not lived to finish the " Argument," as it existed in 
idea in his mind, and as he had actually sketched 
the plan years before, the demonstration as it stands 
in the print of the 5th edition would have been the 
finale : and, indeed, therein a just ending had been 
reached, and no one (unless gifted with a preter- 
naturally acute eye) might have seen that yet there 
was room a desideratum to be, if possible, 

But the demonstration is now ended, ended in 
accordance with the preconceived idea, and the 
actual plan drawn out years ago, viz., at the time 

a Preface to 5th edition. 


the course of " The Argument, a priori, for the 
Moral Attributes of God," was laid down. a Now, 
therefore, there is a full end of "The Argument, 
a priori" A full end, in one sense ; although (it 
is confidently trusted) there will never be a full 
end in another sense, of peculiarly evil signification. 
While the ages roll on, this Argument will exist, 
for it is founded upon a rock which cannot be 
moved. It shall continue as long as this sun : and 
when it shall cease to operate on men s minds, it 
shall be another sun than ours which shall shine 
even that sun, with healing in its beams, which 
shall endure throughout all generations, and beyond 
them all. 

With regard to the new Division of our Argu 
ment, with its Transcendent Excellencies, may 
that be found to be true the like of which happened 
in the case of that eminent man who is declared by 
so many to be Germany s greatest author. May 
the Division in question be its own revelator ; even 
as the famous spire of the Cathedral of Strasbourg 
(ill-fated city !) became a self-revealer to Goethe s 
sensitive eye. " After gazing in admiration upon 
the Minster of Strasbourg, Goethe perceived at 
length, or thought he perceived, that the tower 
arising above the magnificent pile was incomplete. 
On mentioning this to a friend, his friend replied, 

a Tlie plan was sketched in 18G4, the year before the publication of 
the work designated in the text. 


Who told you so ? The tower itself, said Goethe ; 
I have observed it so long and so attentively, and 
have shewn it so much affection, that it at last 
resolved to make me this open confession." And 
then from among the archives of the Cathedral, the 
original sketch, shewing the incompleteness by the 
completeness, was referred to, and Goethe had 
been right. a So, the secret that an additional 
height was awanting, may be revealed by the 
Transcendent Excellencies themselves. There may 
be a talebearer to reveal secrets at present ; as well 
as there had been a faithful spirit to conceal the 
matter. In fine, tis trusted that the thoughtful 
reader, with Division V. before him, will perceive 
that, without these Transcendent Excellencies, the 
demonstration would have been incomplete ; or (to 
state the matter otherwise) with the addition of 
them, the course of the reasonings is duly com 
pleted, so that there is now existent a finished 
performance wanting nothing, and coming to its 
natural and proper ending. 

But although the new portion makes the demou- 

a The instructive anecdote is set down as it was given in the 
"Journal of Sacred Literature" for January-March, 1855, then edited 
by the Rev. Dr H. Burgess. The anecdote occurs in the course of an 
able and generous criticism of "The Necessary Existence of God," as 
set fortli in the Torbanehill edition. The Argument, as it existed at 
that time, suggested, by a self-revelation, its own incompleteness. 
Proof, going farther than Goodness, was desiderated ; and with much 
reason was the desideratum perceived, and sought to be supplied. 


stration complete and perfect in every way, yet tis 
true that the demonstration, as it closed in the 
previous edition, had " a veritable culminating 
point " of its own. It was closed up in a proof of 
the Universal Holiness, and no ordinary reader 
could have perceived any deficiency, far less 
desiderated a whole additional Division. And it 
may be a matter of serious question, whether, even 
yet, the demonstration, as it ends in that fifth 
edition, be not more adapted for Atheists, and 
Infidels generally, than the present edition, with 
its distinct and peculiar addition, can be. The 
Transcendent Excellencies are so exceedingly 
unadapted, and in all ways unsuited, to the state 
of mind in which a professed Atheist, or Antitheist, 
may be expected to be found, that the likelihood is, 
that the handling of these Excellencies before such 
will only provoke outbursts of the most dreadfully 
appalling blasphemies. Such might be the effect. 
Doubtless, an Atheist, or Antitheist, may scoff, and 
scorn, and blaspheme at large, in the most horrid 
manner, with the previous exhibition of the 
Attributes before him. Tis true ; and pity tis, 
tis true. The monstrous jests, and the hideous 
store of lewd sneers, and all the rest of the obscene 
and frightful outcome of the nethermost pande 
monium, may proceed against a proof ending with 
the Holiness of the Lord God. But still the 
blasphemies may be more and greater when those 


Transcendent Excellencies are presented addition 
ally. In fact, these afford peculiarly the pabulum 
on which an impure imagination astride on a per 
verted mind might delight to dwell, in order to 
profane, with the besotted ribaldry, the supremely 
holy things of the Church the more privileged 
peculium of believers, and the assembly of the 
saints universally. We err and sin by casting our 
pearls before the swine, since thereby a more 
abominable filthiness is occasioned than comes from 
the trampling by the brutes upon their more 
accustomed garbage. 

It may be (we advisedly say) a serious question : 
and, accordingly, the Fifth Edition shall, henceforth, 
be reckoned the edition peculiarly adapted for the 
Atheists in perfect accord, indeed, this determina 
tion with the special purpose indicated in the Preface 
thereto ; while the new edition shall be deemed the 
appropriate heritage of the Theists, and believers 
generally. The one shall be called, the Atheists 
edition ; while the other shall have, for its distinctive 
title, the Theists own edition. The former will 
suffice to silence, if not to convince, the unbeliever 
and the disbeliever, and such shall be its function. 
The latter, again, will serve to confirm, and edify, 
the mind of the honest inquirer, and introduce him, 
it may be, into the splendours of a region unvisited, 
or at least uninvestigated, before, to his increase of 


joy, and measureless delight. 


If this our demonstration be as it is commonly 
admitted by its students to be an impregnable 
logical construction : if it be, in truth, a demonstra 
tion equal to a mathematical certainty (as it is 
confidently declared a to be :) mark what follows, 
with regard to various classes of persons. 

In the first place, all Atheists, and Infidels, must 
keep silence in presence of the proof. If the 
unbelievers and disbelievers would proceed to work 
logically, they must be speechless to be in order. 
If they cannot refute this demonstration of the 
existence of a Holy Lord God, they must at least 
hold their tongues. To be allowed, by a logical 
licence, to speak, they must open their mouths 
only to refute the reasonings of the Argument. 
Failing their ability to do so, they must preserve 
unbroken silence before the men of the Church. 

There is another class of the Infidel public, who 
before men call themselves men of Science, but who, 
in reality, are secretly unbelievers. With regard, 
therefore, to the secretly infidel among the men 
of Science (unbelievers are they, though seldom 

a A voice from a far-oil island in the Atlantic, has recently made 
such a declaration. The individual who utters the voice is a genuinely 
zealous student of true philosophy, although he writes from the 
distant and isolated Newfoundland ; and, far away though he is from 
the great centres of thought, he has yet, in one of the periodicals 
of Modern Athens, challenged contradiction of the statement, that 
the Argument, a priori, "has demonstrated, to a mathematical 
certainty, the necessary existence and attributes of God." 


disbelievers) there is a word, in season, to be 

Our gentlemen, then, of Science, of each one and 
all of the Physical Sciences, must allow the applica 
tion to themselves of their own great dictum, That 
each distinct science, and, much more, every great 
department in science, has its own rules, valid for 
itself, and effective for its own internal regulation ; 
and these rules are not to be meddled with, far less 
impugned, in a high-handed way, or by any short 
cut, or indirect method, by any theologian, or by 
any person whatever, be his science or philosophy 
what it may. Mineralogy might be given as an 
example of a single science ; and Geology might be 
adduced as representing a whole class of sciences, 
such as Botany, Comparative Anatomy, Chemistry, 
and even Mineralogy itself. The former is a science, 
while the latter stands for a departmental collection 
of sciences. Now, as touching the rule in view, the 
validity thereof shall by no means be called in 
question in this place. Far from it : for the rule, 
held as settled, shall be founded on for a good 
reason of our own. 

If, then, it has been demonstrated and the affir 
mation we go by is, that it has been demonstrated 
that the Material Universe is finitely extended, and 
is of finite duration, a or began sometime to be ; our 

a See "Argument, a priori:" Div. I. part ii. Sub-Prop., in connec 
tion with Sub-Prop, in Part i. 


men of science cannot l>e permitted to pooh ! pooh ! 
the demonstration. Thev must meet it on its own 


ground, and there controvert it, and overturn it, or 
they must grant it. They dare not controvert 
it, simply because they are men of science ; nor 
dare they by any side wind seem to blow it away : 
because their own rule forbids them to do so. 
Their own grand doctrine is, that every distinct 
science, or philosophy, such as Theism, or group of 
separate sciences, such as Theology, has its own 
rules and method, for which it is answerable to 
the representatives of no other sciences, nor set of 
sciences whatsoever. 

This being so, and it has been settled and fixed 
for ever by the Physical Philosophers themselves 
that it is so, our scientific gentlemen must look 
the matter fairly in the face. It is a position 
regarding that Material Universe which affords the 
basis for all their experiments and observations, 
inductions and generalisations, which is on the 
tapis ; and the logical and metaphysical proof, 
touching the non-eternity of Matter, being before 
them in a legitimate mode, it cannot be kicked 
contemptuously aside or away. As Chemists, as 
Anatomists, as Zoologists, as Geologists, as Astro 
nomers, as what not ? the Natural Philosophers 
cannot object their sciences as being, per se, a 
sufficient opposing force to that demonstration by 
the metaphysical Theist : and no man of Science can 


lawfully travel out of his province, and away from 
the straight path before him, to start an objection 
incidentally, or by the way, while he is making an 
excursion in an irregular cross road. The objection 
must be directed to and against the demonstration 
itself. If it be drawn only from the particular 
pursuit of the Savant, it cannot be but futile, and 
vain, and, as being not in point, it must be 
dropped altogether. In a word, a man of science, 
any one physical science, cannot, as being simply 
a man of science, oppose a demonstration of Theism, 
since Theism is itself a Science, yea (when the 
truth is told) the Science of Sciences. For Theism 
being true, all the sciences must hold of it : It, 
in turn, holding of none. Of the sciences, in fine, 
Theism is the true head and chief, as well as the 
crown and glory. 

The affirmation, therefore, is, that it has been 
demonstrated, demonstrated in the very strictest 
sense, that Matter, finite in extension, is also finite in 
duration ; and so it began to be. Or, you may say, 
it had an absolute beginning. Geologists may dig 
and grope, and better grope, for centuries, yea, for 
millenniums, in the bowels of the earth : they may, 
in the course of countless ages, break down, and 
reduce to powder, and smallest dust, every handful 
of the crust of the earth : but there will still be 
one thing which the Geologists (taken as represent 
ing the men of science in general) cannot do. 


Keeping within their own province, they cannot 
interfere with the rigorous metaphysical and theist- 
ical proof, that Nature herself had an actual 
commencement. The matter of the world had an 
absolute beginning. It was created, having before 
had no existence whatever, except in the thoughts 
of God. 

Should, however, any members of the Scientific 
world, in love with philosophy beyond the bounds 
of their proper sphere, be disposed to go out of 
their own province for a time, to meet, fairly and 
face to face, the Theists on their own domain, 
then, the demonstration itself of the true non- 
eternity of matter will be the subject of discussion. 
And so be it. And God defend the right. 

Even the most cursory reader of the " Argument, 
a priori," will perceive that, between the first part 
and the last part, there is a vast difference in style, 
in a certain weighty respect. The difference may 
be characterised, in few words, by saying, that, while 
the early portions contain few Moral and Religious 
terms (as they may be called), the later portions 
contain many such words, and indeed they may be 
said to abound with them. 

It is quite true, that such a difference exists ; and 
some of the causes of the difference have been 
particularized in the Preface to the Fifth Edition. 

But the reference therein is of a more limited 


nature than that which we have under present 

The early portion of the demonstration, ending 
with the 3rd Part of Division II., is wholly taken 
up with the consideration of the Infinite Being, and 
the purely Intellectual Attributes ; with, in short, 
the Being and the Attributes absolute. While, 
with the Moral Attributes of Division III., begin 
the relative Attributes ; and GOD is considered in 
relation to Man. Here, therefore, Man is intro 
duced upon the stage, and a perfectly different 
course of treatment is the necessary result. 

But, in addition, Moral Attributes involve dis 
tinctively Moral handling. Hence, the introduction 
of Moral words, or words answering to Moral ideas, 
was unavoidable. The necessity for the use of such 
words reached its climax when Holiness entered the 
field of vision : All sorts of Moral and Eeligious 
terms became then an absolute necessity of the situa 
tion. And when the Division with the Transcendent 
Excellencies was added, every sentence must be 
loaded with suitable terms ; and although no defi 
ciency in strict logic was permissible, there must 
needs be a perfect redundancy of words correspond 
ing to the Moral and Religious notions and emotions, 
present through their symbols. 

Any other course, even had it been a logical 
possibility, would have been guilty of an immorality 
chargeable against its very conception. It is an 


offence against morality, no less than against good 
taste, to treat a highly moral subject without a 
sufficiency of words denoting the presence of highly 
moral emotions : whilst it would be equally im 
moral, though the immorality would be of a dif 
ferent complexion, to treat a merely logical theme 
by the interspersion of a crowd of Moral or Religious 
epithets. To have introduced Moral and Religious 
terms, and phrases, into the 1st Division, would 
have been ridiculously out of character ; and to 
have made the 4th and the last Divisions as 
destitute of these as the first Division was, would 
have been, less ludicrous indeed, but much more 
offensive otherwise. The destitution of the highly 
moral and religious words would have been an out 
rage upon both Morality and Religion. 

A late critic characterises the distinction in 
view in a way not so far amiss when he writes : 
"The whole of the earlier part of the treatise is 
"the hardest, closest, most irrefragable argument 
"we have seen for many a day, and, so far as we 
"have discovered, without a single weak point. 
" The later Divisions are looser in texture," &c. a 
Such is the deliverance of one of the latest of my 

One of my earliest critics, however, went much 
farther, and, by one bound, he high over-leaped all 

a " The Literary Churchman" for Feb. 4, 1871. It is the 5th edition 
of " The Argument," which is under notice. 


bound. Division III., with its Moral Attributes, has 
as yet no existence. Only Divisions, I. and II., 
discussing the Being and the Natural Modes, and 

O O 7 

the Intellectual Attributes, had been produced. 
What does the reader suppose that, in these circum 
stances, a resolute theologist-reviewer did ? While 
noticing that in the thin octavo before him (it was 
the first edition) there was no attempt to demonstrate 
the Moral Attributes, he adduces the circumstance, 
that the proof, as it stood, had no terms indicative 
of Moral and Religious emotions and ideas, as a proof 
of a most serious transgression. Transgression of 
what ? Not of the laws of logic. Not of those of 
good taste. A transgression, however, of both the 
theory and the practice of sermonizing, as sermons 
commonly go among us. For your sermon-maker 
is by no means nice, in general, with his adaptations 
of words to subjects. His words may be quite 
germane : or they may not. But we are not to 
condemn the reviewer unheard for his own behoof. 
He is criticising the original edition, and thus he 
makes his charge : " It is to be regretted that Mr 
" Gillespie has so entirely divested his argument 
" of that moral colouring if we may be allowed 
"the expression the presence of whose deep and 
" solemn tinge, pervading every part of Dr [Samuel] 
" Clarke s otherwise abstract demonstration, has 
" always appeared to us one of the most interesting 
"and singular circumstances connected with that 


" masterly performance. In reading Dr Clarke s 
" demonstration, one always feels the inherent 
" grandeur and solemnity of the subject ; in reading 
"Mr Gillespie s never." ["Never" is the word 
in the original diatribe, as it appeared in the bi 
monthly " Presbyterian Review : " but in the 
volume of 1852, when the Torbanehill edition of 
the " Necessary Existence of God " had been several 
years published, the word "never" is changed into 
" but partially and seldom."] " The treatise now 
" before us might almost have been written by one 
" originally and totally destitute of the moral senti- 
" ments. The existence and attributes of the King 
" Eternal, Immortal, and Invisible, whose name is 
" Holy, are reasoned of here with the same passion- 
" less apathy as if they were the properties of an 
"arbitrary and cold abstraction, or as if the subject 
" of discussion were a mere algebraical symbol. 
" This we regard as a very serious defect ; so 
"serious, indeed, that we can hardly imagine it 
"capable of full and satisfactory justification," &c. 
&c. a There is, in the article quoted from, more 
of the same sort of stuff, which he who pleases may 
turn to, if he be in search of excessively candid, 
and more than ordinarily honest, moral colouring. 

a The full title to the volume in question is : " Papers on Literary 
and Philosophical Subjects ; including a Selection from Contributions 
to various Periodicals." It was a means to an end. Soon after the 
publication, the author was seated in a Professor s Chair. 


In fine, the aim, throughout " The Argument, 
a priori" has been, to produce a proof without there 
being in it a single bad argument, or paralogism ; 
a proof, moreover, where technical words, whether 
nouns or adjectives, should never be significantly 
employed until a right to the full and unfettered 
use of them had been successfully established. 

Hitherto, our view has been directed to the content 
of this new, or sixth edition, considered as in and by 
itself: but, before concluding these introductory 
observations, it will be but proper to look at that 
content, as it stands with reference to the contents 
of another volume (the predecessor, in fact, of the 
fifth edition of " The Argument ") to wit, " The 
Necessary Existence of God." a In a word, attention 
must now be bestowed upon the relation which the 
volume entitled, " The Necessary Existence of God," 
bears to that having for its title, " The Argument, 
a priori, for the Being and the Attributes of the 
LORD GOD, the Absolute One, and First Cause." 

This is the more necessary to be done in that a 
misunderstanding about the matter is afloat. A 
kind, no less than judicious, critic, for instance, 
ventures to hope that "some of the treatises" of 
the larger volume, the Necessary Existence, " will 
not be allowed to pass out of print ; " and the 

a It is right to notice that the edition of the work named in the 
text, is the (stereotyped) Eussel edition of 1863, 1865. 


reason assigned for the hope is, because " the 
treatises possess such intrinsic worth." 11 Now, had 
the real truth been fully known, or attended to, no 
such fear need have been once entertained. There 
is no danger of any of the treatises alluded to 
passing into oblivion, by being allowed to go out 
of print, because the smaller volume, the Argument 
itself, has attained to perfect completion. 

If we take the " Argument, a priori," as the 
central figure of the group, we may discern that, of 
its attendants, some are before it, while the others 
go behind and after it. Or (to change the metaphor, 
or rather drop metaphor altogether) let us take that 
Argument as the organon itself. Then, we classify 
the other pieces by the same author, on the same 
general subject, as the ante-predicamenta, and the 

Among the ante-predicamental monographs, we 
may enumerate such pieces as these : 

"Inquiry into the Defects of mere <l puf< ri<>ri 
Arguments for a God." 

" Reviews of the Demonstrations, by Mr Locke, Dr 
Samuel Clarke, the Rev. Moses Lowinan, Bishop 
Hamilton, and others, of the Existence and Attri 
butes of A Deity." 

" Necessary Existence implies Infinite Extension." 

After the central piece, the organon itself (which, 

u The not unsagacious critic has made the "Christian Ambassador 
the vehicle for his ideas. See Number for February, 1871. 


in the " Necessary Existence," is given in no larger 
dimensions than it had in the eyes of the antitheists 
of its early days) come the post-predicamentals. 
Among which stands conspicuously, and so far as 
the volume in question goes exclusively, indeed, the 

"Examination of ANTITHEOS S Refutation of the 
Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 
of God ; " with its various interspersed monographs, 
and subsequent Appendix, containing monographic 
essays of its own. 

Among the interspersed separable treatises, are 

" The non-infinite divisibility of Extension and of 
Matter," and 

" Of the sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space," 
Of the various pieces in the Appendices, some of 
them are, in fact, as many distinguishable essays 
on as many different topics. 

Now, in this enumeration, as a whole, we have a 
set of radically distinct treatises (greater and smaller) 
which have, or may have, intrinsic claims on atten 
tion ; and the claims of some of the treatises do 
nowise depend, wholly, or even mainly, on the 
"Argument" itself. Some of those treatise are, in 
logical arrangement, which is the true equipollent of 
the order of nature, introductory precursors to the 
" Argument, a priori ; " and others fall, as evidently 
or naturally, into their proper place when they are 
made to come after that organon. In a General 
Preface to the " Necessary Existence," a rationale 
of the proper order, or the " relation to each other " 


of " the various pieces " of that volume, is given ; 
and it is shewn, that " they severally handle the 
different departments of the subject." Without 
dwelling farther on the topic in this place, we may 
simply refer the reader to the rationale in question. 
It extends to several pages. 

But among the class of post-predicameutals, we 
might, with great justice, put a production not 
included in the volume which has been under notice. 
The "Examination" of Antitheos was indeed "a 
diffusion and defence of certain portions " a of the 
" Argument : " and equally so was the production to 
be adverted to. The production thus in question is, 
generally speaking, the volume of the Debate between 
ICONOCLAST a ml the present Author* which so far 
as it contains letters and pieces emanating from the 
author of the Argument may very fitly be classed 
with the Examination of the work of the Antitheist. 
Antitheos, with all his force, attacked the 3rd Pro 
position of the Argument: Iconoclast attacked, 
with all his might, the 1st Proposition of the same 
demonstration ; although his predecessor, in the 
autitheistic walk, had declared (what every man, 
gifted with the usual complement of human intellec- 

a See the General Preface, referred to previously. 

h The title of the volume referred to in the text is," Atheism or 
Theism ? Debate between Iconoclast, the accredited Champion of 
British Atheists, and others, and William Honyman Gillespie, of 
Torbauehill," &c. &C.-1870. 


tual faculties, must unhesitatingly declare) that first 
to be altogether unassailable. Both Atheists, how 
ever, purposed to assault the " Argument " itself : 
while, on the other hand, the author thereof defended 
his demonstration (successfully, there can be no 
doubt) against both assailants, thelatest assault being 
repelled with as much good will as the earliest one 
had been. In short, tis evident that both defences 
fall to be ranged among the pieces which, in due 
order, come after the organon itself. You cannot 
defend a thing, until after it exists, and appears 
before you. 

The plain truth is, that the two volumes, "The 
Necessary Existence," and " The Argument, a 
priori," have a principle of vitality, each for itself, 
and distinctly as regards the other. The two are 
distinctively different. The one volume is mainly 
taken up with the natural precursors, and with the 
natural followers, of the organon. The other again 
consists exclusively of the organon itself, pure and 
simple. No need for the one to be the occasion of 
the other s going out of existence, and being seen 
no more in print. Rather, the life of the one 
should be a guarantee for the continued existence 
of the other. The prosperity of the organon, the 
grand central figure, should make the company of 
its congenial attendants desirable. 

In a perfect arrangement of the different works, 
the order would be this : 


1st, The precursors of the Organon, or ante-predica- 

2nd, The Organon itself; and 

3rd, The post-predicamentals, or pure followers of 
the Organon (like the Examination and the 
Debate) as the close of the series. 

And no one of the departments would tend to render 
the other departments, or either of them, superfluous. 
The reverse indeed : The one would naturally pave 
the way for the other, or create, by a well-understood 
law, a desire for the perusal of the rest. 


June, 1871. 

*** Tis evident, now, that the Fifth Edition and this Sixth 
Edition are to be regarded as co-existent works, rather than as 
publications successively put forth as candidates for public attention 
and favour. The two editions are, to all intents and purposes, 
-simultaneous productions : the one being for use against Atheists, 
and disbelievers of all sorts ; and the other for the use of all 
Theistic inquirers, desirous to have their own beliefs strengthened 
and confirmed. The Theists will be edified by seeing, from their 
peculiar sources, how truly unimpeachable, in every respect, is 
their faith in the most vital of all truths. The highest and noblest 
portions of the superstructure will be seen to be held to their 
attachments by the most indissoluble ligatures and fastenings; 
while the common foundations of the entire erection are them 
selves iminoveably stable, and eternally secure. 


THE present is the first complete edition of " The 
Argument, a priori" or, the Argument as consist 
ing of Divisions III. and IV., as well as of Divisions 
I. and II. This is, in other words, the Argument 
as embodying the whole of the Moral Attributes, 
from Goodness onwards to Holiness, the apex of 
the construction, as well as containing that preced 
ing portion which may be regarded as the immut 
able foundation and solid basement-story of the 
whole edifice, however high it may be carried. 
For true it is, that hitherto the demonstrations 
for the Moral Attributes (corresponding generally 
with Divisions III. and IV.) have been procurable 
only in separate volumes, though the volumes were 
but small. But to exhibit a brief historical survey 
of things from the commencement : First of all, 
there appeared, as the original demonstration, what 
(barring alterations) is now comprised within the 
limits of Divisions I. and II. No Greater were the 


dimensions of that first edition of the Argument. 
After a period of some length, during which the 
work was, in various ways, much before the public, 

and much too upon its trial in all respects, the 



Propositions (relating to the Happiness and the 
Goodness) represented by the 1st Sub-Division of 
Division III., were added, and came out in the 
Torbanehill edition (1843.) After, again, a much 
longer interval, in which events of moment to the 
fate of the demonstration were proceeding, the 
Relative Moral Attributes, as corresponding with 
the 2nd Sub-Division of Division III., were 
published, in a little volume, by themselves (1865.) 
Lastly, the Complex or Compound Moral Attributes, 
comprehended in Division IV., were, in a minute 
volume, given to the public in the beginning of this 
year (1870.) Such has been the course of events, 
and the progress of the demonstration to consolida 
tion and completion. 

From its very first appearance, the " Argument " 
was doomed to meet with opposition of every kind 
and variety, and from believer and unbeliever alike. 
The opposition, however, from the side of believers 
has become faint indeed. If conceited and obstrep 
erous at first, it is quite hushed and subdued now. 
It used to take the form of objection to the rele 
vancy of the argumentation generally. At the 
present time, the opposition on the part of Theists 
is almost entirely limited to persons who, up to 
this good hour, advance and advocate the superior 
and exclusive claims of the rival a posteriori 
method : these persons being a remnant of the 


anatomical and physiological school of Paley, and 
the Experimentalists, drawn from the various class 
rooms of the Inductive Philosophers. Of proper 
opposition, there is, in fact, but little now-a-days ; 
and where the voice of objectors goes forth, the 
echoes are but feeble, and the sound is remote and 
unheeded. But however the diminished opposition 
proceeding from Theistical quarters stands at this 
present, our view, on this occasion, shall be confined 
within the limits occupied by the Infidel objectors 
and opponents. 

In another quarter, 31 it has been my business to 
record a survey, by epitome, of the operations 
conducted by the opponents of the atheistical class 
against the reasonings employed in the demon 
stration treated of. With a view to the object 
immediately before us, it will suffice to mention, 
that the "Argument" had been no long time in 
existence when it was assailed by an enemy to all 
Theistical ratiocination, of whom it may be truth 
fully said, that, on the side of the Atheists, his 
equal in metaphysical and logical powers, and 
general grasp of his subject, has not since arisen. 
Yet even the celebrated " Antitheos " (for it is of 
him I speak) was obliged to lower his ensign, by 
virtually acknowledging overwhelming defeat at 
his own weapons. After him, a shoal of small fry 
sailed, in pursuit, in the wake of the offensive 

a Debate, referred to below. 


conqueror : but (as was to be expected) the puny 
efforts availed but little, save only to keep up, and 
support at a certain elevation, the interest by that 
time created in the discussion. 

For a dozen, or for perhaps a score, of years 
after Antitheos s day, the Atheists of the East, no 
less than of the West, and of the South as well as 
the North, tried to find a weak spot in the coat-of- 
inail endued by the author of the "Argument": 
but an unprotected joint in the armour became 
obvious to the eye of no atheist, how keenly soever 
he might peer. All the scrutiny was in vain. The 
reader will understand that it is of the " Argu 
ment," as it originally stood (or Divisions I. and 
II.,) that these assertions are made. But the 
original portion is the essential. 

With regard to the succeeding portion, being 
that corresponding with the 2nd Sub-Division of 
Division III. (comprised in the publication of 
18C5;) it has been pronounced, by a not incom 
petent student, to constitute " a course of severe 
reasoning, as strict, indeed, as that of Euclid." 
("Laws of Thought," 1868.) 

In fine, it may safely be prophesied, that, as the 
Atheists have not hitherto been able to agree as to 
any one vulnerable point in the whole demonstra 
tion ; so, they will never be able to lay their 
fingers on a single place where is any radical 
fallacy. The atheist being yet to be born, will 


therefore never be born, who will succeed in 
discovering the defenceless and indefensible spot. 

Should it be objected, that the atheists, until 
comparatively lately, have had to do only with the 
early part of the entire ratiocination ; the reply 
to be made lies ready at hand : the portion in 
question is indubitably the back-bone of the 
structure, the rest being merely educed elonga 
tions of the skeleton, or pure additions to the 
great axis of the vertebral column. Or if we 


sought to be more accurate in the conduct of the 


comparison, the first might be represented by 
the fixed skeleton generally ; the other portion 
being likened unto the flesh and blood, and all 
the outward adornments of the structure, as a 
living organism, in all the glow of high health and 

Finally, in relation to this topic : If, at this time 
of day, atheistical opponents are less able (if diminu 
tion in ability be possible) to refute the reasonings 
of the "Argument" than they were at the first; 
how impossible, how more than hopeless, now, 
would be the adventure to overturn the founda 
tions, or any of the essentials, of this demonstrative 
construction ! The unabashed present Coryphaeus 
of British Atheists has made it to be publicly 
known and most palpable, that he is even more 
unable than was his predecessor, the Champion of 
the Scottish Atheists, to accomplish the feat of 


overturning the reasonings of that demons! ration 
which bars, and completely obstructs, the Athe 
istical highway.* 

If the "Argument" has, in the Atheists, met 
with foes from the beginning, the tables are turned 
when the "Argument" is brought to bear directly 
against the very head-quarters whence the chief 
enemies must proceed. All this is but natural, and 
what might well have been anticipated. A just 
reckoning is sure to dog the steps of the enemies 
of truth sooner or later. In a word, this Fifth 
Edition is specially intended for Atheists, that is, 
for use against Atheists. But this requires a more 
particular explanation. 

There are contained herein passages which mio-ht 
not have been introduced at all, but for the edition 
having a direct and express relation to the case of 
Atheists. For example, we may take the contents 
of the Postulata, and a not unrelated Scholium, 
under the Sub-Proposition attached to Proposition 
iv., Part i., Division I. ; or we might instance in 
the Scholium attached to Proposition L, Part iii., 
of the same Division, places introduced to meet 
the methods adopted by certain ardent, yet hard- 
pushed members of the existing atheistical host. 
And, on the other hand, there are places where 
additional matter might have been supplied, but 
for its utter unfitness for use against aught so crass 

a See second note below. 


and coarse as the current Atheism : of which the 
non-use of the doctrine of Spirituality, introduced 
in the Sub-Scholium under the same Fourth Pro 
position, may be given as a striking illustration. 
That doctrine, confined as it may be said to be 
within the boundaries of the 1st Division, might 
have been used on a much more extensive scale 
than has been actually adopted. 

But farther. Whereas Dr Samuel Clarke wrote 
his justly celebrated Demonstration "more par 
ticularly in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza, and their 
followers "- with a view, in other words, to special 
schools of Atheists, or the special phases of Atheism 
at that era most prevalent ; the present production 
has reference, almost equal reference, to the case of 
Atheists of another description. In truth, while 
this production does most emphatically keep sight 
of the present phases under which Atheism chooses 
to present itself, it is yet adapted and addressed to 
the case of every species of possible Atheism. This 
demonstration is, no doubt, peculiarly applicable to 
the method of arguing followed by the existing race 
of Atheists. There is, of course, a common, or, at 
any rate, a generally adopted road, in which the 
bulk of the Atheists of our day are to be found 
and this demonstration follows them into their fre 
quented high-way. Every instructed man knows, 
that our present Atheists are pure or, rather, 
extremely gross Materialists, as they deny the 


existence of any extension whatever separate from 
Matter : they, however, add to their pure Material 
ism a sort of Hylozoism, or doctrine of life apper 
taining to matter as matter. They hold (somewhat 
after the fashion of those ancients who belonged to 
the school of Strato of Lampsacus), the doctrine of 
the essential life of all Matter : Matter is the 
gcnetrix and matrix of all particular or individual 
things, whether substances or events. 

But our demonstration is also, and equally, 
applicable to the method of Atheists belonging to, 
and claimable by other schools. It is thoroughly 
applicable, for example, to the Atheism which 
(with the doctrine of Democritus and Epicurus, as 
expounded by Lucretius), admits of vacuum, or 
pure space, as a distinct ab-original principle in 
addition to matter, that is, its fundamental atoms, 
or primordial corpuscles. 

Notice must be taken of a certain great difference 
which obtains between the early and the recent 
portions of the demonstration. In the original, 
and, in fact, in the early editions, the Scholia in 
Divisions I. and II. were brief: while the Scholia 
of the latter Divisions (we can hardly say, of the 
later editions) are frequently long, some being 
very much so. The Scholia, indeed, in Divisions 
III. and IV. are long, in relation to the attached 
Demonstrations, as well as compared with the 


earlier Scholia. One reason is easily given : The 
earlier Scholia concern the Being whose Existence 
is in course of being proved ; while the later 
Scholia have much to do with Man and his con 
cerns. In the former case, the simplicity of the 
Great Being treated of seems to transfer itself into 
the argumentation about Him : In the latter case, 
which is man s, the reflection of the entanglements 
and the disorderliness of his affairs seems to be 
diffused and transfused through all the reasonings. 
The truth about the Being of beings, as He is in 
Himself, is simple, and capable of being clearly 
stated in few words. But with Man s entrance on 
the stage, a complicated and confused state of 
affairs is superinduced, and, by comparison, a 
deluge of words (which you may perhaps accept 
as a modest redundancy of language) becomes 
necessary, and requires to be excused. Sometimes 
words pour down upon the reader avalanche-like : 
nor can the torrent be avoided. The difference, 
in fine, is inevitable, since it arises from the nature 
of the case. 

We may adopt another method of bringing out 
the same result, wherein the points of contact with 
the preceding exhibition will be sufficiently 
obvious. In Divisions I. and II. , the great 
substratal Substance is viewed or His Modes are 
viewed as Absolute, as well as Simple. But in 
the subsequent portion of the piece, the Attributes, 


become Moral, are at length directly Relative, and 
they come to be, at last, Complex or Compound. 
Now, tis plain, that the elucidation of the subject 
of Relative and Complex Attributes, can by no 
means be trajected in so unelaborate a way as that 
sufficient for the handling of the Simple and 
Absolute Modes. The very circumstance of the 
relativity necessitates and enforces a more involved, 
intricate, and perplexed method of treatment. 

Another matter, connected with the same topic, 
is worthy of even more consideration. In this 
Argument, the demonstrations themselves are the 
weighty things : all else is, comparatively speak 
ing, quite subordinate and unimportant. If the 
Demonstrations fail if, in truth, any one of the 
main Demonstrations be not infallible, all goes for 
nothing. If they are all infallible, all is right. 
An ordinary Scholium is but an application some 
inference or other drawn from the proof itself: and 
an error in the application of a demonstration 
would by no means invalidate the piece, in the 
way in which a radical flaw in the demonstrative 
part itself would do. 

Pertinent instances might be easily produced to 
illustrate the position regarding the relative 
importance of a demonstration and a scholium, 
when compared with each other, whereby it would 
be very visible that the whole might remain intact 
and perfect although the application in the 


Scholium were allowed to be renounced as invalid, 
while, at the same time, to make an acknow 
ledgment of the illegitimacy of the proof in the 
Demonstration would have the effect of bringing 
down the entire edifice. The demonstration, as a 
whole, would fail at that point. Though all going 
before had been logically proved, and consequently 
were quite valid, yet at that precise point the 
demonstration, alas ! would give way, and break 
down. On the other hand, again, if the proof at 
the place indicated be unassailable, or at any rate 
indestructible, no mighty harm would ensue 
although a succeeding scholium should contain an 
inaccuracy. But the reader can without difficulty 
look up examples for himself ; and it may be taken 
for granted, that no one can fail to see the superior 
weight attributable to the Demonstrations over 


their attached Scholia. A demonstration must be 
irrefragable : a scholium, however, may be faulty in 
deducing a certain inference, without at all damag 
ing the connected proof containing the imagined 
inference sought to be drawn and applied. 

Tis quite true, that all such special questions 
as are treated of in the long Scholia might have been 
left out of our consideration altogether. A demon 
stration, a full and perfect demonstration, of a 
God, would remain, in the absence of all such dis 
cussions. To be particular : Twere quite possible 
to complete the construction of an a priori 


argument containing a reference to the Moral 
Attributes, even the whole of the Moral Attributes, 
without entering upon any discussion of the 
Rewards and the Punishments of the Future 
(the subject of our Scholium in. Prop, iii., as well 
as Scholium in., Proposition iv., both in Division 
III.) But to give the complete go-by to that 
topic, or any such topic, were to omit the 
topic of perhaps the greatest human interest of 
nil in this whole inquiry. To say nothing of 
never-ending blessedness, what subject can vie, 
in true importance, and absorbing interest to 
man, with the subject of the possible eternity 
of mortal anguish in insupportable torments ? 
And, in point of fact, what theological inquiry 
is at present so all-engrossing ? This topic 
has attached to it, in sooth, the very greatest 
human interest of all in this whole enquiry. 
Not, indeed, the inquiry concerning the Being and 
the Attributes, but that more limited one which 
concerns the Moral region of the Attributes. No\v ? 
an a priori argument which omitted topics of the 
deepest interest would be of too dry a character 
to invite the attention of the most of mankind. 
There might be all the essential fixities of the 
structure : each individual permanent of a perfect 
skeleton might be present : But, after all, the bones 
would be dry bones. " Rather the skeleton of an 
argument," to use the words of a certain Professor 


of Moral Philosophy, " than anything entitled to 
be considered as a full and finished perform- 


ance. a 

The following passages are taken from the 
" Advertisement " prefixed to the publication of 
1865, and from the "Preface to Division IV.;" 
with but few, and unimportant variations. There 
will be perceived, ho\vever, several places which 
touch on ground traversed already. But the 
repetition will not be found to be to any consider 
able extent. 

An attempt to demonstrate, in the strictest way, 
the Moral Attributes of God unlike attempts to 
demonstrate generally the Being and the Attributes 
had never been made before, or, if made, had 
certainly failed, since, of a surety, no a priori 
proof of those attributes is familiar to the world. 
The attempt was, therefore, a most difficult one. 

It is true, that Dr Samuel Clarke, in the 12th 
and last of the Propositions of his celebrated 
"Demonstration," endeavours to reach the Moral 
Attributes : but the great Rector of St. James s 
deals with the " Infinite Goodness, Justice, and 
Truth, and all other Moral Perfections," in that 

a The words quoted in the text, are from the Review of the 
original "Argument, a priori," by the late Professor Patrick C. 
Macdougall, of the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of 
Edinburgh. The Review was published in the Professor s 
permanent volume of his " Papers on Literary and Philosophical 
Subjects," 1852. 


one Proposition, and, in a great measure, in 
cumulo. The author of the Demonstration does 
not treat these Moral Attributes as I have done, 
namely, by making each of them, one by one, in a 
proper order, the subject of a distinct cl priori 
proof, in a Proposition devoted to itself. What 
that famous author did was, therefore, quite 
different from that which I have now attempted. 
My attempt was of a vastly more difficult nature. 

Besides, Dr. Clarke never once essays to intro 
duce such an attribute as Lore. An attribute 
Scripturally revealed, and thought to be so 
peculiarly the deliverance of Revelation that no 
endeavour had been made to attach it to Natural 
Religion by any of its modes of proof. 

In fact, with reference to, not only Love, but 
Moral Purity, a main ingredient and element in 
Universal Holiness, not one of these Attributes 
was ever brought into the field of view by that 
great author in his famous Demonstration. 

The preceding observations are for the most 
part from the Advertisement already spoken of. 
The alterations are few, but it must be confessed 
that there is an addition. 

The following, again, is from the Preface to 
Division IV. The reader will perceive, no doubt, 
that there is some iteration to be encountered. 
But it is hoped that the offences of this kind will 


be of a nature easily pardonable, and really deserv 
ing to be condoned. 

As is patent, this piece is but a continuation of a 
previous work ; in truth, of previous works. Tis 
also not unentitled to be regarded in the light of 
last ivords, since, with the demonstration of the 
cumulative attribute of Holiness, a veritable 
culminating point is attained. 

The production of which a portion is now pre 
sented to the reader, is not the first attempt at 
a priori argumentation on the peculiar subject, 
which the world has seen. By no means : there 
have been many endeavours of the kind. But one 
thing may be boasted of by the present author, and 
tis this, that, while Dr Samuel Clarke (who 
possibly was not singular) aimed at demonstrating 
the Moral Attributes, in, however, a certain brief 
and agglomerating manner ; among those he 
specified, even in his cursory way, were no such 
Attributes as "Love," and "Moral Purity," and 
" Holiness." This production, therefore, is peculiar, 
inasmuch as it has distinct demonstrations for 
Moral Attributes which no previous author ever 
thought, or even dreamed, of proving in a 
demonstrative manner : while, with regard to other 
Attributes, there are here full and separate proofs, 
where before there were only brief allusions, in the 
course of a general proof, by no means lengthy as 


;i whole. In short, in this our work are to be met 
with tilings unattempted yet in prose. 

This may not be the very best place to magnify 
the importance of a work of this kind, on supposi 
tion (as generally conceded, or contended for, by 
the professional theologians) that the attempt at 
irrefragable proof has been successful. Still, it 
may, not inappositely, be noticed, that our age is 
unquestionably infidel, and even atheistical, in 
tendency. The highest philosophy, and the 
exactest science, alike, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the lowest literature, and the loosest 
pseudo science, are equally set against any true 
recognition of a Righteous Moral Governor of the 
world, the Supreme Source of all human lights, 
and the Final Cause to which all mundane things 
must infallibly tend, whether men like or no. 
Again, the whole of Religion, speculative and 
practical, rests on the one foundation of Theism ; 
and the sole root-doctrine of Theism is, There is a 
God. If this doctrine be satisfactorily established, 
and be firmly settled in men s minds, the solid basis 
of Religion is laid, and the superstructure may be 
advanced to completion. But if the doctrine be 
insecurely made out, or be generally deemed to be 
so, the interests of Religion at large cannot be on a 
safe and proper footing, and the ranks of Infidelity 
may be expected to increase still more rapidly, in 
accordance with the spirit of the times. The days on 


which we are fallen are unquestionably evil, and 
evil they will continue to be, and they will be 
increasingly evil, unless men can point to some 
proof which believers shall hail as a true demon 
stration of the truth of their faith ; while the 
unbelievers seek in vain to demolish the edifice 
which, rising step by step, all rests upon a founda 
tion which cannot be shaken far less, removed, or 
to the slightest extent displaced. 

These remarks apply, or their spirit applies, with 
double force to a strictly logical proof of the Moral 
Attributes. A Supreme Being such as is imagined 
by some Deists, is one thing : A Supreme Judge 
who, executing righteous judgment, will assuredly 
reward the good, and punish the evil, exactly 
according to merits and demerits ; this is quite a 
different existence, and one which the immoral man 
cannot but be most averse to in his inmost heart. 

Neither is this the very best place to magnify 
our demonstration as a relative thing : If our 
method be good in itself, tis perfectly obvious that 
it is vastly superior to the rival method. To 
magnify the virtues of a strict deductive proof, by 
vindicating its vast superiority over the claims of 
the other plan, even allowing this latter to be all 
that its patrons can legitimately claim it to be ; is 
not the proper business on this occasion. Nor are 
we in search of a contrivance by which, if we do 


not perceive a lawful road, we can at least make a 
cimning though arduous cutting through the 

unsuitable and, indeed, intractable middle region. 


No : the superiority of the one method to the 
other, is no such occult matter, nor so difficult to 
understand, that we need to force the topic 
unseasonably on attention. Suffice it to say at 
this present, that there is evidently a fast-growing 
disposition on the part of theologians to desert the 
mere a posteriori way, and come over to the 
dialectical domain where the a priori method is 
regnant. None know so well how unfit the 
a posteriori argument is for the exigencies of these 
days in which we live, as do those who have tried 
to use the method in encounters with skilled 
atheists. The atheists, indeed, contemn the method 
now in view, to the very point of holding it in 
contempt, as a weapon calculated to affect their 
position : and, of a truth, the argument derived 
from the beautiful and majestic works of Nature 
draws none of its glory from its adaptation to the 
case of atheists. On the other hand, according to 
the admissions of the atheists themselves, they 
have not, up to the present moment, been able to 
bring forward a single good argument in opposition 
to "The Argument, a priori:" that is, there is no 
common consent, nor any approach to a common 
consent, among our atheists as to any one good 
objection valid against the demonstration in ques- 


tion. So far from any valid objection, of universal 
acceptation, having been worked out, there is the 
strongest evidence that no one objection is recog 
nised save by its own creator, and elaborator, 
and advocate. Having endeavoured, for more 
than a score of years, to adduce undoubtedly 
valid objections against that demonstration, the 
atheists have, in their latest efforts, gone to 
lop-o-erheads with each other about which of 


them has failed most egregiously. Who has 
done most harm to the common atheistic cause 
by the ill-directed blows against the impreg 
nable rock-built citadel ? this is the bitter com 
plain t. a 

One thing may be apt to strike the student of 
the present performance ; and, in sooth, it has 
forcibly struck its author. The conclusions arrived 
at by virtue of the most rigid and rigorous reason 
ings, are in wonderfully exact accordance with the 
intuitional discoveries of the Prophets of the East, 
made thousands of years ago. The seers of the 
segregate Hebrew people uttered truths appertaining 
to the higher planes of the Moral, where the Moral 
and the Religious are blended together in one, such 
as no Gentile philosopher, not even a Plato, nor an 
Aristotle, nor a Zeno, ever found out, or even so 
much as approached. Whether those surpassing 

a See the "Debate" between Iconoclast and W. H. G., (1869), and, 
specially, the Address prefixed to Division II. thereof. 


ethical and theistical discoveries were made by 
reason of a supernatural elevation of the spirit into 
a sphere transcending the ordinary human sphere, 
or by reason of more purely human intuitions, in 
open vision : this is not a point for us, and for this 
place. Those intuitions were of the grandest 
nature, however they were come by. But our point 
is this, that, derive the discoveries of the Israelitish 
and Jewish Seers from what source you choose to 
fix on, the discovered truths are mighty facts, and 
are in astonishingly close conformity with the 
conclusions reached by our perfectly independent 
a jiriori reasonings. The truths promulgated by 
the " prophets old " of that Shemitic people, and 
the truths attained by so much labour of brain, and 
cast abroad in the present hour, ARE ONE. Japliel 
can do no better yet than dwell in the abodes of 
Sham : and well will it be, if there be full content 
ment with an ordinance which there is no passing 

Finally, in an advertisement prefixed to the 
Fourth, or Russet, Edition of " The Necessary 
Existence of God," (1863), it was said : " I wish 
" I could mention, here, (or any where,) that I am 
" quite ready to publish the full results of my much 
"pondering on the proper ultimate form for the 
" strict a priori determination of the great Moral 
Attributes of JUSTICE, or RIGHTEOUSNESS, and of 


" HOLINESS. " a The strong desire, imparted to the 
public in that expressed wish, synchronising with a 
wail of the heart, (for there was^ undoubtedly such,) 
has, at length, been accomplished. The great 
Moral Attribute of Justice was demonstrated, and 
the demonstration was published, several years 
ago ; and now the great, and, if possible, greater 
Attribute of Holiness is demonstrated too. After 
the aspirations, and heart-yearnings, of so many 
weary waiting years, the years have fulfilled their 
course : the star of hope has risen above the 
horizon, and, after a happy ascension, it is to be 
beheld now in the zenith. There is no question of 
any arguing with any atheist here, and most 
unfeiguedly do I say, 

Too Qeci) <Joct. 

W. H. G. 

September, 1870. 

a The wish of the text had been transferred from the Torbanehill 
edition, where, however, the aspiration might have had no very 
articulate expression. Sub-Auditur, it was heard as an indispensable 
ground-tone. By no means the first time wishes and expressions to 
the same effect had found vent.